

AFGHAN DIASPORA IN EUROPE

MAPPING ENGAGEMENT IN DENMARK, GERMANY,
SWEDEN, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM



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DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL'S DIASPORA PROGRAMME

The Diaspora programme is part of DRC's Civil Society Engagement Unit, and focuses on facilitating, supporting, and enhancing the role of diasporas as effective agents of humanitarian assistance, recovery and development.

DRC is a private, independent, humanitarian organization working in more than 35 countries to protect refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) against persecution and to promote durable solutions to the problems of forced displacement based on humanitarian principles and human rights.

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ASIA DISPLACEMENT SOLUTIONS PLATFORM

The Asia Displacement Solutions Platform is a joint initiative launched by the Danish Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, Norwegian Refugee Council and Relief International, which aims to contribute to the development of solutions for populations affected by displacement in the region. Drawing upon its members' operational presence throughout Asia, and its extensive advocacy networks in Europe and North America, ADSP engages in evidence-based advocacy initiatives to support improved outcomes for displacement-affected communities. As implementing agencies, ADSP members work closely with displaced populations and the communities that host them and are therefore able to contribute a distinctive, field-led, perspective to policy and advocacy processes which can sometimes be removed from the realities on the ground and concerns of those living with, and in, displacement.

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THE MAASTRICHT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE/UNU-MERIT

The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) of Maastricht University is integrated within the United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT). UNU-MERIT is a research and training institute of the United Nations University and Maastricht University, based in the Netherlands. MGSoG/UNU-MERIT is leading the way in operational, policy-relevant studies and evaluations with ample experience conducting data collection and analysis around the world.

Website: <https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/research/maastricht-graduate-school-governance>

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

STUDY BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Afghans are currently amongst the top nationalities for asylum applications globally (UNHCR, 2019a). Driven by decades-long ongoing conflict and insecurity, **large-scale migratory trends are not new**; Afghanistan has traditionally been considered an 'emigration country' (Weinar, 2014). Given the scale of the Afghan diaspora, migration stakeholders are increasingly interested in engaging the diaspora due to the importance of diaspora networks in providing information and support to new arrivals, the importance of remittances in economic development, and the two-way transfer of knowledge and skills between destination and country of origin. In this context, the Danish Refugee Council's Diaspora Programme (DRC-DP) has commissioned the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) /United Nations University-MERIT in the Netherlands to conduct a study of Afghan diaspora and diaspora organizations **in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom**. This study has the specific objectives of **mapping Afghan Disapora Organizations (ADOs), providing a capacity and needs assessment of the ADOs, and developing recommendations for further ADOs engagement**. This report is based on 4 ADO consultation meetings and 103 interviews conducted with Afghan diaspora (individuals and members of ADOs), and other relevant stakeholders, in addition to a desk-based literature review and mapping exercise.

THE AFGHAN DIASPORA

- The Afghan diaspora has consistently been found to be a **heterogeneous group** due to factors such as ethnicity, political affiliations or views, time of arrival, generation, and religious beliefs.¹
- **In Denmark** the divisiveness of the Afghan diaspora along lines of ethnicity, political views, and generation was raised repeatedly. Specifically, Afghans that arrived in the 1970s and 1980s have maintained Afghan culture, while later waves see themselves as broadly belonging to the Afghan community, but are more concerned with work, education, and being active in the larger Danish society. Some younger Afghans in Denmark are perceived to be well-connected with the Afghan diaspora outside of Denmark.
- **Germany** hosts the largest Afghan diaspora population in Europe, with significant influx occurring in the last five years. There are **significant socio-economic distinctions** between arrivals in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and recent arrivals. In general, the diaspora is focused on prioritizing integration with German society rather than within the diaspora. Connections between the diaspora in Germany are highly dependent on familial ties, without a broader sense of community.
- **Sweden** experiences more interaction between diverse diaspora sub-groups due to the relatively small size of the community; however, there are clear **distinctions between earlier arrivals and recent arrivals**, with the latter being primarily Hazaras who migrated from Iran and who have less direct connection with Afghanistan. **Unaccompanied minors (UAMs) comprise nearly 50 percent of recent arrivals** and may resist integration as a means to reduce their loneliness and isolation.
- **The UK** hosts a major Afghan diaspora population in Europe. The Afghan diaspora in the UK is **significant and diverse**, though Pashtuns are overrepresented proportionately. The older generation has not been as willing to integrate as younger diaspora members and that **cultural clashes are common within Afghan** diaspora in regard to social norms.

1 Religious beliefs or affiliations were not found to be a major factor in the Afghan community divisions.

OVERVIEW OF AFGHAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS (ADOS)

- A total of **462 organizations** have been established by the Afghan diaspora: Denmark (96), Germany (129), Sweden (133), and the UK (104), with the **majority founded between 2010 and 2016** following large influxes of Afghan migrants after the withdrawal of most NATO troops from Afghanistan.
- **The number of ADOs per country does not correlate with the size of the Afghan diaspora:** Germany has a diaspora population approximately five times that of Sweden, but fewer ADOs.
- The membership composition of ADOs is generally mixed in terms of age, gender, education level, size, and ethnicity – though all tend to have open membership policies, many experience ethnic and generational divisions.
- **Supporting integration of Afghans into host communities is more prominent in Sweden (74%) and the UK (42%)** as opposed to Germany (22%) and Denmark (17%). Diaspora members remain connected to events in Afghanistan, though there is mixed engagement with humanitarian and development activities. **German and British ADOs are significantly more engaged in Afghanistan (63% and 40%, respectively)** when compared to Swedish (7%) and Danish (19%) organizations.
- The areas and the level of engagement by ADOs vary among the focus countries due to needs, opportunities, and the characteristics of the diaspora population.
- ADOs have **diverse but unstable sources of funding** that are often insufficient to meet needs. Based on information, sources of funding include: donations (17%), grants (7%), membership fees (5%), sales (1.7%), personal funds (0.8%), and loans (0.6%).
- ADOs mostly form transnational ties based on ethnicity rather than thematic areas or objectives. The fractured landscape has limited the formation of national umbrella organizations. **None of the countries studied have an inclusive coordinating body organization.**

OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGES AND NEEDS

- **Diaspora division.** Ethnic, political affiliations or views, time of arrival, generational, and religious beliefs factors limit membership, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination amongst ADOs.
- **Capacity and access to funding.** Proposal writing and project cycle management skills are limited, which have further limited funding opportunities. The voluntary nature of the work means organizations struggle to have adequate time dedicated to operational issues and are unable to attract technical staff.
- **Engagement in Afghanistan.** The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, a reluctance to work with the Afghan government, and a lack of proper knowledge and awareness about the development policies in Afghanistan have reduced ADOs engagement. Also, ADOs without sufficient local connections face difficulties implementing projects, particularly in the rural areas.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Support social cohesion activities within the diaspora.** Activities that engage multiple ethnic groups, generations and genders over a common purpose will support a foundation for inter-ADO collaboration.

- **Encourage the participation of second generation and young diaspora members.** Second generation and youth were noted to be more likely to disregard traditional social and cultural divisions and offer an energized base for collaboration.
- **Build on pre-existing umbrella organization efforts.** Collaboration should start small and have realistic objectives. It is essential this is complimented by operational funding.
- **Support capacity development.** Direct outreach and mentorship with local non-diaspora organizations can be facilitated both in-country and in Afghanistan.
- **Increase access to integration support.** Municipalities and foundations should accept referrals from ADOs and provide funding opportunities for integration initiatives.
- **Advocate for definitional and data consistency in EU countries regarding the diaspora.** Cohesive diaspora engagement must be based on consistent data to properly assess needs, geography, and scale of diaspora networks.



1. INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan is a key country of origin of asylum seekers globally (UNHCR, 2019a), ranking second only to Venezuela (UNHCR, 2019b). Following global trends, Afghans are one of the most common asylum-seeking nationalities in Europe² and originating an increasing number of unaccompanied minor (UAM) migrants³ (Eurostat, 2017; Eurostat, 2018). However, movement of Afghans to Europe is not new: decades of migration (e.g., asylum, family reunification and education) have resulted in a diverse and sizeable diaspora population.⁴ Currently, the size of Afghan diaspora is six and a half million persons – equivalent to 18.4% of the Afghan total population (Die Bundesregierung, 2018). The diaspora is dynamic; their improved access to higher education, better connectivity, and their capacity to send financial and social remittances⁵ have all contributed to interest in leveraging the diaspora for durable solutions.⁶ Furthermore, there is widespread recognition of the importance of diaspora networks in providing support would-be and recently arrived migrants.

The Danish Refugee Council's (DRC) Diaspora Programme seeks to engage the diaspora in Europe to promote local humanitarian assistance, contribute to development in countries of origin, and improve coordination, with the overall objective of seeking durable solutions for displaced people and those at risk of displacement. In recognition of the importance of the Afghan diaspora, DRC is seeking to improve engagement with relevant Afghan Diaspora Organizations (ADOs) across Europe. Specifically, the Danish Refugee Council's Diaspora Programme has commissioned the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSog) /United Nations University-MERIT in the Netherlands to conduct a study of Afghan diaspora and diaspora organizations **in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom** to support improved coordination and collaboration with the Afghan diaspora.

1.1. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The Afghan diaspora mapping study has three specific objectives:

- Develop a comprehensive mapping and overview of the Afghan diaspora and ADOs in each of the four focus countries (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom);
- Provide a capacity and needs assessment of ADOs, and;
- Present specific recommendations for DRC regarding context-appropriate and conflict-sensitive ways of engaging with key individuals and entities of the diaspora, in particular for humanitarian and development work as well as contribution to durable solutions.

In order to respond to these objectives, four key guiding questions have been developed (Table 1).

2 Nearly 41,000 Afghans applied for first time asylum in 2018 (Eurostat, 2019)

3 An unaccompanied minor is any migrant under the age of 18 who is not accompanied by another individual over the age of 18. Minors may be considered 'separated' should they be accompanied by a caregiver over the age of 18 who is not their parents. While unaccompanied children are typically accounted for separately from child victims of trafficking, long over-land routes mean that minors (as well as adult migrants) may travel with varying levels of consent throughout their journey.

4 There is no universally accepted definition for the term diaspora (See section: 1.2). Thus, for the sake of this study we use the definition by DRC: "Diaspora refers to migrants, refugees and their descendants who live outside their country of birth or ancestry yet still maintain emotional and material ties to that country." (DRC, n.d.).

5 In 2018 remittances sent (USD 384 million) to Afghanistan were estimated to 1.9% of the share of the GDP of Afghanistan (World Bank, 2019).

6 Based on the feedback from several respondents.

TABLE 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Guiding Questions	Sub-Questions
How the Afghan diaspora is characterized in the focus countries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the migration patterns and history of Afghan emigrants, and what are their demographic profiles? • In what ways has the engagement of the diaspora evolved over time (e.g. through home- and/or host-country factors and policies)?
What ADOs exist in the focus countries, and what are their aims and activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What networks, organizations, associations, and initiatives of the Afghan diaspora exist? • What kinds of cooperation exist among different groups within the Afghan diaspora? • What are the structures, aims, and activities of the organizations? • What lines of conflict may exist between organizations and with reference to Afghanistan?
In what ways does the Afghan diaspora contribute to humanitarian aid or relief and development in the origin country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What forms of engagement and involvement do diaspora organizations pursue with Afghanistan, and what factors influence these initiatives? • What are the prospects of organizations to contribute to relief and development of Afghanistan and in the wider region of origin? • What are challenges the diaspora organizations face in their engagement?
What are the potentials for constructive cooperation between the Afghan diaspora and the DRC's Diaspora Programme?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the needs and goals of the Afghan diaspora and ADOs in the respective focus countries? • How can these goals be connected for engagement with the DRC's Diaspora Programme? • What are the perspectives, aspirations, and motivations of the Afghan diaspora regarding integration, potential voluntary return and reintegration, as well as development and humanitarian activities?

1.1.1. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

This report is divided into five sections. First, Section 1 outlines brief introduction, research objectives and questions, concept of diaspora for the study by outlining current understanding of diaspora mobilization, and displacement and migration in the Afghan context. This provides the basis for the study methodology in Section 2. Section 3 provides an overview of the Afghan Diaspora mobilization in selected residence countries, focusing on providing an overview of the specific diaspora context in each county as well as the organizational landscape of ADOs and challenges limiting their operations. Finally, Sections 4 and 5 provide conclusions and recommendations, respectively. This report is supported by several annexes, including a glossary of terms, a list of ADOs identified, and interview guide.

1.2. CONCEPT OF DIASPORAS

Traditionally, the term ‘diaspora’ has served as a broad term to refer to immigrant populations, displaced communities, ethnic minorities, and transnational social formations (Brubaker, 2005; Sökefeld, 2006). In this regard, diaspora may be defined as **“any population that is considered “deterritorialized” or “transnational” – that is, which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states, or indeed, span the globe”** (Vertovec, 1997, p. 277). It implies a dispersion from the home country, while maintaining connections with the home country (Cohen, 2002) by preserving the distinctive ‘home’ identity abroad (Brubaker, 1998). In some cases, diaspora populations may experience troubled relationship or tensions with the host society and the eventual development of return movement (see, among others, Hall, 1990; Safran, 1991; Gilroy, 1993; Van Hear, 1998, 2014).

This study adopts a transnational social movement approach to analyze the opportunities, structures, and practices that enable the mobilization of the Afghan diaspora. Specifically, Sökefeld (2006) argues that diaspora formation depends on the mobilizing practices within its network and on the individual members’ push for collective action. As such, diasporas are reliant on a global and local framework of social structures from which they can expand, frame their cause, and monitor the relations between origin and host countries (see also Adamson, 2012; Koinova, 2011, 2014). Diaspora formation and engagement can take place both informally and formally to channel collective action, engagement, and mobilization. In this regard, **diaspora organizations are crucial components of collective action as they form through organic self-mobilization and represent joint interests.** However, the role of diaspora organizations should be considered critically.

Though often acting to represent the diaspora group as a whole, **organizations can be made up of a small elite that mobilizes in the name of the diaspora** (Marinova, 2017; Baser, 2014; Portes, Escobar, & Arana, 2008; Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003). Importantly, Danström et al. (2015) also detail that “the term ‘diaspora’ can be criticized for assuming belonging to and responsibility towards an imagined homeland with the implication that other kinds of practices and senses of belonging are ignored, for instance inclusion in the country of residence” (p. 70). Considering these implications, diaspora engagement may occur in three spheres: (1) the private sphere, which includes the household and the extended family with strong channels and sustained commitment; (2) the known community, which includes individuals known and known of in community spaces (e.g., schools, neighborhoods, work environments); and, (3) the public sphere, which requires significant mobilization in order to be sustained (Fischer, 2018). The private sphere is commonly acknowledged to engage through remittances and the participation in life events, while the public sphere includes membership in political parties and involvement in demonstrations (Fischer, 2018; Van Hear & Cohen, 2016; Van Hear, 2014).

It is also important to note that **diaspora engagement is highly heterogeneous and often reflects the diversity of diaspora themselves.** Members of the same diaspora often face different social, economic, and political conditions in a host country and represent diverse socio-economic, political, and cultural backgrounds in the country of origin. These diverse factors influence the aims, aspirations, and activities of each sub-diaspora community and may influence the viability of a cohesive nationality-based diaspora community (Van Hear & Cohen, 2016; Shain & Barth, 2003; Al-Ali, Black, & Koser, 2001). Moreover, the capacity to become involved in larger issues may be limited for some members of a diaspora due to practical concerns of managing daily life and integration into the host population, despite a potential desire to be actively engaged. In this regard, **this study sees diaspora as an active, complex, and dynamic grouping that consists of various interests, agendas, and degrees of organization.**⁷ Practically, this means that the Afghan diaspora reflects divisions based on familial characteristics, socio-economic backgrounds, political affiliations, and ethnicity (Fischer, 2015) – ultimately influencing the approach to engagement and the feasibility of certain forms of united action. Despite the challenges to addressing

7 As such, the findings of this study cannot be entirely representative of the Afghan diaspora in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom

cohesive action amongst a heterogeneous diaspora, diaspora members and organizations are an important entry point for those interested in supporting new arrivals. This includes social and economic integration as well as practical support and service provision in the host countries (Nimkar, et. al., 2018). Moreover, diaspora are critical partners for durable solutions (See: DRC, 2017), and they are agents of development as they send remittances, and transferring knowledge and skills to their countries of origin (Flores & Malik, 2015).

1.3. AFGHAN EMIGRATION CONTEXT

Four decades of continual armed conflict have sustained protracted refugee and migration flows from Afghanistan, with fluctuations that closely follow critical political events. The following section outlines key trends in migration during this period to set the context for understanding diversity within the Afghan diaspora in Europe.

The overthrow of Mohammad Daoud Khan's government in 1978 and the successive invasion by the Soviet Union in the end of 1979 created the first large migratory movements out of Afghanistan (Jazayery, 2002), resulting in more than 6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran by 1990 (UNHCR, 2000). After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's troops in 1989 and the fall of the Najibullah government⁸ in 1992, the Mujahideen took over the government in Kabul (Jazayery, 2002) in a period marked by ethnic-driven civil war in Afghanistan from 1992 until 1994 but also a period of large-scale returns (Marsden, 1999). This period was followed by the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in 1996 (Jazayery, 2002). In 2001, an invasion under a US-led coalition resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime (Bree, 2008). According to İçduygu and Karadağ (2018), an immediate international concern during this period was to stabilize the country and repatriate the refugee population via peacekeeping efforts; however, the invasion has instead led to a longstanding insurgent war and conflict-related civilian casualties in Afghanistan have increased significantly in the last ten years (UNAMA, 2019). The deteriorating security situation, particularly following the withdrawal of most NATO troops in 2014 has declined the economic growth (Haque et al., 2018). Furthermore, it has eroded basic human rights, limited opportunities for education and healthcare, and reduced freedom of movement. Deteriorating living conditions were contrasted with the possibility of seeking asylum in countries that offer stability, job opportunities, as well as education and training programmes, especially in Germany, when the country announced an open-door refugee policy in 2015 (Personal interviews, June 2018 – July 2019).

The successive waves of conflict and displacement and the evolving trends in the age of migrants has contributed to a diverse Afghan diaspora in Europe and is reflected in countries reviewed in this study (Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK). **Heterogeneous diaspora groups based on ethnicity, political affiliations or views, time of arrival, generation, and religious beliefs** do exist in the focus countries (Personal interviews, June 2018 - July 2019). Yet, the diaspora is critical in providing information, practical and moral support to new arrivals and also a source of information and remittances for those remaining in Afghanistan (Nimkar, et al., 2018). Despite the importance of the Afghan diaspora, there are relatively **few concrete policies in Afghanistan or in the EU focusing on engagement of the diaspora**. The Afghan government is currently drafting the Afghan National Diaspora Engagement Policy (ANDEP), supported by the IOM Development Fund. However, there is currently no common policy amongst the multiple Afghan ministries engaging with different aspects of migration and Afghans abroad.⁹ A variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements signed between Afghanistan and diaspora hosting-

8 Dr Najibullah was the President of Afghanistan from 1987 to 1992.

9 The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) is responsible for the administration and management of overseas employment of Afghan workers; the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) concerns issues related to (returned) refugees, reintegration, and IDPs management; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) focuses on bilateral and multilateral relations with migrant host countries. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) is responsible for issuing legal documents such as passports and visas as well as handling the prevention of irregular migration.

countries for Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR)¹⁰ of migrants (Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation [MoRR], n.d.; Amnesty International, 2017). Returnees receive a small reintegration package – typically cash or a combination of cash (See: UNHCR, 2012).¹¹ The EU and Afghanistan have also negotiated the **Joint Way Forward (JWF)** which outlines the need for cooperation in preventing irregular migration to Europe and ensuring standards for returns.¹²

At the EU level, the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (2017) establishes a legal framework for EU-Afghanistan cooperation (EEAS, 2017a). The agreement aims to underline the EU's support towards developmental projects contributing to Afghanistan's Decade of Transformation (2015-2024) policies and outlines the legal basis for the EU Strategy on Afghanistan (EEAS, 2017b). The EU Strategy on Afghanistan focuses on four priority areas: 1) promoting peace, stability and regional security; 2) strengthening democracy, human rights and the rule of law; 3) the empowerment of women and good governance; and, 4) support of human and economic development as well as addressing migration related challenges (EEAS, 2017b). However, these programmes do not directly target the diaspora and, taken together, Afghanistan, and the EU member states are limited in engagement with the diaspora outside of migration reduction and returns.

10 The AVR programmes are fairly controversial (e.g., see: Guillaume & Majidi, 2018; Mixed Migration Centre, 2019; ECRE, 2017).

11 Agreements formally exist with Pakistan, Australia, and Turkey. Several EU states hold Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) (France, UK, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Australia) or Joint Declarations (Finland, Germany and Sweden) (See: Amnesty International, 2017).

12 There are many critics to the JWF, who see it as a mechanism for placing undue pressure on Afghans migrants and would-be migrants (See: Amnesty International, 2017).

2. METHODOLOGY

In order to address the specific objectives and research questions identified in Section 1, this research was conducted in four phases: literature review, mapping, semi-structured interviews, and consultation meetings in the focus countries.

Literature Review: The literature review was conducted on the concept of diaspora, emigration history, and characteristics of Afghan diaspora in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. Secondary data were collected from academic journals and grey literature reports. Statistical data was collected from Danish, Germany, Swedish, and British institutions and reviewed to provide an overview and comparison of the demographic characteristics of the Afghan immigrant population in each of the focus countries. Due to variation in the definition of immigrant populations, data is not comparable across the focus countries.

Mapping: A mapping exercise to identify ADOs was conducted in all focus countries. For inclusion in the mapping exercise, diaspora organizations must be founded and/or managed by Afghan diaspora members and must be based locally in one or more of the selected study countries. This also included umbrella organizations/networks/councils founded or managed by the Afghan diaspora. Researchers conducted online searches but also employed a network of engaged individuals (e.g., academics, reporters, activists, religious figures/leaders, researchers, entrepreneurs, international organizations/NGOs, and donors) to support identification and referral. A search of the state organization registers in each country (See: Appendix C) was conducted using a range of relevant keywords in German, English, Danish, Dari/Farsi, Pashto, and Swedish.¹³ After the identification of key contacts through the initial mapping, snowball sampling and extended desk research were used to identify additional contacts. Contacts were excluded in cases of irrelevance (e.g., not having members from the Afghan diaspora) and/or missing contact information (e.g., phone, physical/mailling address, email address, web presence, and social media page). A total of 462 ADOs were identified in Denmark (96), Germany (129), Sweden (133), and the UK (104). The mapping included information about the aims, activities, year of establishment of the ADOs, source of funding, geographical locations, and field of work. Most of the information was obtained from the ADO websites or social media pages.¹⁴ The field of work for the ADOs are divided generally into nine categories based on their activities. However, there were also ADOs who are working in more than one field.

Semi-structured and in-depth Interviews: A total of 103 interviews were conducted with Afghan diaspora (individuals and members of the ADOs) and other relevant stakeholders¹⁵, including non-diaspora organizations.¹⁶ Of the 103 interviews, eight were conducted as a follow up with persons already interviewed. Interviews were conducted between June 2018 and July of 2019 in English, Dari/Farsi, Pashto, German, and Swedish in-person or over telephone, Skype, WhatsApp, or Viber. Interviews were recorded when consent was granted by the interviewee. To ensure in-depth analyses of the interview data, all recorded interviews were transcribed using f4transkript transcription software and thematically analyzed by means of inductive content analysis using NVivo coding software. The interview guide has been included as Appendix B.

13 Some of the keywords used included: Afghan, Afghanistan, afghanische, afghanischer, afghanisches, afghanisch, afghanske, afghansk, afghanska, Hazaras, Pashtuns/Pashtons, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Aimaq, Pashto, Dari, Afghan Sikhs, and Nooristanis.

14 All information regarding the organizations covered in this report, primarily reported in the country sections under 'Organizational landscape' has been compiled based on the website of the organization, social media page and supplemented by interview data.

15 Stakeholders include: academics, reporters, activists, religious figures/leaders, entrepreneurs, researchers, international organizations/NGOs & donors. In addition, information was also obtained informally from DRC staff members in order to get an overview of DRC's Diaspora Programme. The section 'Subjective view of the diaspora' in each country chapter is based on perceptions expressed by the respondents.

16 Non-diaspora organizations include organizations which were not set up by Afghan diaspora members, but they had or not Afghan diaspora as employees. They are major players either in the area of development and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan or some of them addressing the needs of Afghans in residence countries. They have also much access to funding.

Consultation Meetings: In addition to the interviews, consultation meetings with ADOs were held in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The meetings were hosted by DRC in September and October of 2018. A total of 33 Afghans participated in the consultation meetings (See: Appendix C). The objectives were: to identify the main challenges Afghan diaspora organizations are facing in their engagement in support of displaced Afghans in Europe and in Afghanistan. To develop solutions to overcome the most important challenges and identify the type and nature of external support that they would require. Overall, the mapping, the participants in the consultation meetings and in the interviews conducted for this study is not representative of all Afghan diaspora and ADOs from the focus countries.




3. AFGHAN DIASPORA MOBILIZATION IN SELECTED RESIDENCE COUNTRIES

3.1. DENMARK

3.1.1. BACKGROUND

Over the last ten years, the Afghan diaspora population (immigrants¹⁷ and descendants¹⁸) in Denmark has grown steadily.¹⁹ Though Denmark is not a primary residence country for Afghans abroad, a sizeable population of 18,511 Afghans reside in the country (Figure 1). Approximately 35% of total Afghan population in Denmark were between the ages of 20-34, representing a very young population. The statistics on descendants suggest that the bulk of the Danish-born Afghans are under the age of 15 (Statistics Denmark, 2018a).

FIGURE 1: GROWTH OF AFGHAN POPULATION IN DENMARK, 2008-2018



Source: Statistics Denmark, 2018a

17 “An immigrant is defined as a person born abroad whose parents are both (or one of them if there is no available information on the other parent) foreign citizens or were both born abroad. If there is no available information on either of the parents and the person was born abroad, the person is also defined as an immigrant” (Statistics Denmark, 2017).
 18 “A descendant is defined as a person born in Denmark whose parents (or one of them if there is no available information on the other parent) are either immigrants or descendants with foreign citizenship. If there is no available information on either of the parents and the person in question is a foreign citizen, the person is also defined as a descendant” (Statistics Denmark, 2017)
 19 Statistics Denmark (2018a) does not provide information on Afghans in Denmark prior to 2008.

Between 2015 and 2017, 2,408 Afghans lodged asylum applications in Denmark (Statistics Denmark, 2018b).²⁰ Of them, 759 were granted refugee status (Appendix C). However, asylum applications in Denmark have declined substantially following policy changes in 2015 and 2016 that introduced new border controls, stricter measures for family reunification, and rules that allowed for the impounding of migrants' valuables (Kvist, 2016). Furthermore, the existing refugee resettlement programme was superseded by provisions in the Danish Integration Act (2017) (Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 2018). New provisions add responsibilities onto migrants. For example, individuals benefiting from the family reunification are now responsible for finding their own housing (European Commission, 2018).

The Danish Government has been supporting Afghanistan since 2001 with a focus on political dialogue, security, development cooperation, and humanitarian assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2018).

3.1.2. SUBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE DIASPORA

The Afghan population in Denmark is a **heterogeneous group** due to factors such as ethnicity, political views, time of arrival, generation, and religious beliefs. It is observed that **ethnic differences play out on a generational level**: the first generation find factors like ethnicity and religion to be significant determinants of social grouping within the diaspora but is less important for younger diaspora members. According to some respondents, the **importance attributed to education by members of the younger generations varies significantly from older diaspora members**. This represents one of the most significant changes in current Afghan diaspora practices and it has an important role in the integration of Afghans.

"[...] Something significantly changed between the Afghans and the way to move towards education, right [...]. Afghans who came here first, they never thought about gaining education. Most of them only thought about having a pizzeria or probably working somewhere as a laborer. But the new generation of Afghans, they don't think like that. Every Afghan that comes now here, they will just contact somebody, 'how can I get into the university and study', and that's something, an amazing difference that I could see amongst Afghans. It means that we as a society now understand the importance of knowledge." (DK IN6, personal interview, August 2018)

Learning Danish and going to university is a path taken increasingly often by younger Afghans who are motivated to acquire a better job and contribute to Danish society later on. Many respondents indicated that education was bringing Afghans together and supporting the adoption of liberal views and attitudes. In this context, the respondents expressed that **education eases their way into Danish society and creates the feeling of being integrated** for diaspora members. However, respondents emphasized that it is **important to see integration as a two-way exchange** that involves sharing of positive values between Afghan and Danish cultures instead of forgetting or changing one's own cultural, religious, or ethnic identity.

A number of respondents mentioned the importance of promoting or preserving Afghan culture and promoting cross-cultural understanding to avoid cultural clashes, especially among the recent arrival families or parents and their children. Some respondents expressed that perceptions of integration vary on a generational level. **Afghans that arrived in the 1970s and 1980s** were noted to insist on keeping Afghan culture and establishing their livelihoods while recent arrivals see themselves as broadly belonging to the Afghan community but are more concerned with work, education, and being active in the larger Danish society. Afghan religious actors and institutions (e.g., Imams, Afghan mosques or religious centers) in practice were seen to have little to no influence on diaspora activities in Denmark across generations.

²⁰ "The gross application figure includes all people who have applied for asylum in Denmark, regardless if their case is processed in Denmark or not, hence including people, who are returned to a safe third country, transferred or re-transferred to another EU Member State under the Dublin Regulation as well as disappearances and withdrawals, etc., during the preliminary asylum procedure. The registration figure includes persons, whose asylum case is processed in Denmark" (Statistics Denmark, 2018b).

Regarding the networks with Afghans in other European countries, the diaspora in Denmark has relatively weak networks. However, limited forms of cooperation are seen with diaspora groups across country borders where geographic proximity offers practical opportunities (e.g., Copenhagen, Denmark and Malmö, Sweden) compared to other Danish cities. Cross-border **links between diaspora seem to be primarily made based on family ties or friendship**. It is also important to note that while there may be multi-national informal Afghan diaspora networks with well-established cooperation assisting each other when necessary, one network is not always aware of the existence of another.

“You will find a network between a group of Afghans in Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, [and] which is completely unaware of another network existing in the same countries. So, there are methods, there are channels, but it’s really based on kinship and friendship I would say.” (DK IN6, personal interview, August 2018)

Considering such instances of collaboration, some respondents, particularly emphasized the role of active ADOs and Danish institutions – such as DRC – in bringing together Afghans and strengthening the connections between the diaspora. Some **younger Afghans in Denmark are perceived to be well-connected** with the Afghan diaspora outside of Denmark, particularly as a result of social media. **Digital platforms such as Facebook act as crucial channels** for ADOs to promote their engagement to a wider audience and have positively facilitated the relationships between Afghans in Denmark and in different countries.

“Thanks to media and social networks, the connection between Afghan diaspora in Denmark and also slower around the world is getting better.” (DK IN2, personal interview, August 2018)

A commonality across generations is a continuing **interest in Afghanistan**. Respondents noted that **diaspora members often keep themselves up to date with current events in Afghanistan**. Diaspora members often come together to fundraise for relief efforts following a disaster in Afghanistan. Some respondents also noted a general trend in being concerned about long-term development work in Afghanistan rather than just focusing on relief or humanitarian aid.

Afghan diaspora members **did not express an interest in returning to Afghanistan** due to the deteriorated security situation. Several respondents mentioned that the risk of involuntary return of failed asylum seekers, extended periods for outcomes of asylum processes, and stricter family reunification has had a negative influence on the engagement of the diaspora. The respondents emphasized on the need of political participation of the Afghan diaspora in Denmark in order to have a stronger voice on such issues. Presently, Samira Nawa Amini is commonly cited as the most visible politically active diaspora member and is serving as a member of the Social Liberal Party.


3.1.3. ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

A total of 96 ADOs (72 registered) were identified in Denmark, with **most founded after 2006**. The number of registered organizations correlates with the increase in the arrival of Afghan migrants (regular and irregular) in Denmark following the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2019).

The membership composition of the ADOs in Denmark was generally mixed in terms of age, gender, education level, size, ethnicity, and time of arrival. On occasion, other nationalities (e.g., Iranians) take part in ADO activities. All ADOs are non-profit and activities are almost always carried out by their members on a voluntary basis. Of the identified diaspora organizations with available funding information, **the majority receive funds through donations, membership fees, and grants**. Respondents pointed out that, in some cases, Afghan diaspora can be limited in the financial support they can provide due to the commitments they have regarding remittances.

FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF ADOs IN DENMARK, 1992-2018



Funding and capacity building opportunities are available for diaspora organizations in Denmark at the municipal level, CISU²¹, Danish Youth Council (DYC).²² Furthermore, the ADOs can obtain support from the DRC's Diaspora Programme and indirectly through the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The sources of funding through Danish municipalities and the Ministry of Social Affairs can also be difficult to acquire, as the municipal and social funds are exclusively available for projects targeting local communities in Denmark (Danstrøm et al., 2015, p. 27). Respondents were aware of capacity building opportunities (e.g., proposal writing, project management, etc.) for the diaspora organizations and their members by the DRC's Diaspora Programme.

ADOs in Denmark are located in approximately 40 cities, some with multiple branches. Aarhus, Copenhagen and Vejle have the largest number of ADOs and have significant diaspora populations. However, Kolding and Odense are among the top six cities with high diaspora populations (Statistics Denmark, 2019), but only three and two ADOs were identified, respectively.

FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT

The greatest proportion of the ADOs in Denmark are active in the area of culture (73%), which focuses on **fostering cross-cultural understanding and preserving or promoting the Afghan culture through cultural and social events, including** Celebrations like Eid²³ or Nowruz²⁴. The second largest field of engagement by the ADOs is development & humanitarian aid (19%) followed by integration (17%).


21 CISU is an association of more than 280 Danish Civil Society Organizations working for development in different countries (See: <http://www.cisu.dk/eng>).

22 DYC was identified as a particularly useful body by respondents as it provides operation funds.

23 Eid means "festival", which is celebrated twice a year by Muslims.

24 A celebration of the first day of the Persian new year.

FIGURE 3: FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT OF ADOs IN DENMARK*



* It should be noted that there are not always clear distinctions between the various fields of engagement, and there is, for example, some overlap of organizations that work on both issues of culture and integration. In addition, some organizations that are involved in development activities in Afghanistan also identify themselves as humanitarian aid organizations.

Source: Authors' fieldwork and desk research

Note: This table relies on an organization count of 66. Organizations engaged in more than one field are counted multiple times. The numbers are rounded up for the fields of engagement in all country sections

ADOs may also support younger generations (second generation) to preserve culture and prevent culture clashes within families and between newcomers and the general population. One of the very active ADOs in the field is Katib Kultur Forening (Katib Cultural Association), founded in 2007. In addition, the Dansk Afghansk Kulturforening (Danish Afghan Cultural Association) offers Dari and Pashto language courses for second- and third-generation Afghan children and organized cultural and social events for both Afghans and Danish communities, including election debates, dances and games, 'meet and mingle' events, and a monthly dinner night.

The second largest field of engagement or work by ADOs in Denmark is **development and humanitarian activities in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on education-related activities**. For example, the Afghan Cultural Association (ACA) started its engagement in Afghanistan in 2011 with the support of DRC's Diaspora Programme and has built a library, supplies students with books and computers, and provides courses in different subjects to support school students interested in pursuing a university degree.²⁵ Most recently, it started providing conditional financial support to families whose children remained in school. From Street to School (FSTS) founded in 2011 has branches in Aarhus, Odense, Copenhagen, Kolding, and Næstved (as well as one location in Norway) and supports street children go to public schools through cash transfer in Nangarhar, Kabul, Herat, and Bamyán provinces. The ADO currently supports 127 children. FSTS also supports the distribution of food and blankets during the winter in refugee/IDP camps in Kabul.

25 According to a respondent from the organization, university enrolment in Afghanistan has increased due to such activities.

The Afghan Youth Association in Denmark (AYAD) founded in 2010 has local associations in Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Kolding. AYAD focuses on children exposed to violence and images of violence throughout their childhood and provides psychosocial support through projects that show peace, positive images, and bright colors. AYAD is implementing a project called 'Children's Mobile Lab', which is financed by the DRC Diaspora Programme-administered DANIDA Fund, where 600 children in Afghanistan have received books with colorful, peaceful images.²⁶ AYAD is also implementing the project 'Digitizing Kabul University Monographs'.²⁷ It has contributed to natural disaster relief efforts and has coordinated with FSTS in organizing common fundraising activities, events, and joint proposals.

The Network for Open Afghanistan (NOA) founded in 2014 is a platform organization meant to connect people and foster dialogue with the aim of creating a vibrant civil society in Afghanistan. NOA hosts and participates in conferences and seminars, presenting TV shows, art exhibits, and music events. They also provide school supplies for schools and translated texts for primary health organizations working in Afghanistan. Other engagement by the ADOs in the context of development and humanitarian aid includes more ad hoc activities such as fundraising for acute crises and funding small development projects (e.g., building a village dam) based on an emergency need.

Insecurity and lack of necessary cooperation by the Afghan government were pointed out by the respondents as the main reasons behind limited engagement of diaspora organizations in development work in Afghanistan. In addition, the founder of an ADO explained lack of capacity and local contact in Afghanistan as another reasons.

Furthermore, some respondents mentioned that the **members of the Afghan diaspora are often looked upon with suspicion by some locals when returning back to Afghanistan for taking part in the development of the country** as they are perceived to have abandoned the country.

"Every time I talk to my friends who are active there and I ask them how is it going, they tell me 'Hey, you left us all alone and now we are suffering here.' They would believe that [...] the diaspora actually left Afghanistan in the most difficult times and are coming back when there is money or some profit or benefit for us. This is [a] general belief that exists in Afghanistan, so the engagement of [the] diaspora in Afghanistan must also be carefully calculated." (DK IN6, personal interview, August 2018)

COORDINATION EFFORTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION

Despite coordination and networking among some ADOs, there is currently no national or inclusive Afghan umbrella organization in Denmark. According to the chairman of an active ADO, the main reason for this failure was primarily attributed to the increase in ethnic and political divisions among the Afghan diaspora. During consultation meetings held in 2018, DRC expressed its willingness to discuss any proposal coming from diaspora organizations for the establishment of a network or umbrella organization (formal or informal) but no proposals were forthcoming. Currently DRC hosts the Afghan Diaspora Board, which consists of 7 members from ADOs, elected annually by members of diaspora organizations. The role of the Board is to provide input to the DRC Diaspora Programme, ensure transparency toward the diaspora, advice on criteria for grants, and review submitted project proposals by diaspora organizations to DRC (DRC, 2019) – but this is not operational outside direct coordination by DRC.

26 Afghan artists were involved in the project and contributed their skills in producing illustrations of Afghanistan. In addition, the organization sent a researcher to different Afghan villages with the purpose of collecting folklore stories, which were included in the books together with stories from Denmark by Hans Christian Andersen.

27 Monographs of Bachelor theses from this department are being digitized and kept in online databases (as well as in hardcopy at the university). In addition, students are also being trained to use this online digital library.

3.1.4. CHALLENGES AND NEEDS

ADOs expressed the main challenges linked to divisions within the diaspora community, limited ability to attracting young and technically skilled members, and the limits of voluntarism.

Divisiveness of the diaspora leading to intra-organization conflict: Despite strong motivations for engagement and examples of cooperation amongst the diaspora, the divisiveness of the Afghan diaspora in Denmark along lines of ethnicity, political views, and generation was raised repeatedly. In this regard, one respondent noted that some organizations have even lost members due to intra-organizational conflicts while another mentioned that umbrella organizations were not an option due the lack of a unified vision due to the cited differences. The divisiveness was seen to encourage competitiveness for funds rather than a spirit of collaboration building on capacities and strengths.

Attracting young and technically skilled members: Some ADOs led by the older generations expressed that generational differences in ways of thinking often discourage youth involvement, resulting in difficulties preserving membership levels and fostering future leadership. While many of the existing members felt a passion for their work, many organizations expressed a need for certain skill sets. Respondents also emphasized that organizations have difficulties preparing project proposals and a lack of overall professional expertise in project management (e.g., financial reporting and strategy development). Many respondents expressed that language difficulties and a lack of strong English writing skills is perceived as a barrier to securing funding.

“We need strong leaders in each organization. That can speak the language here, but also know how does an institution functions, how to keep people motivated. We are lacking that. We have very good people, emotionally committed to Afghanistan. But we need also professionals. You need a roadmap for the organization, [to] keep track of that. This is lost. Nobody knows where we are in 5 years. We just move with the wind, with whatever comes.” (DK IN6, personal interview, August 2018)

Encouraging voluntarism: Most day-to-day operations are carried out by a group of individuals, board, or core organizing team of typically less than ten people. These roles are conducted on a voluntary basis and are thus highly dependent on a few individuals and results in delays in administrative tasks as these individuals also have normal work and family responsibilities.

3.2. GERMANY²⁸


3.2.1. BACKGROUND

Similar to other European countries, Germany experienced an influx of migrants from 2014-2017 – aligning with the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan due to the withdrawal of most NATO troops in 2014. Moreover, Germany’s ‘open-door refugee policy’ tied to the Syrian crisis and relatively high social security benefits for refugees could have contributed as pull factors (Mayer, 2016).

The data reveals that there were **251,640 Afghans²⁹ in Germany** as of 31 December 2017 with a disproportionate number of young males (nearly 50% between the ages of 15-29). Between 2014

28 This section of the report builds upon the work of Daxner and Nicola (2017) Prepare - Protect - Promote: Mapping of the report on the Afghan Diaspora in Germany, commissioned by the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM).

29 In general, the annual data provided by the Statistisches Bundesamt do not include migrants that have naturalized to gain German citizenship. When Afghan nationals in Germany “obtain German citizenship, their “statistical” migration background will disappear from the records” (Daxner & Nicola, 2017, p.18). A person with a migration background is considered to be: “a person who was not born in Germany or who has at least one parent who is not a German citizen” (Staudenmaier, 2018). Thus, data on the overall size of the diaspora is not available.

FIGURE 4: GROWTH OF AFGHAN POPULATION IN GERMANY, 1967-2017


and 2017, the majority of Afghans entering the country were granted temporary residence permits on humanitarian grounds and, to a lesser extent, for family reasons (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018).³⁰ Germany hosts the greatest number of Afghans in Europe (UNHCR, 2015).

In response to the recent ‘migration crisis’ and the rapid increase in Afghan migration specifically, the German government has restricted asylum, residence, and integration policies and has implemented campaigns in Afghanistan to discourage emigration (Ruttig, 2017). This includes specific limitations on the ineligibility of Afghans to attend integration and language courses while waiting on their refugee status determination (ECRE, 2017). Respondents pointed out that **Germany’s ‘welcoming culture’ towards refugees no longer exists on the ground** – which could lead to a mismatch between what asylum seekers (and migrants more generally) expect to find in Germany and the reality. Long and ambiguous waiting periods³¹ associated with the asylum process often create anxieties and make integration difficult.

Afghanistan is the largest recipient of German bilateral aid and Germany is the second largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan (Die Bundesregierung, 2018). Germany has pledged EUR 1.7 billion to Afghan development and civil stabilization projects until the year 2020 (Die Bundesregierung, 2018). The Centrum für internationale Migration und Entwicklung (Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) hosted **the first ‘Afghan Diaspora for Development’ Forum in Hamburg** at the beginning of 2018, which brought together more than 100 participants from several ADOs. The aim of the event was to facilitate diaspora engagement, networking, and dialogue as well as to support the involvement of the diaspora in Afghan policy making (CIM, 2018).

30 Permission to reside “enables asylum seekers to stay in Germany for the duration of the asylum procedure (Section 11 of the Foreigners Act)”; in contrast to permanent residence, “Permission to reside and a Temporary suspension of deportation do not confer a legal right of stay, but merely a protection from repatriation” (European Refugee Fund, 2004).

31 There was an average of almost 13 months between 2013 and 2017 (AIDA, n.d.).

3.2.2. SUBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE DIASPORA

Respondents generally expressed that **the Afghan diaspora in Germany is fractured** along lines of ethnicity, political views, generation, and religious beliefs. Some of the interviewees pointed out that **significant socio-economic distinctions** between arrivals in the 1970s, 1980s, and the 1990s and recent arrivals may also contribute to the fractured relationship.

“Different people, those who came earlier, they have integrated themselves here. Those who came new they have language barriers, there are mental barriers, they haven’t come so far. It is a bit of a mixed bag. Partially integrated, and partially not. And there are also those who came here from different countries, not directly from Afghanistan. These refugees from Afghanistan, their thoughts aren’t immediately with integration. Those people who came from Iran and were there for 30 years, and see themselves as Afghan here, they have a completely different perspective on the integration story. And those who have come directly from Afghanistan are different again.” (GE IN15, personal interview, September 2018)

Diaspora members tend to be focused on establishing their own lives in German society and are particularly focused on acquiring German language skills. Some respondents expressed a resentment of Afghans that rely on social welfare in Germany and considered this to contribute negatively towards integration. There is a **strong tendency within the Afghan diaspora population in prioritizing relations within German society**, including direct communication with Germans in the workplace, in school, and sports clubs, to support integration as opposed to connections within the Afghan diaspora alone (Fischer, 2017). Connections between the diaspora in Germany are highly dependent on familial ties, without a broader sense of ‘Afghan’ community. Respondents pointed to the importance of promoting or preserving Afghan culture and while also creating a cross-cultural understanding to ensure recent arrivals have the tools to succeed and integrate. Afghan religious actors do not have an important and official role or influence with overall diaspora engagement, though many diaspora members do see mosques as important community centers.

Respondents felt that policies are increasingly focused on ‘voluntary return’ and deportation rather than promoting the integration of Afghan newcomers. **They spoke of international fatigue when it comes to Afghan refugees**, particularly within the context of the war in Syria (See: Ruttig, 2017). Respondents criticized the return and deportation practices surrounding failed asylum claimants or irregular migrants, which reflects the broader backlash by the Afghan diaspora against these policies and who resent the Afghan government for supporting for the return and deportation practices of Western countries. Respondents described that regular anti-deportation protests and demonstrations have been held across Germany, for example in Berlin³² by the Berliner Bündnis gegen Abschiebungen nach Afghanistan (Berlin Alliance against Deportations to Afghanistan). According to some respondents, the risk of return for failed asylum seekers and long waiting periods for refugee status holders for family reunification negatively affects participation in diaspora activities. They also mentioned that many have unmet psychosocial needs.

3.2.3. ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE


ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

A total of 129 ADOs (110 registered) were identified, with extensive growth through the 2000s.³³

32 Nonetheless, turn-out at these events is often not as large as expected by organizers because there can be a lack of solidarity and common ground when it comes to such issues (GE IN17) and Afghans do not always have the means to buy a transportation ticket or relinquish their other obligations (GE IN9).

33 The year of establishment is not known for all identified ADOs.

FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF ADOs IN GERMANY, 1979-2018



The proliferation of organizations post-2000 has resulted in distinctions between pre-2000 organizations and the more recent organizations: **older organizations were often focused on political activism to voice opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,**³⁴ and reflected the prominence of student unions and religious organizations in the 1960s and 1970s than now.

Most ADOs have between 20 and 70 members, though in some cases there are up to 150 members. Engagement in the organizations is overwhelmingly carried out on a voluntary basis -typically by a smaller sub-group of very active members. ADOs generally expressed that they represent diverse ethnic and educational backgrounds with a mix of male and female members and were not necessarily targeted – new arrivals, naturalized citizens, and Germans without a migration background were welcome. The majority of the identified organizations receive their funds through donations, grants, and membership fees – with some organizations reporting active members using personal funds to finance activities. Respondents also expressed that **sending financial remittances is a common practice** by Afghan diaspora and does not deter many Afghans from paying membership fees or to contributing financially to diaspora activities.

ADOs are spread across approximately forty cities, with the highest concentrations in Frankfurt am Main, Munich, Essen, and Cologne – corresponding to high Afghan populations in these areas (Destatis, n.d.). Only one ADO was identified in Dusseldorf and one in Bochum, where low numbers of Afghans are living (Destatis, n.d.). No ADO has been identified in any cities in the federal states of, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Saarland (Daxner & Nicola, 2017).

34 According to the respondent, such organizations were commonly funded by the German government due to the fact that these actions were often in line with the anti-communist sentiments in the West at that time; associations were given great discretion as to how those funds were used, thereby lacking the vigour of the financial reporting that is currently required when receiving a grant.


FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT

The majority of the organizations (63%) engage with development and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, with cultural promotion (31%), integration (22%), religion (17%), and advocacy (17%) also being common.

For organizations providing support to Afghanistan, activities are focused on education and health sectors. Seven health-focused diaspora organizations have formed the umbrella organization Dachverband des Afghanischen Medizinischen Fachpersonals (DAMF) (Association of Afghan Medical Professionals), founded in 2002. DAMF coordinates its activities with the Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Education and the German institutions, including GIZ in Afghanistan.³⁵ There are also some ADOs that are well-linked on the ground in Afghanistan to facilitate their work. For example, Freundeskreis Afghanistan (Friend’s Circle Afghanistan) founded in the 1980s has also established cooperation with the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan for transportation services for school equipment and other materials and also partners with some humanitarian NGOs both from Germany and Afghanistan. Ärzteverein für Afghanische Flüchtlinge e.V. (Doctors Association for Afghan Refugees), founded in the 1980s works in Afghanistan in the areas of education, health, and training. It cooperates with Kawoon University, several local associations for women, the Hashemi Foundation, as well as Afghan doctors in Afghanistan.

ADOs highlighted insecurity and lack of necessary government cooperation as obstacles for diaspora engagement in relief and development activities in Afghanistan. In one example, an ADO built a school in Afghanistan and registered with the Ministry of Education to ensure books were provided. Ultimately the books were bought from the market so instruction could begin as there was not sufficient or timely cooperation. Another interviewee described that their school and a hospital both were threatened by the Taliban, but with the support of local people they were able to continue their work.

FIGURE 6: FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT OF ADOs IN GERMANY*



* It should be noted that there are not always clear distinctions between the various fields of engagement, and there is, for example, some overlap of organizations that work on both issues of culture and integration. In addition, some organizations that are involved in development activities in Afghanistan also identify themselves as humanitarian aid organizations.

Source: Authors’ fieldwork and desk research

Note: This table relies on an organization count of 108. Organizations engaged in more than one field of actions are counted multiple times

35 For more details see it’s website: <http://www.damf-ev.de/Startseite/>

Several ADOs are engaged in more than one field of work in Germany. Bildung, Kultur, Begegnung (Education, Culture, Encounter) (YAAR) founded in 2012 and based in Berlin offers German, Dari/Farsi and Pashto language courses and advice for refugees from Afghanistan in addition to social activities for women. The Afghanisches Kommunikations- und Kulturzentrum (Afghan Communication and Culture Centre) promotes Afghan culture in Germany and to assists with integration of recent Afghan arrivals in Berlin, including providing German lessons. In addition, it offers social and psychosocial counselling, cultural activities and social events (e.g., theatre, film, festivals), and provides Dari and Pashto courses. Both ADOs are engaged in advocacy related activities (e.g., protests against recent deportation policies). The Afghan mosque in Berlin also regularly supports such protests in an unofficial manner.

“The second priority is that we are trying to connect with other organizations, refugee organizations - could be Arab, Iranian and Turkish, whatever – for a more and better result, refugee wide. And I mentioned it kind of, there was a huge movement in Berlin three years ago, and a huge demonstration with a community with most of the organizations and actors in Berlin against this deporting policy... Trying to fight, to resist against this discrimination.” (GE IN17, personal interview, August 2018)

COORDINATION EFFORTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION

There is currently no inclusive Afghan diaspora umbrella organization in Germany; however, the last year has seen increasing focus on creating an umbrella organization by the German Development Agency/ Centre for International Migration and Development (GIZ/CIM). GIZ/CIM organized a meeting for approximately 10 ADOs in 2018 with the purpose of identifying the actors that would be interested in participating in such an initiative. The next meeting is scheduled for late 2019 where legal requirements and topical focus of the organization will be outlined. This initiative is limited in scale and, while a ‘unified voice’ for the diaspora may be ideal, this only represents a small but critical step towards establishing a full coordination body.

3.2.4. CHALLENGES AND NEEDS

ADOs in Germany face multiple challenges that limit scale and efficacy; however, respondents were largely fixated on funding and the difficulty in attracting and retaining new members.

Funding limitations: There is a perception of lack of support from donors due to a change in priorities that has made funding opportunities available less relevant. While some organizations have received praise for their activities in support of Afghan refugees in Germany, ADOs also consistently encounter lack of financial assistance due to re-focusing of the German government’s goals on reconstruction in Afghanistan. Others felt the focus had shifted to the Syrian diaspora. One interviewee expressed frustration that one funding body from the German government would pay a consultancy fee for acquiring project ideas from the ADO but would implement the selected project without the participation of the ADO. ADOs also struggle with the administrative practices associated with applications and financial reporting for donors due to the level of detail required.

“Now, everything is digitalized, and you’ve got to say how much [money] and where it is spent. At that time, it was just signature and so on [that was required to receive funding].” (GE IN11, personal interview, August 2018)

Administrative challenges are often exacerbated by a lack of human resources and technical skills as involvement in ADOs is primarily voluntary.

New members engagement: Attracting and retaining younger members has been highlighted as a key challenge as this restricted engagement threatens the long-term sustainability of organizations and their ability to stay relevant to the needs and interests of the diaspora. Respondents noted the specific challenge in generating interest in Afghanistan amongst the second and third generation diaspora members:


“And that is not only in our organization but in many organizations, that the younger generation is failing us. And when people look at it like that, it is an open door to also say that the dinosaurs are going extinct and that perhaps the younger generation will organize itself differently. And amongst the Afghani youth that grow up here and were born here, they have a different socialization. They see Afghanistan; they know Afghanistan only through word of mouth. They have not experienced it. They have no emotional connection other than the stories that mom or dad tells, or something like that, but personally they have no experiences in Afghanistan.” (GE IN12, personal interview, August 2018).

3.3. SWEDEN

3.3.1. BACKGROUND

By 2018, 51,979 Afghans were living in Sweden (65% men and 35% women), with 65% between the ages of 15-34 (SCB, 2019a). In the last decade, Sweden has become one of the main receiving countries for Afghan asylum seekers, but has also seen a significant drop-off in the last two years due to the introduction of more restrictive immigration controls (Çelikaksoy & Wadensjö, 2017; Parusel & Bengtsson, 2017). **In 2015, 41,564 Afghans applied for asylum**, of which 56% were unaccompanied minors (97% boys, 3% girls) (SCB, 2019b). By 2018, the number of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan had dropped significantly (SCB, 2019c).

FIGURE 7: GROWTH OF AFGHAN POPULATION IN SWEDEN, 2000-2018



Source: Statistics Sweden (SCB), 2019c : The SCB website does not include the definition of the following terms: immigration, newly arrived immigrant and citizenship (See: <https://www.scb.se/en/documentation/word-list/>). Foreign background is defined as “a person who is foreign born, or born in Sweden and with two foreign-born parents” (SCB, n.d.). “Persons seeking asylum are not registered in the Swedish population register. Only after an asylum seeker is granted a residence permit and has been registered in the Swedish population register is the person included in Statistics Sweden’s official population statistics” (SCB, n.d.).

Specifically, by the end of 2015, border controls were enacted that made it harder for immigrants to enter Sweden without a valid passport or other identification document (Polisen, n.d.). Sweden has **openly promoted returns** and attempted to renew a bilateral agreement for returns with Afghanistan; however, the agreement was rejected by the Afghan parliament due to concerns over forced returns and “that there could be returns of people who had not had their identity verified by the Afghan government” (ECRE, 2017, p.12).

Sweden is a major donor to Afghanistan. In June 2014, a new results strategy for Afghanistan was adopted, which allocated SEK 4.8 million for the period between 2014 and 2019 and focuses on democratic and sustainable development, human rights and equality, education, as well as long-term economic growth (Regeringskansliet, 2018). There is no specific focus on diaspora engagement under this programme.

3.3.2. SUBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE DIASPORA

As with other study countries, the Afghan diaspora in Sweden is diverse; however, **the degree of interaction between distinct diaspora groups varies**. Respondents noted that they generally do not consider the ethnicity of those they interact with and felt the role of Afghan religious actors are not engaged or have any influence in diaspora activities. However, respondents did note the change in recent arrivals versus established diaspora members. Newcomers to Sweden largely belong to the Hazara ethnic group and are primarily Shia Muslims. Many who arrived from Iran were born or raised as refugees. Therefore, mistrust may exist between the existing diaspora members based on ethnicity, time of arrival, and differences in connection with Afghanistan itself. Though, according to respondents, this trend seems to be a result of avoiding integration (common celebrations, events, etc.) rather than actively excluding others. **Arrivals from the 1970s-1990s and their children see themselves well integrated** in Swedish society, including command of the language, attaining a higher level of education, and leading a ‘normal life’ (stable housing, family, work comparable to other Swedes).

“[...] first we have to define integration. This is a not easy task. It depends on the generation. The generation that came in my age (...) they’re integrated somehow and of course they’re living a normal life, called normal life. Have a work, they have a house, apartment they are living, and they’re following exactly most of their time in the office and they’re coming in the night. It’s like just like me, I’m running from morning to evening, me and my wife.” (SE IN1, personal interview, July 2018)

Learning Swedish language was identified as a key factor for integration as recent arrivals may struggle to complete routine tasks (e.g., shopping, employment and education). Thus, older migrants typically were seen to have had more difficulty with integration in general. It was also highlighted that **unaccompanied minors may be overwhelmed and resist integration** as a means to reduce their loneliness and isolation. Some respondents also mentioned that the large influx of recent newcomers to Sweden could not be easily absorbed by the administrative system in Sweden – therefore reducing opportunities for integration compared to past arrivals.

While integration was seen as an important objective, **it was also seen as a process of ‘compromise’** between the Afghan and Swedish cultures.

“[Integration] means, while you keep part of your cultures and values, still being active in the society and take social responsibilities [...]. This is a country that we cannot have parallel society in one society. That’s not possible. You cannot have an Afghan society and Swedish society. You cannot be free in a special occasion in Swedish... in Afghan this is a special occasion for Afghan, I should be off from my job. This is mean that 365 days people should be off from their job. These are the things that with integration issues mostly a compromise issue that from both sides we should respect.” (SE IN5, personal interview, July 2018)

For instance, although it is permissible to wear traditional Afghan dress for special occasions, one interviewee suggested that wearing traditional dress in public would infringe on the rights of Swedish people to preserve their own culture and values. In addition, many respondents mentioned the importance of promoting or preserving Afghan culture and increasing cross-cultural understanding to prevent cultural clashes between generations. It was also added that gender-based cultural clashes can limit integration: Afghan women are sometimes prevented from participating in social life in Sweden by their parents or husbands – which also limits participation in the volunteer activities of diaspora organizations.

Respondents stated that they stay up to date with current events in Afghanistan and would visit if the security situation would allow it, but universally do not want to return permanently. Some even went so far as to say that they see Afghanistan as a possible regular holiday spot for diaspora members in the future; however, in its current state, the country is not seen as a desirable place to visit due to insecurity.

“[...] the average Afghan family here in Sweden has no real intention whatsoever to move back to Afghanistan. Maybe, rather they say something in the style of in 40 years when it might be peace right, and things are cheap we might buy a big farm again in our province of origin, we can use it like a holiday place like the Turks have, in Turkey.” (SE IN4, personal interview, August 2018)

When asked about the family reunification, the respondents explained that it takes approximately two to three years for refugee status-holders to unite with family members. However, these difficulties cause psychological strain, lack of sleep, and depression to the inviter and invitee. According to some respondents, both stricter rules for family reunification and the risk of return for failed asylum seekers have a negative influence on the participation of many Afghans in diaspora activities.

3.3.3. ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS


A total of 133 ADOs (94 registered) were identified in Sweden. The majority were founded between 2012 and 2017, coinciding with the latest influx of recent arrivals.

Sweden has the largest number of ADOs in the focus countries and organizations are generally mixed in terms of age, gender, education level, size, and ethnicity. Recent arrivals were more likely to be a member of an ADO compared to other focus countries. All the diaspora organizations are non-profit, and they reported that their members work on a voluntary basis. Of the identified diaspora organizations in Sweden with available information in the source of funding, most receive funds through donations and membership fees. Sending financial remittances to Afghanistan was found to reduce the ability of some Afghans to pay membership fees or contribute financially to diaspora activities in Sweden.

ADOs in Sweden are located in approximately 60 cities, some with multiple branches. The mapping data shows that most of the ADOs are accommodated in the largest cities: Malmö, Goeteborg, Stockholm and Uppsala.

The Swedish government does not provide any specific support for ADOs. However, the government-funded Samarbetsorgan för etniska organisationer i Sverige (SIOS) (Cooperation Group for Ethnic Associations in Sweden) is a cooperative body for ethnic minority organizations that makes funding available for civic activities run by any community-based organization, including diaspora organizations (MIPEX, 2015).

FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF ADOs IN SWEDEN, 1987-2018



FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT


In terms of the fields of engagement, 74% of Swedish ADOs identified their activities as relating to integration and 64% to culture. The lack of engagement in development and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan of ADOs in Sweden is notable compared with other study countries.³⁶

Most of the identified ADOs in Sweden carry out their work in the field of integration to newcomers (especially UAMs). Integration activities focus on assisting recent arrivals with understanding Swedish culture and norms, language, sport, and asylum procedures. For example, SEF (Swedish Association for Unaccompanied Minors) founded in 2012 has a total of seventeen offices in different Swedish cities and has around 1,100 members, who are mostly male and between 18 and 25 years old, reflecting the gender and age of the target population which are mostly male unaccompanied minors of Afghan and other origin. SEF received local government funding (Municipality of Malmö) and specific funding projects from foundations and civility society organizations. Their activities include hosting of cultural, educational, and social events for refugee minors, organizing sporting events such as football matches and bowling games, as well as open discussion groups. The organization also offers legal advice and counselling and supports interactions with the Swedish migration authorities.

Fanos diaspora organization founded in 2012 is based in Gothenburg. It also focuses on **guiding and helping Afghans who recently arrived in Sweden** including explaining the asylum procedure to newcomers and providing support on local culture, norms, and rules of the Swedish society. The organization is one of the founders of an Afghan umbrella organization called Shahmama and Salsal National Association (SASNA). SASNA was founded in 2012 with the aim as stated on the website “to improve human/minority rights situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.” SASNA organizes various events, including guidance on asylum procedures and cultural events. As an umbrella organization, SASNA has gathered 12 member associations in Sweden, though is predominantly a Hazara umbrella organization and does not represent all ADOs in Sweden.

³⁶ The reasons behind this finding are explored in detail in the concluding chapter of this report.

FIGURE 9: FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT OF ADOs IN SWEDEN*



* It should be noted that there are not always clear distinctions between the various fields of engagement, and there is, for example, some overlap of organizations that work on both issues of culture and integration. In addition, some organizations that are involved in development activities in Afghanistan also identify themselves as humanitarian aid organizations.

Source: Authors' fieldwork and desk research

Note: This table relies on an organization count of 122 and a total engagement count of 209. Organizations engaged in more than one field of actions are counted multiple times

The second highest field of work by ADOs in Sweden is **cross-cultural understanding and promotion or preservation of Afghan culture**. This includes support to newcomers and the prevention of cultural clashes between partners, parents and their children. For instance, the Afghanska Penklubben (the Afghan Pen Club) is a cultural organization established in 1997 in Nacka by a group of Afghan migrants who were mostly poets, writers, musicians, and film makers. The aim of the organization is to use culture – in particular, literature, music, and film – to build bridges between Afghan and non-Afghan communities in Sweden. They also hold an annual Afghan International Film Festival in Stockholm.

Another organization with the objective of working in more than one field is the Bureau for Rights-Based Development (BRD), which is a Swedish chapter of an Afghanistan-based non-profit, non-governmental development organization by the same name. BRD has been active in Sweden since 2018, working in multiple fields, including: human rights and development in Afghanistan; engaging in policy advocacy and lobbying on these issues; identifying Afghan diaspora and engaging diaspora members on issues related to human rights, peace, and development; and to facilitate funding for all BRD activities. BRD is currently working on establishing the network of Afghan diaspora in Sweden.

COORDINATION EFFORTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION

No national and inclusive umbrella organization has been established in Sweden, despite past attempts led by Svenska Afghanistan Kommitten (SAK; the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (a non-diaspora organization)³⁷ in 2008 and 2013 as well as the limited early success of SASNA. BRD Sweden has recently moved to create 'a network of Afghan diaspora', rather than a legal body, that would be led by a

37 SAK is an active non-diaspora organization in Sweden. Its activities are mainly focused on Afghanistan.

'Coordination Committee' consisting of the members of ADOs. However, they lack funding to move the idea forward. In addition, some efforts have been made over social media, including a Facebook group called Afghansk (Afghan) diaspora to promote cooperation amongst ADOs in Sweden. It has 1,100 - 1,200 members at time of writing.

3.3.4. CHALLENGES AND NEEDS

The main challenges identified by ADOs in Sweden are remaining relevant to needs, accessing funding, and networking with Swedish organizations.

Remaining relevant: Older organizations tended to be founded based on a specific need of the diaspora community at the time and shaped the identity of the organization. Today, many of the original ADOs struggle to redefine themselves and attract new and active members. More specifically, a number of respondents expressed concerns about the sustainability of their organizations and the need for more active and engaged members. Part of this loss of membership seems to be due to a generational issue. Many organizations have not adopted social media or other forms of advertising and community engagement due to lack of human capacity. As seen in other voluntary organizations, active members have personal responsibilities that limit the amount of time that can be dedicated to the organization.

Accessing funding: Many ADOs receive their financial contributions through donations or membership fees. ADOs struggle to obtain external funding due to the administrative knowledge required to apply for grants, including preparing grant proposals and financial reporting. Some organizations expressed that dealing with bureaucratic hurdles in Sweden is often exacerbated by language difficulties and not having the required professional experience available in the organization.

Limited networking: Some respondents noted that there seems to be a lack of interest in networking with Afghans amongst the Swedish population in addition to a general lack of knowledge about Afghanistan. In this regard, one respondent reports difficulties in his attempts to reach Swedish artists and filmmakers who were unresponsive to his outreach activities.

"Engaging [in] Afghanistan is easy for me. Engaging [in] Sweden is very difficult for me. When I'm talking about engaging [in] Afghanistan, this one is easy because I know the language of my country. I know that good people there. I know a lot of good networking happening alongside the country. But here [...] if even I'm sending email, I didn't get any response. [...] In this past 6 years, I was trying to make a network." (SE IN6, personal interview, August 2018).

3.4. UNITED KINGDOM


3.4.1. BACKGROUND

In 2018 an estimated total of 73,000 Afghan-born individuals were residing in the UK (58% male, 42% female - see the figure below). Afghanistan is the fourth most common country of origin for asylum seekers in the UK, though the recognition rate is fairly low (34%) (UK Home Office, 2017).

Beginning in 2010, policies have been introduced that aim to limit non-EU nationals seeking residence in the UK (PERFAR, 2018). This included a limit to the number of employer-sponsored skilled migrants as well as increased language requirements were introduced in 2011 (PERFAR, 2018). In 2012, the minimum income requirement for family reunification was revised and benchmarks were set according to the number of children to be brought into the UK (PERFAR, 2018) and an English language requirements was introduced for the partner or spouse seeking reunification.³⁸ Policies also made it difficult for former

³⁸ See <https://www.gov.uk/>

**FIGURE 10:
GROWTH
OF AFGHAN
POPULATION IN THE
UK, 2007-2018***



* This refers to the population of Afghans who were born in Afghanistan but residing in the UK. The total population is calculated by the authors from male and female figures.

Source: Office for National Statistics: "Overseas-born population in the United Kingdom, excluding some residents in communal establishments, by sex, by country of birth" (Office for National Statistics, 2019). The estimates are based on the Annual Population Survey (APS).

international students to remain in the UK without a formal job offer upon graduation (PERFAR, 2018). Finally, the Immigration Act (2014) facilitated removal of persons that have not been granted permission to stay in the country and reduced opportunities for appeal (PERFAR, 2018). Although there are no programmes of the UK government designed to address the particular needs of the Afghan diaspora, there are several local government initiatives meant to address the needs of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees more generally. Initiatives tend to include service directories and basic supports, such as English lessons, legal advice, educational support, and health consultations (Brighton & Hove, 2018; Khan, 2013). For the period 2016 to 2020, the UK has committed GBP 750 million to support the Afghan government’s work on issues of security, poverty reduction, as well as access to health and education, but no specific focus on migration or diaspora engagement (GOV.UK, 2017).

3.4.2. SUBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE DIASPORA

London has the highest concentration of Afghan diaspora arriving in the 1980s-1990s, particularly the northwest neighborhoods of Oxbridge, Northolt, Barnet, and Wembley. Birmingham is the second largest concentration, hosting arrivals primarily from the 1990s-2000s (Personal interviews, June 2018 – July 2019). As observed in the other focus countries, **the Afghan diaspora in the UK is very heterogeneous regarding ethnicity, political views, time of arrival, generation, and religious beliefs.** According to the interview respondents, there are several sizeable ethnic groups in the UK, namely Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek – though Pashtuns are overrepresented in the UK (Communities and Local Government, 2009). The Niazi – a Pashtun tribe - is particularly recognized within the Afghan diaspora in the UK for their concentration in London as well as for their inclination to engage in businesses:

“If you ask anybody from Niazis in London, they are about 80 percent of businesses Niazis-owned or pizza shops and restaurants, and some have been thriving very well. They [the Niazis] have become very rich in those sectors because they have opened several shops and they are doing great. Besides that, we have also Poundshop, like home accessories and those shops. Although they are not doing very [well], because of Poundline and Poundworld and the other shops there... Big companies came next to them and then obviously they affect these small companies. Therefore, they are not thriving, but these pizza shops are doing very well.” (UK IN15, personal interview, August 2018)³⁹

Ethnic division is a prominent feature of the Afghan diaspora in the UK. In some cases, links are stronger with ethnic groups across Europe than within the Afghan community at-large in the UK. For example, several respondents noted that social media platforms like Facebook have made it possible for Hazaras in the UK to establish closer ties with Hazaras in Denmark, Sweden, and Austria. These relations typically involve the exchange of views on different issues as well as discussions of different events in Afghanistan that have particularly affected members of the ethnicity in question. Such links are also often based on family ties that exist across European countries. Respondents mentioned that even fundraising in response to an acute crisis in Afghanistan will be met with enthusiasm amongst those that belong to the same ethnic group as those affected, but the participation of members from other ethnic and religious groups would be notably lower. Despite entrenched divisions, large celebrations and performances by famous Afghan musicians perform do draw mixed crowds.

The ethnic division also appears to be an issue of concern for older diaspora members and recent arrivals. The majority of the younger generation born in the UK do not reflect the diversionary views of their parents, though some respondents observed that a small portion of the younger generation avoid social connections with other ethnic groups due to respect for their parents. This limits the opportunities to improve the cohesiveness of the diaspora. This tension has also created a divide between associations run by the elders and associations run by youth.

Challenges based on gender roles and culture clashes within the Afghan community persist within the diaspora population. Respondents noted that community events are often primarily attended by men, with women typically attending women-only events. Due to household gender roles, women may be less likely to work outside the home and also less likely to have additional opportunities for day-to-day integration. Failure to integrate within British society is also very pronounced amongst those of the older generation who may have not learned English and live within mostly segregated Afghan communities and work in jobs that do not require much interaction with the larger British society.

“[A]ccording to some research, there is some 20,000 taxi drivers, Afghan[s] in London only [...]. They said look, ‘We’ve come here, and we are refugees, even if we have the passport, we do not feel like we are this country yet. We cannot survive in this system; we have to work very hard.’ And that is so true because, I’ve realized this is some people who spent 10, 20 years here. They cannot speak the language, they cannot integrate, they cannot have friends, so except only Afghans, because they haven’t studied well, they don’t know the language, and so on.” (UK IN24, personal interview, September 2018)

In addition, some of the respondents pointed out that the relationships between husbands and wives (even marriages formed before arriving in the UK) have changed due to cultural exposure. This seems to provide greater rights and freedoms to women in general, which has also caused cultural clashes within the household.

³⁹ Poundshop, Poundline, and Poundworld are large online retailers

“[A] clash of civilisations is of the main factors that Afghans are currently facing in the UK. [...] by this I mean, for example, if a woman in Afghanistan or a wife in Afghanistan behaves differently with her husband is not totally [the same] here in the UK. Like a woman who treated her husband in Afghanistan in a different way, now she treats him in a different way here because she knows her rights. [...] she wants to have those rights over here. But some husbands, they don’t want to give away those values they had or rights. They want to keep their wives as Afghan wives, not as Western wives. That is why some clashes happen. There are divorces; there are clashes between families’ husband and wife.” (UK IN15, personal interview, August 2018)

It is also observed that the views of Afghan children either reflect the views of their parents even more strongly or, instead, become what one respondent noted “a product of both countries” where one does not feel entirely English nor entirely Afghan (UK IN20). For example, the UK gave the respondent felt freedom to decide if he wishes to practice his faith or not without societal impositions and expectations, leading to a renewal of his faith. Afghan religious actors do not have an important and official role or influence with overall diaspora engagement, though similar to Germany, many diaspora members in the UK do see mosques as community centers.

Recent arrivals who may struggle for some time with unclear asylum or residency status were often highlighted as integration risks as their ability to work is limited and government-selected living locations are required receive a small living stipend. The lengthy process – particularly for minors who may be granted residency until the age of 18 and then be subject to removal – often lead to uncertainty and a feeling of ‘limbo’. Many respondents pointed out that the risk of return for failed asylum seekers and stricter rules for family reunification negatively affects participation in diaspora activities as in both situations they are suffering stress and depression.

According to respondents, having opportunities for **political participation is important for Afghan diaspora and ADOs to have a stronger voice** and contribute to a better integration of Afghans while also promoting and protecting the interests at the community-level. However, Peymana Assad being the singular example noted by respondents in the UK. She is a recent council member at Harrow Borough Council for Labor party.

3.4.3. ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

A total of 104 ADOs (67 registered) were identified in the UK. As with other study countries, **the 2000s saw a dramatic increase in the formation of organizations.**


The membership composition of ADOs in the UK was also generally mixed in terms of gender, age, size, education level, and ethnicity. Most of ADOs in the UK receive funding through donations, membership fees, and grants. Respondents noted that most members are able to send financial remittances⁴⁰ and also pay the membership fees on time, with the exception of those waiting on documentation and work permits. ADOs in the UK are located in approximately 30 cities. London accommodates the highest number of ADOs (36) followed by Birmingham (7), reflecting the areas with the highest diaspora concentration.

FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT

Cultural activities (42%), integration-related activities (42%), and development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan (40%) are the most common fields of engagement for the ADOs in the UK.

40 According to several respondents, remittances are so critical that Afghan foreign exchange companies or teller shops have proliferated, particularly those that are able provide lower transfer fees compared to the Hawala system and also ensure respect for stricter regulations imposed on financial transfers.

FIGURE 11: NUMBER OF ADOS IN THE UK, 1981-2018



Cultural activities include events, but also radio and television programmes and channels. For example, the Afghan Voice Radio aims to provide a platform for discussion, news, interviews, and promotion of Afghan music. Similarly, Afghan Academy International founded in the 1980s is now working on providing an Afghan television channel.


The ADOs active in integration tend to focus on the social integration of Afghan recent arrivals. The most active ADO in the field of integration is Paiwand Afghan Association, founded in 2002. This ADO is based in London and its activities are wide ranging and entail providing advice related to health care, mental health, employment, and education as well as offering language courses, mentoring for youth, and accommodation for newly arriving, including UAMs.⁴¹ What should perhaps be specifically emphasized is the mentorship programme that the organization offers.

“I was assigned to the refugee children and I used to visit them for one hour in a week, just talk to them in their school, how they’re feeling, how was their school week. [...] I would just tell the student you know what, you need to do good because you can do anything here, you can study medicine, and you can study whatever you want to study because they really respect medicine [...]. I took them to the library, and I took some very easy books for them, and they started reading and that changed their lives so much.” (UK IN24, personal interview, September 2018)

Development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan tend to focus on health and education. For example, the Association of Afghan Healthcare Professionals founded in 2011 is based in Edinburgh is a group of health care professionals who were either born in or immigrated to the UK and have a connection

⁴¹ What is unique to this organization is that it also rents two buildings in London where Afghan youth can be accommodated; an official from the organization is present during the day, while the tenants are alone at night.

FIGURE 12: FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT OF ADOs IN THE UK*



* It should be noted that there are not always clear distinctions between the various fields of engagement, and there is, for example, some overlap of organizations working in multiple fields of engagement.

Source: Authors' fieldwork and desk research

Note: This table relies on an organization count of 92. Organizations engaged in more than one field of actions are counted multiple times.

to Afghanistan.⁴² The organization offers a variety of services, including financial support for hospitals and technical support for key health screenings (e.g., hepatitis and preeclampsia in pregnant women). Farkhunda Trust for Afghan Women's Education is the most active ADO in the area of education. It was founded in 2016 and supports Afghan women with exceptional academic records by providing mentorship and scholarships to attain their education in the UK. Farkhunda Trust has institutional links in Afghanistan with the Kabul University and Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education based in Kabul.

ADOs working in the development and humanitarian sector highlighted the poor security situation as a key barrier to being effective. One respondent explained that they have stopped operation in Afghanistan due to insecurity issues. Some other respondents noted the lack of necessary cooperation by the Afghan government and lack of clarity around the legal process for operating in Afghanistan.

COORDINATION EFFORTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION

The diaspora in the UK has succeeded in their efforts to establish an umbrella organization – though with limited functionality. In 2013, the Afghan Academy International initiated the Afghan Council of Britain (ACB) as a platform and umbrella group.⁴³ As of now, the ACB has nearly 20 ADO members, which include ADOs from different ethnic groups. However, the ACB currently only has limited activity due to lack of time and financial resources. In addition, the respondents, particularly in the consultation meeting agreed that a viable umbrella organization/network should be associated with a pre-existing institution. One idea presented by the respondents was the creation of a study unit at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London. Moreover, the participants pointed out that umbrella organization or network should be impartial and independent and focus on capacity building (e.g., literacy on asylum process, voting system, and Afghan language curriculum), advocacy, and promoting Afghan culture.

42 The majority of the association's members received their education in Afghanistan but registered as physicians once arriving to the UK. The minority are UK- or European-educated doctors of Afghan origin.

43 For more details visit <http://www.afghanacademy.org.uk/afghan-council-of-britain/>

3.4.4. CHALLENGES AND NEEDS

The main challenges and needs reported by ADOs in the UK are limited funding, generational and gender differences, and lack of a collaborative working relationship between ADOs.

Limited funding: ADOs mentioned that the quality of the services they provide could be greatly improved with additional funding. This included expanding initiatives that would improve the health and well-being of Afghans receiving services as well as having the financial capacity to out-source some services would also improve the general operating environment. In addition, the voluntary nature of ADOs means that the implementation of activities results in a decrease in their momentum in organizing activities. Limited capacity to apply for funding and report against awarded funding also contributes to this challenge.

Generational and gender differences: Some respondents noted the challenge of attracting younger members as youth tend to create their own organizations. Traditional gender roles also have limited the participation of women and girls and, when participation occurs, girls and women are reluctant to voice their opinions, particularly if they are in contrast to those of the elders.

Lack of a collaborative working relationship between ADOs: Respondents mentioned the deep ethnic, political, and generational divisions amongst the Afghan diaspora that has led to a severe lack of trust, resulting in competition for funding.

“This year, we had an event. We collaborated with another Afghan [organization]. So using their society, we worked together... we wanted to work together and so they booked the hall and everything for us, but they didn’t like the fact that... they didn’t like us, or they were jealous about us. A day before the event, they stopped their agreement. So there are people like that, and they either can’t trust us, or they are too jealous. They still think about the race/ethnicity thing.” (UK IN1, personal interview, June 2018).





4. CONCLUSION

Based on the findings from Afghan diaspora and diaspora organizations, several conclusions can be drawn from the focus countries on motivating factors in diaspora life, the challenges that a fractured diaspora faces, and political participation in the residence countries. This study has also highlighted the role of religious actors in diaspora activities, the role of remittances, risk of return of failed asylum seekers, and stricter family reunification rules in the focus countries. Furthermore, this study has focused on the overall organizational landscape of ADO, challenges and needs to engagement both at host countries and in Afghanistan, and collaboration and coordination efforts amongst ADOs.

4.1. THE AFGHAN DIASPORA

This study found that the **Afghan diaspora is extremely heterogeneous**, with the diaspora in all focus countries presenting different variations on ethnic, political affiliations or views, time of arrival, and generational divisions. **Ties are often stronger among members of the same family and/or ethnic group, even those living in different European countries**, with 'Afghan identity' not representing a specific organizing factor amongst the diaspora. The 'imagined Afghan community' is not mobilized in the same manner as sub-diaspora groupings, suggesting that "there is an underlying sense of belonging to an imagined Afghan community, which is implicitly shared but rarely collectively enacted" (Fisher, 2017, p. 31). Findings suggest that overcoming divisions to create an atmosphere of collective action may be the greatest challenge to leverage the full potential of the diaspora to contribute to durable solutions.

Religious beliefs or affiliations were not found to be a major factor in the Afghan community divisions and **Afghan religious actors do not strongly influence the activities of the Afghan diaspora**. Afghan religious actors specifically seem less important and active in Denmark and Sweden than in Germany and the UK, which could be as a result of the lower population size and more recent arrival of the population. While some Islamic leaders (e.g., imams) are more divisive, mosques are generally seen by the majority as inclusive 'community centers'.

Within the diaspora population, there are also **'culture clashes' that manifest at the sub-group level and cause divisions within diaspora families and affected diaspora organization**. Gender roles have been found, particularly in the UK and Sweden, as a barrier to increased diaspora cohesion, participation, and ensuring full representation of viewpoints. In other cases, traditional roles have been challenged and created tension within families and between generations where youth are more likely to want to fully integrate into host societies. The generational culture clash has also occurred in regard to maintaining ethnic divisions. Second generation youth have consistently been found to have to balance the sensibilities of their parents with their willingness to adopt local culture and customs, including working across the political, ethnic, and religious lines within the diaspora that may distance older generations. This pattern of youth overcoming the ideological views and ethnic divides of their parents has also been observed in Afghanistan (Montagne, 2013). In general, the willingness of younger diaspora members to work across traditional divisions has caused a lack of acceptance towards some older ADOs and resulted in the proliferation of youth-led organizations, threatening the sustainability of some of the initial organizations.

Despite practical divisions, those across the **Afghan diaspora view integration as critical** and is achieved through diaspora members being active and productive member of society. This is reflected in the focus of many ADOs on integration-related activities - particularly in Sweden, Germany and the UK. Furthermore, of those ADOs focusing on culture, they work on promoting or preserving Afghan culture and cultural understanding of the host country (e.g., language, norms, customs) – which is critical for integration. Having opportunities for **political participation was found to be important** to Afghan

diaspora. However, there were very few instances of political participation, with Peymana Assad, a recent council member of Afghan origin at Harrow Borough Council in the UK, and Samira Nawa Amini, a member of the Social Liberal Party in Denmark, serving as rare examples. Limited political engagement of Afghan diaspora in the focus countries are linked to several factors, including the experience, networks and connections required to run for political positions as well as unity of Afghan diaspora. On a more practical level, the amount of effort required to settle in another country and integrate into day-to-day life (e.g., language, employment, housing, and education) and raise a family is prioritized over political participation, especially for more recent arrivals.

There is **little information on the volume of remittances by Afghan diaspora** in the countries included in this study⁴⁴; however, this study confirms supporting families, relatives and friends in Afghanistan is common practice. While sending remittances represents an additional financial burden for the diaspora, the findings were not consistent in the impact this had on their ability to contribute financially to diaspora activities in the study countries. Thus, overall income, the economic situation of family in Afghanistan, as well as their interest towards diaspora activities combine to influence decision-making on an individual level.

Regarding the perceptions on return, Afghan diaspora did not show willingness to return permanently to Afghanistan due to the deteriorating security situation. Many Afghans did not believe that any return to Afghanistan could be 'voluntary'. This is in-line with research by Houte and Davids (2014), who propose to re-define voluntary return as "return of migrants with a legal alternative to stay permanently in the European country of residence" while "return of migrants without such legal alternative is defined as involuntary" (Houte & Davids, p. 78). Increased requirements for family reunification and threat of forced return for unsuccessful asylum seekers was found to have negative influence on the participation of many Afghans in diaspora activities due to stress and depression amongst affected members of the community.

4.2. AFGHAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGEMENT

4.2.1. ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE

A total of 462 ADOs were identified in the four focus countries. **Sweden hosts the greatest number of the organizations (133)**, with most being established in the post-2012 period in response to more recent waves of new arrivals due to the deteriorated security situation in Afghanistan after 2014 (UNAMA, 2019), mainly due to the withdrawal of most NATO troops from the country.


Reflecting the perceived importance of integration for diaspora population as well as a concern about fostering cross-cultural understanding, it is not surprising that integration and culture-focused activities are prominent. In Sweden almost 74% per cent of ADOs are active in the area of integration. A focus on **cultural engagement remains a high priority among organizations across all four countries**, particularly in Denmark (73%) and Sweden (64%). In addition, the ADOs in Sweden (20%), Germany (17%), and the UK (16%) are more commonly engaged in advocacy, focused on stopping the return of failed Afghan asylum seekers, than those in Denmark (5%). The reason for this is that Sweden, Germany and the UK are among the top destination countries for Afghans in Europe. Moreover, the UK, Germany and Sweden are among the European countries which have returned⁴⁵ more Afghans between 2015 and 2016 (See: Amnesty International, 2017), although the security situation is worse in Afghanistan (UNAMA, 2019).

ADOs showed a striking difference between countries on the engagement with **development and humanitarian aid or relief activities** in Afghanistan. While this was a major focus in Germany, with over 60% of ADOs having some work in Afghanistan, only 7% of organizations in Sweden can say the same. Indeed, Swedish organizations focus nearly all programming on the country of residence. The UK also

44 This is still primarily being conducted through the Hawala system, though increased use of systems that can more easily be traced (e.g., MoneyGram, AxisRemit, etc.) means that more reliable data will be available in the future.

45 "There are no comprehensive, comparable data on the breakdown of forced versus so-called voluntary returns from European countries" (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 31).

FIGURE 13: FIELDS OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ADOS ACROSS FOCUS COUNTRIES



had a very high proportion of activities focused on Afghanistan comparatively (40%). The limited interest in development and relief activities from ADOs in Sweden may be due to lack of having necessary knowledge and professional experience, and a high prevalence of Afghans who lived or were born as refugees in Iran prior to moving to Sweden – limiting their first-hand connection to Afghanistan. Limited engagement (19%) from ADOs in Denmark could be a result of three intersecting reasons: Denmark has the smallest Afghan population size, ADOs in Denmark are relatively new, and, frequently cited, attracting young and technically skilled volunteers was a challenge (see Section: 3.1.4). However, Danish ADOs still have more activities focused on Afghanistan compared with Sweden because their members are more likely to have direct connections with and knowledge about Afghanistan, experience, and have more access to funding. It is also important to note that the overall level of engagement with the country of origin across all focus countries is low compared to that of other diaspora groups (e.g., Somali diaspora) (e.g., see Sheikh & Healy, 2009).

4.2.2. CHALLENGES AND NEEDS OF THE ADOS FOR ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Though actual engagement is limited, **many diaspora organizations have the desire to be active in Afghanistan.** Several challenges were limiting engagement, including: the deteriorating security situation, a general reluctance from the diaspora to work with the Afghan government, and a lack of awareness about the development policies, particularly in the case of Sweden. For those that do manage to overcome these barriers, many ADOs reported being primarily active in the villages or regions where the members originate from and where pre-existing information networks exist. For those who lack local networks, multiple visits to the country are needed in order to meet the relevant community leaders, Community Development Councils (CDCs), and the relevant civil society – this can be costly and time consuming - presenting another barrier to engagement.

Furthermore, we found that there is reluctance from the diaspora to work with the Afghan government due to lengthy and non-transparent bureaucratic procedures as well as delays caused by staff turnover, concerns of corruption and lack of cooperation. The Afghan National Diaspora Engagement Policy (ANDEP) (in drafting phase) will also see the creation of a 'diaspora institution' to act as a focal point for diaspora organizations wishing to be active in Afghanistan in addition to encouraging private investment from diaspora businesses, though special attention will need to be paid to coordination so as not to create additional bureaucratic delays. Diaspora engagement in Afghanistan is seen as productive for the Afghan government and society with regards to transfer of knowledge and skills acquired by the diaspora as well as remittances and business investments (Haidari, 2018; Oh, 2015; MIGA, 2005).

4.2.3. CHALLENGES AND NEEDS OF THE ADOS IN THE FOCUS COUNTRIES

In each of the focus countries the ADOs pointed out their challenges and needs. The most common challenges across the focus countries were: getting youth involved in diaspora organizations (maintaining relevance, overcoming cross-generational cultural differences), lack of cooperation and collaboration among the ADOs (ethnic divisions, technical capacity), and access to funding (technical capacity, bureaucratic burden, time, lack of dedicated funding available). These challenges exist despite capacity building opportunities available in the countries (with the exception of the UK⁴⁶). Recommendations on how to address the needs and challenges of the ADOs in the host countries are provided in Section 5.

4.2.4. COORDINATION EFFORTS FOR ESTABLISHING UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION

The fractured nature of the Afghan diaspora has resulted in serious limitations to ADO cooperation, coordination and collaboration. This research found several examples of duplicated efforts and a general lack of awareness of other actors. **There have been interests and efforts to create a singular umbrella organization/network/council that would include diaspora organizations of all backgrounds.** But only two examples were found where the efforts for establishing a singular, inclusive or national umbrella organization were successful: The Afghan Council of Britain (UK – limited activity) and the SASNA (Sweden – predominantly a Hazara organization). The establishment of the umbrella organization/network will help the diaspora in exchange of information and experiences, support the political participation of Afghan diaspora members, improve funding opportunities, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among the ADOs in the host countries. In addition, creation of a singular or national and inclusive umbrella organization will increase the engagement of ADOs in development activities and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan.

⁴⁶ According to respondents, no such capacity building opportunities exist in the UK. The researchers have additionally searched for such opportunities, but without success. However, this does not mean that such efforts do not exist, but that simply respondents were not aware of any, and no such opportunities could be found through an online search.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Support activities to improve social cohesion within the diaspora. Activities that could facilitate social cohesion are cultural, religious and thematic events which would offer opportunities for diaspora members to meet in person and overcome existing divisions. Workshops for members of diaspora organizations presenting conflict situations in other communities and how they were dealt with are presented may serve as case stories to learn from them,⁴⁷ this could include exchange meetings with other diaspora network leaders who have overcome obstacles.

Focus on encouraging youth and second-generation participation. Individuals that settled in the country in question very young or are part of the second generation have been repeatedly identified as being willing to work across typical social divisions. They also have a unique position between culturally and linguistically, feeling tied to both countries. Young people who have benefited from educational opportunities and professional experience can play a pivotal role in redefining diaspora organizations and ensuring they remain relevant and may be ideally positioned to form and lead umbrella organizations.

Build on gains from social cohesion activities with the ultimate goal of creating umbrella organizations and/or thematic networks for improved coordination, collaboration, information sharing, and advocacy. Supporting agencies should provide financial and logistical support and coordination of activities related to the formation of umbrella organizations and may also choose to act as a convener and facilitator to mediate differences. Given the distrust that exists in some parts of the diaspora community, it is important that the chosen facilitator is regarded as neutral by all organizations. However, the process of forming an umbrella organization should result from the initiative and participation of the diaspora organizations themselves – without buy-in, organizations will not be sustainable.

Support access to funding. Donors should be more mindful of some of the limitations in terms of capacity of the ADOs, particularly in regard to proposal writing and reporting. This may begin with showing more flexibility in evaluating project proposals and ensuring that grants provide for the employment of a professional administrator or coordinator. Donor agencies could consider small grants for start-up agencies or opportunities for grants that support expansion and professionalization. Donors and supporting agencies should continue to hold capacity building sessions or individual coaching sessions to ensure specific administrative requirements are understood, but also offer opportunities for frank feedback on processes and support needed.

Start small. The umbrella organization in the early stage would have to be a small group of organizations. In the initial stages of an umbrella organization, information sharing, coordination and collaboration should be the focus. The development of an umbrella organization is a continuous process and requires consistent resources for basic activities such as basic coordination, event costs, amongst others. As part of supporting the initial phase of creating an umbrella organization, supporting agencies should provide those financial resources while at the same time facilitate the umbrella's efforts to raise more direct and sustainable funds. Donor agencies on the other hand should be ready to provide structural funding to the umbrella organization as soon as possible, either directly or through an established funding mechanism managed by an organization. Instead of trying to connect all diaspora organizations, regardless of the type of activity they perform, there should be an attempt to connect diaspora organizations that have similar focus, thus theme-specific coordination.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Based on the feedback from two respondents.

⁴⁸ Respondent from Germany noted that this would also be beneficial for ADOs in Germany as well - in particular those working in medicine. They can learn from each other, and travel together to Afghanistan, in order to identify the main needs of people in Afghanistan.

Support capacity development through direct outreach. Project development, proposal writing, and project management capacity gaps have been identified consistently. While some diaspora organizations are aware and have knowledge of these sessions, it is clear direct outreach to organizations to confirm participation and understand barriers to attendance (funding, travel time, time commitment) is needed. Likewise, ADOs must promote capacity building activities among its members and take advantage of such opportunities. Should umbrella organizations form, these could offer an excellent forum for coaching and training.

Support capacity development through mentorship partners with local-run community organizations. Respondents and ADO representatives expressed both a lack of capacity for project cycle management and also a desire to more closely connect with the local community outside the diaspora network. Supporting partnerships between diaspora and non-diaspora local organizations can facilitate information sharing, training, and create a platform for cross-cultural initiatives and collaboration – which is a priority for many ADOs.

Increase opportunity and support for integration in country of residence to recently arrived asylum seekers. The local institutions such as the municipalities should strengthen social and economic integration programmes, such as language classes and access to labor market. ADOs should be properly linked as referral providers for these programmes to ensure reach. Where possible, small-scale funding provided by municipalities and local foundations should be provided to diaspora organizations to carry out their own integration projects that complement state and local institutions.

Promote Afghanistan in the media. Organizations should promote positive stories in the media related to Afghanistan and diaspora members, and work toward allowing for stronger Afghan voices in the public landscape to raise awareness amongst residence countries and promote cross-cultural understanding.

Establishing local contacts to engage in Afghanistan and providing information and support: The Afghan government should facilitate and provide support for the ADOs in establishing local contacts with the Community District Councils (CDCs) and the District Development Assemblies (DDAs) as part of the increased interest in leveraging the skills and financial investment many diaspora organizations are willing to make in the country. Furthermore, the relief and development active actors such as ACBAR, DACCAR, SAK, and DRC/DEMAC are good entry points for partnership and engaging in Afghanistan. In addition, contacting the ADOs who are already engaged in Afghanistan such as DAMF and the Doctors Association for Afghan Refugees from Germany, SAK from Sweden, ACA and FSTS from Denmark, and Farkhunda Trust and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)⁴⁹ from the UK can be good sources to learn how to engage in Afghanistan.

Data consistency. All countries included in the study conceptualize the diaspora differently in national statistics. While some countries only measure recent arrivals under temporary protection, residency, or work permit – others consider these categories as well as naturalized citizens. Other countries include naturalized citizens and the first descendants (though may not categorize these on a national origin-basis). In order to fully understand the diaspora, it is essential that similar data is collected and shared across the EU.

49 BAAG is an active non-diaspora organization in the UK. It supports development and humanitarian activities in Afghanistan (See: <https://www.baag.org.uk>).





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APPENDIX A: CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

Code	Gender	Type ⁱ	Main organisational focus	Reason for migration	Time of arrival	Interview details
DK IN1	F	DO/AI	Integration	N/A	Born in Denmark	27 June 2018; Skype; English
DK IN2	M	AI	N/A	Political reasons, Security	1999	18 August 2018; (Roskilde); Farsi
DK IN3	M	DO	Culture, Development, Humanitarian Aid	Security	2004	17 July 2018; Phone; Farsi
DK IN4	F	DO	Culture, Integration	Economic hardship, Security	2000	28 August 2018; (Copenhagen); Farsi
DK IN5	F	DO	Culture, Integration	Political reasons	2000	29 August 2018; (Aarhus); Farsi
DK IN6	M	DO	Culture, Integration	Security	2010	27 August 2018; (Copenhagen); English
DK IN7	M	DO	Culture, Integration	Security	1989	28 August 2018; (Ballerup); Farsi
DK IN8	M	DO	Culture, Development	Security, Political reasons	2011	29 August 2018; (Aarhus); Farsi
DK IN9	(1). M (2). M	DO/AI	Culture, Integration, Development	Security, Political reasons, Health reasons	(1). 2000 (2). 2001	29 August 2018; (Aarhus); Farsi
DK IN10	F	DO	Integration, Development, Advocacy	Security	2002	30 August 2018; (Copenhagen); Farsi
DK IN11	F	DO	Integration	Political reasons, Security	1999	6 September 2018; Phone; English
DK IN12	F	DO	Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy	Security	2001	21 September 2018; WhatsApp; Dari
GE IN1	M	AI	N/A	Security, Political reasons	2015	21 June 2018; Phone; Farsi
GE IN2	M	AI	N/A	Security, Political reasons	1984	4 July 2018; Phone; English
GE IN3	M	DO/NAI	Integration	N/A	N/A	20 June 2018; Skype; English
GE IN4	M	AI	N/A	Security, Political reasons	1990	3 July 2018; Skype; Farsi
GE IN5	M	DO	Development	Education, Security	1970	5 July 2018; Skype; Farsi
GE IN6	M	DO	Culture, Integration, Advocacy	Security	1990	15 August 2018; (Berlin); English
GE IN7	M	DO	Development	Family reunification	2013	16 August 2018; (Berlin); English

Code	Gender	Type ¹	Main organisational focus	Reason for migration	Time of arrival	Interview details
GE IN8	M	AI	N/A	Education	2015	18 August 2018; (Berlin); English
GE IN9	M	DO	Culture, Integration, Religion	Political reasons	1980	19 August 2018; (Berlin); German
GE IN10	(1). M (2). M	AI	N/A	Security, Discrimination, Political reasons	(1). 2014 (2). 2015	19 August 2018; (Berlin); German
GE IN11	M	AI	N/A	Education, Work	2008	23 August 2018; (Cologne); English
GE IN12	M	DO	Integration, Development	Education, Security	1973	24 August 2018; Phone; German
GE IN13	F	AI	N/A	Work	2017	23 August 2018; Phone; English
GE IN14	M	DO	Culture	Education	1976	28 August 2018; Phone; German
GE IN15	M	DO	Development	Education	1972	5 August 2018; Phone; German
GE IN16	F	DO	Culture, Integration	Security,	1987	Paris May 2017
GE IN17	F	AI	N/A	Security, Persecution, Political reasons	2015	30 August 2018; Phone; English
GE IN18 ⁱⁱ	M	DO/NAI	(1). Development, Humanitarian Aid (2.) Humanitarian aid	N/A	N/A	25 August; Phone; English
SE IN1	M	DO	Culture	Work	1989	19 July 2018; Phone; English
SE IN2	M	DO	Integration	Security, Personal reasons	2010	26 July 2018; Skype; English
SE IN3	M	DO	Culture	Security	2014	22 July 2018; Phone; Farsi
SE IN4	M	AI	N/A	N/A	Born in Sweden	2 August 2018; Skype; English
SE IN5	M	DO	Integration, Advocacy	Security, Economic hardship, Health reasons	2009	25 July 2018; Skype; English
SE IN6	M	DO	Culture	Political reasons	2012	13 August 2018; (Stockholm); English
SE IN7	M	AI	N/A	Security, Economic reasons	2003	17 August 2018; Skype; English
SE IN8	M	DO	Culture	Security	2012	29 June 2018; Skype; Farsi
SE IN9	M	DO	Culture, Integration	Education	2000	29 August 2018; Skype; English
SE IN10	M	AI	Development, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy	Security, Political reasons, Persecution	2004	30 August 2018; Skype; English

Code	Gender	Type ¹	Main organisational focus	Reason for migration	Time of arrival	Interview details
SE IN11	M	DO	Integration, Advocacy	Security	2015	31 August 2018; (Malmo); English
SE IN12	M	AI	N/A	Security, Political reasons	2015	4 September 2018; WhatsApp; English
SE IN13	F	AI	N/A	Family reunification	2016	5 September 2018; Phone; Swedish
SE IN14	F	DO	Culture, Integration, Advocacy	Security, Family reunification	2004	6 September 2018; Phone; English
SE IN15	M	DO	Culture	Security	2007	6 September 2018; Phone; Swedish
SE IN16	M	DO	Journalism	Political reasons, Persecution	2008	11 September 2018; Phone; English
SE IN17	M	AI	N/A	Security, Political reasons	1992	15 September 2018; Phone; English
SE IN18	M	AI	N/A	Personal reasons, Persecution	2012	15 September 2018; WhatsApp; English
SE IN19	M	DO	Culture, Integration	Security	2011	19 September 2018; WhatsApp; Dari
SE IN20	M	DO	Development, advocacy	Security/ Persecution	2014	28 February 2019; WhatsApp; Pashto
SE IN21	M	DO	Culture, Integration, Sport	Security/ Persecution	2004	07 May 2019; Viber; Dari
UK IN1	M	DO	Culture, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy	Security	2011	26 June 2018; Skype; English
UK IN2	F	DO	Development, Humanitarian Aid	Security	1997	5 July 2018; Phone; English
UK IN3	F	AI	N/A	Education	2014	25 July 2018; Skype; English
UK IN4	F	DO	Humanitarian Aid	Security	1999	17 July 2018; Skype; English
UK IN5	M	DO	Development	Education	2011	22 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN6	F	DO	Integration, Advocacy	Security	1990s	24 August 2018; Phone; English
UK IN7	M	AI	N/A	Family reunification	2002	25 August 2018; Phone; English
UK IN8	M	DO	Integration/Journalism	Political reasons, Persecution	N/A	22 August 2018; (London); English

Code	Gender	Type ¹	Main organisational focus	Reason for migration	Time of arrival	Interview details
UK IN9	M	DO	Integration/Journalism	Political reasons, Persecution	2002	22 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN10	M	DO	Integration, Development	Political reasons, Persecution	1999	23 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN11	M	AI	N/A	Education	2013	25 August 2018; WhatsApp; English
UK IN12	M	AI	N/A	N/A	2001	26 August 2018; WhatsApp; English
UK IN13	(1). F (2). M	(1). AI (2). DO	(1). N/A (2). Integration	(1). Security (2). Family reunification	(1). 1993 (2). 2010s	26 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN14	F	DO	Culture, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy	Security	2006	26 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN15	M	DO	Integration, Humanitarian Aid	Political reasons, Persecution	1995	27 August 2018; WhatsApp; English
UK IN16	M	AI	N/A	Work	2007	27 August 2018; WhatsApp; English
UK IN17	(1). M (2). F	(1). DO (2). DO	Integration	Political reasons, Family reunification	1981	27 August 2018; Phone; English
UK IN18	F	AI	N/A	N/A	Late 1990s-early 2000s	27 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN19	F	DO	Development	Security, Work		27 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN20	M	DO	Integration, Advocacy	Security	2007	28 August 2018; (London); English
UK IN21	M	DO	Integration	Political Reasons	2002	29 August 2018; Phone; English
UK IN22	F	AI	N/A	Education, Security	2013	1 September 2018; Phone; English
UK IN23	M	DO	Integration, Development	N/A	N/A	6 September 2018; Skype; English
UK IN24	M	DO	Integration, Development, Student/Academic	Education	2015	9 September 2018; Skype; English
UK IN25	M	AI	N/A	Work	N/A	10 September 2018; Phone; English
UK IN26	M	AI	N/A	Work	1999	11 September 2018; Skype; English

Code	Gender	Type ⁱ	Main organisational focus	Reason for migration	Time of arrival	Interview details
UK IN27	F	DO	Student/Academic, Professional/Business	Family reasons	1990	12 September 2018; WhatsApp; English
UK IN28	M	AI	N/A	N/A	N/A	13 September 2018; Phone; English
UK IN29	M	AI	N/A	Security	N/A	14 September 2018; Skype; English
AF IN1 ⁱⁱⁱ	M	AI	N/A	N/A	N/A	13 July 2018; Phone; Farsi

i DO = Member of Afghan diaspora organization; AI = Afghan individual; NAI = Non-Afghan individual

ii GE IN18 was a non-Afghan individual involved in two ADOs.

iii This individual was based in Afghanistan and is a stakeholder in the Afghan government.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES - SECOND ROUND OF INTERVIEWS (MARCH – JULY 2019)

Code	Gender	Type	Details of interview
DK IN13	M	Donor	March – July 2019
DK IN14	M	DO	March – July 2019
DK IN15	M	DO	March – July 2019
GE IN19	M	Donor	March – July 2019
GE IN20	M	DO	March – July 2019
GE IN21	M	DO	March – July 2019
GE IN22	M	DO	March – July 2019
SE IN20	M	AI	March – July 2019
SE IN21	M	DO	March – July 2019
SE IN22	M	DO	March – July 2019
SE IN23	M	DO	March – July 2019
SE IN24	F	DO	March – July 2019
UK IN30	M	DO	March – July 2019
UK IN31	M	IN	March – July 2019
UK IN32	M	IN	March – July 2019
UK IN33	M	IN	March – July 2019
UK IN34	F	Donor	March – July 2019
UK IN35	F	IN	March – July 2019
UK IN36	M	IN	March – July 2019
UK IN37	M	IN	March – July 2019
AF IN2	F	IO	March – July 2019
AF IN3 ^{iv}	M	AI	March – July 2019

*DO - diaspora organization

*IN - individual (diaspora)

*IO - international organization

iv This individual was based in Afghanistan and is a stakeholder in the Afghan government.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE

QUESTIONNAIRE IDENTIFICATION	
x.1 Questionnaire Number	
x.2 Date	
x.3 Location of interview	
x.4 Language of interview	
x.5 Organization name	
x.6 Contact person name	
x.7 Contact person phone number	
x.8 Contact person email address	
x.9 Mailing address (organization)	
x.10 Consent to share contact details with DRC?	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes

Background Information

Maastricht University/United Nations University-MERIT in the Netherlands recently got commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC)'s Diaspora Programme (DP) to conduct a mapping study on the Afghan diaspora in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The aim of the study is to provide a capacity assessment of, amongst other attributes, the structure, purpose, and aims/objectives of Afghan diaspora organizations in order to identify areas of potential collaboration.

Specifically, the mapping and study will be used by DRC to engage with relevant groups of Afghans (associations and individuals) across Europe for consultations on diaspora views and engagement in the country of origin. DRC aims to extend its work with the Afghan diaspora (currently limited to Denmark) to more European countries both through its own programming (DRC DP) and in collaboration with the DRC Regional Office for Asia.

I will appreciate if I can have your permission in the followings:

- Do I have permission to share your contact details with the DRC and potentially other partners who are working on supporting the engagement of the Afghan diaspora?
- Do I have the permission to record the interview?

A. Introductory question

First, I would like to start with a more personal question

1. Can you tell me a bit more about your migration experience? [or that of your family?]
 - a. How was your life before you left Afghanistan? [How was your family's life before they left Afghanistan?]
 - b. What year did you [or your family] migrate to [host country]?
 - c. What were the reasons for your [family's] migration?

B. Afghan Diaspora

Now, I would like to ask you some questions on the Syrian diaspora.

2. Can you tell me some details about the Afghan diaspora in [host country]?
 - a. Is it homogeneous or heterogeneous (in terms of socio-economic factors, ethnicity, political aspirations and religion)?
 - b. Are there strong ties/networks within the Afghan diaspora in the [host country]?
 - i. How about with other countries?
 - ii. What is the role of ethnicity and religion, if any?
 - c. What is the relationship to Afghanistan?
 - i. Are there strong connections?
 - ii. What is the relationship to the state?
 - d. How do you perceive the “evolution” of the Afghan diaspora since you’ve lived in [host country]?

C. Basic Organizational Information

Now, I would like to ask some basic information about your organization — about how it started, why it started, and its registration status.

3. What motivated you to become engaged?
4. In what year was this organization established?
 - a. Have you been with the organization for much of/not much of its history?
 - b. Have you seen it change much in the time you’ve been here?
5. Why was the organization established, and why at that time?
6. What would you say is the goal or the “core mission” of the organization? Has it changed over time?
7. What kind of organization do you consider [name of organization] is? For instance, would you consider it a humanitarian organization, political organization, a professional network, a religious organization, etc.?
8. Is your organization registered?
9. What is the size of your organization’s membership (excluding staff)? Does this include both active and inactive members? (What is the size of both groups?)
10. Do you have paid staff? Or is it run on voluntary basis?
11. Is the size of your membership consistent, or does it fluctuate?
12. What is the composition of your membership? What is the distribution in terms of:
 - a. Gender
 - b. Age
 - c. Generation (e.g., first, second, etc.)
 - d. Ethnic group
 - e. Other characteristic [Education or skill level]
 - f. Also more recently migrated members?
13. How is your organization financed?
14. Is the organization part of any larger network of organizations, like an umbrella organization for all Afghan diaspora organizations, or a transnational migrant platform, or something similar? Why or why not?

D. Current Organization Activities in Conflict

Now, let's talk about what your organization does, about what kinds of activities or events your organization organises or takes part in.

15. In your opinion, how would a peaceful Afghanistan look like and how could peace be achieved?
 - a. How do you perceive the role of the Afghanistan diaspora?
16. What kind of activities and projects does your organization implement both Afghanistan and in [host country]? (Please describe all activities in detail)
17. Have these core activities changed over time?
18. Where do these activities take place? For instance, are some activities run exclusively from [host country] while others take place in Afghanistan?
19. Why have these activities become the focus of your organization? What inspired these activities?
20. Aside from these "core activities", what other sorts of actions or events does your organization take part in? [Alternate formulation: In a typical year, what activities will your organization have carried out?]
21. Does your organization raise collective remittances? [Prompt: if yes, how is the money transferred to Afghanistan, challenges?]

E. Cooperation

22. Do you cooperate with other Afghanistan diaspora organizations in [host country] or other countries of residence?
 - a. Why or why not?
 - b. If yes: Could you give me the names of the organizations?
23. How does your organization interact with stakeholders in Afghanistan?
 - a. What kind of stakeholders are these?
 - b. Does your organization support any specific group in Afghanistan?
24. Does the government in [host country] have programmes in place to facilitate cooperation with stakeholders in Afghanistan?
25. Do you see potentials for cooperation with Danish Refugee Council's Diaspora Programme?
 - a. If yes, through which means/forms?

F. Integration and Voluntary Return

26. In your opinion and experiences, what are the motivations and perceptions of Afghans in [host country] with regards to integration?
27. What do you consider integration? And do you think this is important?
28. Do you personally feel integrated? Why/Why not?
29. In your opinion and experiences, how are the perceptions and intentions of Afghans living in [host country] towards returning to Afghanistan? Do people see return as a viable option? Do people want to return?

G. Main Challenges and Future Plans

30. Here, I would like to talk about the future of your organization about what is on your agenda for the coming months and years.

31. What is the key driver that motivates you to continue your engagement? What would you like to see the organization achieve in the future? [For instance, what are its short/medium/ long-term goals?]

32. What are its key challenges/obstacles now and in the future?

33. What do you need for your organization for a better and smoother development towards its goals?

34. Are you individually or as an organization in contact with Afghan migrants prior or/and during migration? If yes, what is the nature of the relation? [please give as much information as you feel comfortable with]

Is there any other important information, you think I should know? Could you please share with us the contacts of additional diaspora organizations or engaged individuals of which you are aware?

APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES

TABLE C.1: ASSOCIATION REGISTERS CONSULTED

Country	Name of association register
Denmark	Central Business Register (Centrale Virksomhedsregister) ¹
Germany	Common Register Portal of the German Federal States (Handelsregister) ²
Sweden	Swedish Companies Registration Office (Bolagsverket – Sök företagsfakta) ³
UK	Charity Commission of England and Wales; Scottish Charity Regulator ⁴

Note: A number of contacts for ADOs and engaged individuals provided by DRC and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ) were also included in the mapping.

TABLE C.2: THE DETAILS OF CONSULTATION MEETINGS IN THE FOCUS COUNTRIES

Country	City	Date	# of participants
Denmark	Copenhagen	8 September 2018	9
Sweden	Stockholm	15 September 2018	9
UK	London	29 September 2018	9
Germany	Hamburg	6 October 2018	6

TABLE C.3: RESIDENCE PERMITS GRANTED TO AFGHANS IN DENMARK, 2015-2017

		2015	2016	2017
Asylum	Refugee status	130	294	335
	Other	17	24	34
Family reunification	Spouse or cohabitant, Refer to refugee	31	34	53
	Spouse or cohabitant, Refer to foreigner, but not refugee	10	5	6
	Spouse or cohabitant, Refer to Danish/Nordic person	29	19	42
	Minors, Refer to refugee	28	24	48
	Minors, Refer to others	5	3	2
	EU/EEA, Family members	1	1	2
Study		2	8	1
Work		11	8	5
Others		16	2	13

Source: Statistics Denmark, 2018c

1 See more: <https://datacvr.virk.dk/>

2 See more: <https://www.handelsregister.de/>

3 See more: <http://bolagsverket.se/en/us/about/e-services/foretagsfakta>

4 See more: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organizations/charity-commission> and <http://beta.charitycommission.gov.uk/>

TABLE C.4: RESIDENCE STATUSES FOR AFGHAN CITIZENS IN GERMANY, 2014-2017

		2014	2015	2016	2017	
Residence status (Aufenthaltsstatus)						
	Limited residence permit (Aufenthaltstitel – zeitlich befristet)	33,998	36,920	50,660	105,535	
		Education	333	385	410	345
		Work	57	75	90	135
		Humanitarian grounds	25,414	27,791	40,880	94,725
		Family reasons	7,461	7,910	8,480	9,495
		Residence status with special right of residence	733	759	805	840
	Permanent residence permit (Aufenthaltstitel – zeitlich unbefristet)	14,547	14,925	16,020	15,795	
	Exempt from requirements to have residence title	11	11	10	10	
	Applied for residence permit/legal status (Aufentshaltstitel)	2,258	3,169	8,810	12,530	
Freedom of movement according to EU law/EU mobility		211	233	260	305	
Temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung)		3,834	9,040	10,540	10,445	
Permission to reside		15,956	35,549	126,770	85,290	
Without status: No residence title, temporary suspension of deportation, or permission to reside (ohne Aufenthaltstitel, Duldung oder Gestattung)		4,570	31,607	40,415	21,725	

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018

TABLE C.5: GROUNDS FOR SETTLEMENT FOR AFGHANS IN SWEDEN, 2014-2017

	2014	2015	2016	2017
Students, non-EU/EEA citizens	2	3	6	3
Labour, non-EU/EEA citizens	14	22	11	27
Relatives to EU/EEA citizens	7	8	6	5
Non-EU/EEA citizens resident in another EU country	2	5	13	24
Labour, family members to non-EU/EEA nationals	20	37	31	28
Family members to non-EU/EEA nationals	346	336	234	346
Relatives to refugees	1,226	1,347	727	837
Adopted children non-EU/EEA citizens	2	0	0	0
Convention refugees	1,268	784	1,341	4,763
Persons in need of protection	405	288	735	4,275
Particularly distressing circumstances	505	503	919	687
Other permits, refugees non-EU/EEA citizens	6	6	4	4
Other permits non-EU/EEA citizens	41	36	51	112

Source: SCB, 2019d

APPENDIX D: MAPPING OF AFGHAN DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Aarhus Dansk Afghansk Forening (ADAF) (Aarhus Danish Afghan Association)	Denmark	Aarhus	
Afghan Association in Frederikssund	Denmark	Frederikssund	
Afghan Council in Denmark	Denmark		Culture, Integration
Afghan Cultural Center (ACC)	Denmark	Søborg	Religion
Afghan European Pharmacists Association (AEuPA)	Denmark		Professional/Business
Afghan Masjid (Afghan Mosque)	Denmark	Viby	Religion
Afghan Mosque in Copenhagen	Denmark		Religion
Afghan Union Fredericia	Denmark		
Afghan Voice Radio	Denmark	Copenhagen	
Afghan Youth Association in Denmark (AYAD)	Denmark	Copenhagen Aarhus	Culture, Integration
Afghanistan Peace and Brotherhood Islamic Union (APBIU)	Denmark	Kolding	
Afghans in Aarhus and Parastoha Organization	Denmark	Aarhus	Culture, Integration
Afghansk Damil Kulturforening (Afghan Damil Cultural Association)	Denmark	Aarhus	Culture
Afghansk Dansk Kultur Forening (Afghan Danish Cultural Association)	Denmark	Ferritslev Fyn	Culture
Afghansk Dansk Kvinde Association (ADKA) (Afghan Danish Women Association)	Denmark	Vejle	Advocacy
Afghansk Forening (Afghan Association)	Denmark	Næstved	
Afghansk Forening i Randers (Afghan Association in Randers)	Denmark	Randers	
Afghansk Forening i Viborg (Afghan Association In Viborg)	Denmark	Viborg	
Afghansk Forening Watan (Afghan Association Watan)	Denmark	Copenhagen	Culture
Afghansk idræt & kulturforening (Afghan sport & culture association)	Denmark	Viborg	Culture
Afghansk Idræt (Afghan Sports)	Denmark	Viborg	
Afghansk Kultur Forening (Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Lystrup	Culture
Afghansk Kultur Forening Mehterlam (Afghan Cultural Association Mehterlam)	Denmark	Viby	Culture

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Afghansk Kulture Dameli Forening (Afghan Culture Dameli Association)	Denmark	Aarhus	Culture
Afghansk Kulturel Forening (Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Søndersø	Culture
Afghansk Kulturelle Forening (Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark		Culture
Afghansk Kulturforening (Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Skanderborg	Culture
Afghansk Kulturforening i Farum (Afghan Cultural Association in Farum)	Denmark		Culture
Afghansk Kulturforening i Halsnæs Kommune	Denmark		Culture
Afghansk Kvindeforening (Afghan Women's Association)	Denmark	Aalborg	Integration
Afghansk Tawhid Institut	Denmark	Copenhagen	
Afghansk Ungdom Forening i Sorø (Afghan Youth Association in Sorø)	Denmark		
Afghansk/Dansk Integrationsforening (Afghan/Danish Integration Association)	Denmark	Ringsted	
Afghansk/Dansk Kulturforening (ADKF) (Afghan/Danish Cultural Association)	Denmark	Vejle	Culture
Afghansk-Dansk Venskabsforening (Afghan/Danish Friendship Association)	Denmark	Vejle	Culture, Integration
Afghansk-Dansk Venskabsforening (Afghan-Danish Friendship Association)	Denmark	Aalborg	
Afghanske Dansk Kulturel Forening (Afghan Danish Cultural Association)	Denmark	Årslev	Culture
Afghanske Familier Omsorg Forening (Afghan Families Caring Association)	Denmark	Viby	Integration
Afghanske Kultur Forening (Afghan Culture Association)	Denmark	Søborg	Culture
Afghanske Kultur Forening i Hasle (Afghan Cultural Association in Hasle)	Denmark	Aarhus	Culture
Afghanske Kulturcenter i Århus (The Afghan Cultural Center in Aarhus)	Denmark	Tilst	Culture
Afghanske Kulturelle Forening (Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Copenhagen	Culture
Afghanske Kulturforening Nordsjælland (The Afghan Association in North Zealand)	Denmark	BrøndbyStrand Ølstykke	
Aghansk idræt & kulturforening (Afghan sport & culture association)	Denmark	Viborg	Culture
Ahlebait, Dansk/Afghansk Venskabsforening (Ahlebait, Danish/Afghan Friendship Association)	Denmark	Herning	
Brabrand Afghanske Forening (Brabrand Afghan Association)	Denmark	Brabrand	

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Chowki Association	Denmark		
Danish Afghan Rebuilding International Organization (DARIO)	Denmark	Aarhus	Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy
Dansk Afgansk Venskabsforening Vejle (Afghan Danish Association of Friends)	Denmark	Vejle	Culture
Dansk Afghansk Forening i Hadsten (Danish Afghan Association in Hadsten)	Denmark	Hadsten	
Dansk Afghansk Kulturel Forening	Denmark	Vejle	Culture
Dansk Afghansk Kulturforening (Danish Afghan Cultural Society)	Denmark	Gråsten	Culture
Dansk Afghansk Kulturforening (Danish Afghan Cultural Society)	Denmark	Køge	Culture
Dansk Afghansk Kulturforening i Danmark/ Ballerup	Denmark	Ballerup Søborg	Culture, Development
Dansk Afghansk Kulturel Forening (Danish Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Sønderborg	Culture
Dansk Afghansk Venskabforening (Danish Afghan Friendship Association)	Denmark	Herning	Culture
Dansk- afgansk Kultur Forening (Danish-Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Sønderborg	Culture, Religion
Dansk/afghansk Kulturelle Venskab Forening	Denmark	Kaerslund	Culture
Dansk/Afghansk Kulturforening i Hjallerup (Gulkhosha Ha) (Danish/Afghan Cultural Association in Hjallerup (Gulkhosha Ha))	Denmark	Hjallerup	Culture
Dansk-Afghansk Kultur Forening (Danish-Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Sønderborg	Culture
Dansk-Afghansk Kulturforening Ishøj (Danish-Afghan Cultural Association Ishøj)	Denmark	Ishøj	Culture
Dansk-Afghansk Litterature Forening (Danish-Afghan Literature Association)	Denmark	Søborg	Culture
Dansk-Afghansk Venskabsforening Kolding (Danish/Afghan Friendship Association Kolding)	Denmark	Kolding	
Dansk-Afghanske forening ved Næstved (Danish-Afghan Association at Næstved)	Denmark	Næstved	
Danske/Afghanske Unge Aktivitet (Danish/Afghan Young Activity)	Denmark	Kolding	
Den Afghanske Akademiske Forening i Danmark (The Afghan Academic Association in Denmark)	Denmark		Student/Academic
Den Afghanske Aktive Forening (The Afghan Active Association)	Denmark	Viby	
Den Afghanske Association i Aarhus (The Afghan Association in Aarhus)	Denmark	Aarhus	Culture, Integration, Development

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Den Afghanske Danske Venskabsforening Kolding (The Afghan Danish Friendship Association Kolding)	Denmark		Culture, Religion
Den Afghanske Forening i Danmark (The Afghan Association in Denmark)	Denmark	Taastrup Herlev	
Den afghanske forening i Viborg (The Afghan Association in Viborg)	Denmark	Viborg	
Den Afghanske Fynske Forening (The Afghan Funen Association)	Denmark	Odense	
Den afghanske kultur - og sportsforening (The Afghan Culture and Sports Association)	Denmark	Aarhus	Culture
Den Afghanske Kulturelle Forening (The Afghan Cultural Association)	Denmark	Copenhagen	Culture
Den afghanske Kulturforening i Kolding (The Afghan Cultural Association in Kolding)	Denmark	Kolding	Culture
Den afghanske litteratur forening (The Afghan Literature Association)	Denmark	Frederikssund	Culture
Den Afghanske Moske Fyn (The Afghan Mosque Funen)	Denmark	Odense	Religion
Den Dansk Afghansk Kulturforening i Vejle (The Danish Afghan Cultural Association in Vejle)	Denmark	Vejle	Culture
Denmark-Afghanistan School for Government, Public Policy, Economic and IT / International Agency for Good Governance, Modernization and Effectivization of Public Sector	Denmark	Frederiksberg	Development, Student/Academic
Donate & Educate Foundation	Denmark	Aarhus	Development
Foreningen af afghanske jurister i Danmark (The Association of Afghan Lawyers in Denmark)	Denmark	Lyngby	Integration, Development, Advocacy
Foreningen for Afghanske Danskere i Roskilde (Association of Afghan Danes in Roskilde)	Denmark	Roskilde	
From Street To School (FSTS)	Denmark	Aarhus Odense Copenhagen Kolding Næstved	Culture, Development, Humanitarian Aid
Holbæk Afghansk Forening (Holbæk Afghan Association)	Denmark	Holbæk	
Katib Kultur Forening (Katib Cultural Association)	Denmark	Rødovre	Culture, Integration
Khatamul Anbia Forening	Denmark		
KOMAK	Denmark		
Network for Open Afghanistan	Denmark	Helsingør	Culture

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Nugal H. Forening	Denmark		
Open Fun Football Schools for All Afghans	Denmark		Culture, Integration
Qaran	Denmark		Religion
Skole-projekt i Afghanistan (School project in Afghanistan)	Denmark	Vejle	Development
Social Welfare and Economic Development of Afghanistan (SWEDA)	Denmark	Vallensbæk Strand	Integration
The Mobile Mini-Circus for Children (MMCC)	Denmark	Copenhagen	Development
Walking Future Center	Denmark		Development, Humanitarian aid
ABM Afghanischer Verein für die Beisetzung von Muslimen e.V.	Germany	Essen	Religion
AFGHAN - Freiburg (Afghanisch-deutscher Förderverein für Gesundheit, Handwerk und Ausbildung) e.V.	Germany	Freiburg im Breisgau	Development
Afghan Analysts	Germany		Advocacy
Afghan Bedmoschk Solar Center e.V. (ABS)	Germany	Bad Krozingen	Development, Advocacy
Afghan e.V. (Afghanisch-deutscher Förderverein für Bildung, Gesundheit und Handwerk e.V.)	Germany	Berlin	Development, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy
Afghan Euro Sport e.V.	Germany	Düsseldorf Essen	Culture
Afghan German Online	Germany		Integration
Afghan Hindu Kulturverein / Verein für Afghan-Hindu-Kultur in Deutschland	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	Culture, Religion
Afghan Medical Staff Association e.V. (AMSA)	Germany	Göttingen	Development, Humanitarian Aid, Professional/ Business
Afghan Mosque in Berlin	Germany	Berlin	Culture, Integration, Religion
Afghan Peacemaker e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	Development, Advocacy, Student/ Academic
AfghanaSamai	Germany	Mönchengladbach	Journalism
Afghanisch-Deutsche Kulturinitiative e.V.	Germany	Bremen	Development
Afghanisch-Deutscher Ärzteverein e. V.	Germany	Freiburg im Breisgau	Development
Afghanisch-Deutscher-Ärzteverein Weimar e.V.	Germany	Weimar	Development
Afghanische Frauen in München e. V.	Germany	München	Integration
Afghanische Gemeinde München-Deutschland e.V.	Germany	München	Integration, Religion

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Afghanische Gemeinschaft Kiel	Germany	Kiel	Advocacy
Afghanische Hindus Gemeinde in Köln e.V.	Germany	Köln	Religion
Afghanische Kinderhilfe Deutschland e.V.	Germany	Düsseldorf	Development
Afghanische-deutsche Ärztevereinigung Berlin e.V.	Germany	Berlin	Development, Advocacy
Afghanischer Elternrat e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	
Afghanischer Frauennetzverein e.V.	Germany	Hannover	Integration, Development
Afghanischer Frauenverein	Germany	Osnabrück	Development, Advocacy
Afghanischer Kultur- und Dialogverein e.V.	Germany	Kassel	
Afghanischer Kulturverein e. V.	Germany	Hannover	Religion
Afghanischer Kulturverein Hessen e.V.	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	
Afghanischer Kulturverein im Kreis Offenbach	Germany	Darmstadt	Culture, Development
Afghanischer Kulturverein Köln Meschenich e.V.	Germany	Köln	Culture, Religion
Afghanischer Kulturverein Lippe e.V.	Germany	Detmold	
Afghanischer Kulturverein Mittelfranken e.V.	Germany	Nürnberg	Culture, Integration, Religion
Afghanischer Kulturverein Ostwestfalen/ Lippe e.V.	Germany	Schloss Holte-Stukenbrock	Culture
Afghanisches Kommunikations- und Kulturzentrum	Germany	Berlin	Culture, Integration, Advocacy
Afghanisches Kulturhaus des Hazaravolkes (in Bayern) e.V.	Germany	München	
Afghanisches Kulturzentrum Maihan e.V. Ansar Moschee	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	
Afghanistan - Hilfe die ankommt e.V.	Germany	Bad Kreuznach	Development, Humanitarian Aid
Afghanistan Forum	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	
Afghanistan Information Center (Afghanic) e.V.	Germany	Bonn	Culture, Development
Afghanistan-Schulen-Verein zur Unterstützung von Schulen in Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Oststeinbek	Development
Afghan-Kidney	Germany	Friedrichsdorf	Development
Aryana School - Afghan Initiative for Children, Youth, and Women for Education	Germany	München	Culture, Integration
Ärzteverein für Afghanische Flüchtlinge e.V. (AFAF)	Germany	Mariental-dorf	Development, Humanitarian
Avicenna Hilfe für Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	München	Development

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Baham - Gemeinsam für die Menschen in Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	Culture, Development
BARFI Women's Association	Germany	Berlin	
Berliner Bündnis gegen Abschiebungen nach Afghanistan	Germany	Berlin	Advocacy
Bildung für Kinder in Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Wolfsburg	Development
Bildung, Kultur, Begegnung e. V. (YAAR)	Germany	Berlin	Culture, Integration, Advocacy
BookClub Afghanistan	Germany		
Brücke der Hoffnung - Hilfe für Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Heidelberg	Development
Canon "Afghanischer Frauen- und Familienverein" e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	
Children's Hope Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Köln	Development, Humanitarian
Christuskirche - Afghan Community	Germany	Hamburg	Religion
Dachverband des Afghanischen Medizinischen Fachpersonals e.V. (DAMF)	Germany		Humanitarian Aid
Das Afghanistan-Komitee für Frieden, Wiederaufbau und Kultur	Germany	Berlin	Culture, Advocacy
Das Waisenhaus Afghanistan	Germany	Friedrichsdorf	Humanitarian
Deutsch - Afghanischer Kulturverein e.V.	Germany		
Deutsch-afghanisch Studierende e.V.	Germany	Bochum	Development, Student/Academic
Deutsch-Afghanische Gesellschaft e.V. (DAGEV)	Germany	Essen	Culture
Deutsch-Afghanische Handelsgesellschaft mbH	Germany	Essen	
Deutsch-Afghanische Initiative e. V.	Germany	Freiburg im Breisgau	Development
Deutsch-Afghanische Universitäts-Gesellschaft e.V. (DAUG)	Germany	Bonn	Development
Deutsch-Afghanischer Bildungs- und Integrationsverein e.V.	Germany	Berlin	Culture, Integration
Deutsch-Afghanischer Flüchtlingshilfe Verein e.V.	Germany	Stuttgart	Integration, Development
Deutsch-afghanischer Kulturverein Karlsruhe e.V.	Germany	Karlsruhe	Culture, Religion
Deutsch-Afghanischer Verein "KINDER IN NOT" e.V.	Germany		Development
Die Vergessenen Afghanistans e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	Development, Religion
Direkthilfe für afghanische Witwen und Kinder e.V.	Germany	Karlsruhe	Development
Empor e.V.	Germany	München	Development, Humanitarian Aid

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Ffm Afghan Kickers	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	Culture
First Contact	Germany	Hamburg	Culture
Förderverein für das Schulwesen und die Medizinische Versorgung in Afghanistan e. V.	Germany	Brakel	Development
Frauenhilfe Afghanistan - Schutz und Bildung e.V.	Germany	München	
Freiheitlich Demokratische Partei Afghanistans FDPA	Germany	München	Advocacy
Freunde Afghanistan Rhein-Main e.V.	Germany	Mainz	Culture
Freundeskreis Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Berlin	Development
Friedensbäume Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Weimar	Development
Grüne Trauma Erststabilisierungszentrum/ Grüne TEZ	Germany	Hamburg	Integration
Gurdwara Singh Sabha Sikh Center e.V. Hamburg	Germany	Hamburg	Religion
Haus der Kulturen (HdK) e.V.	Germany	Göttingen	Integration
Haus Hazara Saar e.V.	Germany	Saarbrücken	
Hazara Cultural Association, Hamburg	Germany		
Hilfe für Diabetiker-Ambulanz in Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Bad Nauheim	Development
Hilfe in not e.V.	Germany	Bamberg Vetschau	Integration, Religion
HINDU TEMPEL UND AFGHANISCHER HINDUS GEMEINDE e.V./Afghanischer Hindu-Tempel	Germany	Hamburg	Religion
Hindukusch -Zukunft für Afghanistan	Germany	Weil am Rhein	Development
Hope Foundation for women and children of Afghanistan e.V. (HOFA)	Germany	München	
Imam Ali Kulturzentrum e.V.	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	Religion
Impuls-Afghanistan e. V.	Germany	Ravensburg	Culture, Development
Independent Afghan Women Association e.V.	Germany	Bremen	Development, Advocacy
Informationkreis Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Bremen	
Initiative Afghanisches Hilfswerk e.V. (IAH)	Germany	Marburg	Development, Advocacy
Innovativer deutsch-afghanischer Studentenverein e.V./idaSt e.V.	Germany	Essen	Culture, Integration, Development
Institut für Afghanistik & Stärkung der digitalen Bürgergesellschaft in Afghanistan (INSAF) / Institute für Afghan Studies & Empowerment of Digital Civic Society in Afghanhistan e.V.	Germany	Darmstadt	Advocacy

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Islamisch-Afghanisches Zentrum Abu Hanifa e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	Religion
Islamischer Verein Muhajirin Afghanistan e.V./ Ibrahim-Khalil-Moschee	Germany	Hamburg	
Kaussar e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	Development
Khorasan Kulturforum e.V. Deutsch-Afghanische Gesellschaft für kulturellen Dialog	Germany		
Komitee zur Unterstützung der Flüchtlinge in Afghanistan und zum Wiederaufbau des zerstörten Landes (KUFA) e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	Development, Humanitarian Aid
Kompass Center for Business Startups	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	Integration, Professional/Business
Kultureller Verein afghanischer Hindus in Deutschland e. V.	Germany	Essen	Culture
L'Afghan e.V. - Hilfe für Frauen und Kinder in Afghanistan e. V.	Germany	Leer	Development, Advocacy
Lichtblick für Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Altenkirchen	Development
Islamischer Verein der in Essen lebenden afghanischer Mitbürger e.V.	Germany	Essen	Religion
Mediengruppe Interkultura/ Interkultura Bildungsverlag	Germany	Hamburg	Integration
Mediothek Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Berlin	Development, Advocacy
Mrastah - Hilferuf für Afghanistan e. V.	Germany	Berlin	Development
NAZO Deutschland - Hilfe für Afghanische Frauen e.V./Afghan Luminous Sun	Germany	Lohmar	Development
Netzwerk Afghanistan Info	Germany	Hamburg	Culture, Development, Humanitarian Aid
Newsgroup Afghanistan	Germany	Berlin	Culture
Organization zur Förderung Afghanischer Regionaler Initiativen und Nachbarschaftshilfen (OFARIN) e.V.	Germany	Randersacker	Development
Radio Pearl Hamburg/Radio Sadaf Hamburg	Germany		Culture
Razi Film House, SocioCinema	Germany		
Roshani - Afghan Helping Organization e.V.	Germany	Wiesbaden	Development
Safi-Stiftung für Solidarität und Ausbildung, Finanzierung und Integration in Afghanistan	Germany	Bonn	Development, Professional/Business
Schah Do Schamschera Moschee Afghanische e.V	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	
Solidarni eV	Germany	München	Culture, Integration
Sport- und Kulturgemeinschaft Afghanistan e.V.	Germany	Hannover	Culture
Stiftung Akbar und Sima Ayas/Ayas Stiftung	Germany		Development
Turkistan Berlegi Afghan e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Verein afghanischer Muslime "Belal" e.V./Belal e.V. Afghanischer Islamischer Kulturverein	Germany	Hamburg	Culture, Integration, Religion
Verein der demokratischen Frauen Afghanistans	Germany	Essen	Integration, Development, Advocacy
Verein für AFGHAN HINDU KULTUR in Deutschland e.V.	Germany	Köln	Culture
Verein für Afghanistan-Förderung (VAF) e.V.	Germany	Bonn	Culture, Integration, Development, Humanitarian Aid
Verein Iranischer Flüchtlinge in Berlin e.V.	Germany	Berlin	Integration
Verein zur Förderung der afghanischen Kultur e.V.	Germany	Köln	Culture, Development
Visions for Children e.V.	Germany	Hamburg	Development
ZAN Hilfsorganisation zur Förderung der Rechte afghanischer Frauen	Germany	Frankfurt am Main	Integration
Zuflucht Kultur e.V.	Germany	Stuttgart	Culture
Afghansk Hazara Kulturförening i Orebro	Sweden	Örebro	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Kalmar	Sweden	Mönsterås	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen i Älmhult	Sweden	Älmhult	Culture, Advocacy
Afghan DN Sverige	Sweden		Journalism
Afghan Engineers Association in Sweden	Sweden		Development
Afghan Islamic Center in Sweden	Sweden	Bandhagen	Culture, Religion
Afghan National Fred Förening (Anff) i Eskilstuna	Sweden	Eskilstuna	Culture, Integration
Afghan Students Association in Sweden	Sweden		Integration, Advocacy
Afghan Van Familjeföreningen	Sweden	Skellefteå	Integration
Afghan Women Empowerment Programme	Sweden	Gothenburg	Development, Advocacy
Afghan Women's Association in Göteborg (Afghansk Kvinnoforening i Göteborg / Afghansk Kvinnors)	Sweden	Gothenburg	Culture, Integration, Advocacy
Afghaner i Sverige	Sweden		Culture
Afghaner som bor i Örnsköldsvik	Sweden		Culture, Integration
Afghanistan Children	Sweden	Täby	Humanitarian Aid
Afghansk Ariana förening i Tranås	Sweden	Tranås	Culture, Integration
Afghansk Förening Abasi Nasim	Sweden	Lidköping	Culture, Integration
Afghansk kulturforening i Helsingborg	Sweden	Helsingborg	Culture, Integration
Afghansk Kultur Och Idrottsforening I Mölndal	Sweden	Västra Frölunda	Culture, Integration
Afghansk kulturcenter i Boden	Sweden	Boden	Culture, Integration, Religion
Afghansk Kulturcenter i Kiruna	Sweden	Kiruna	Culture

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Afghansk kulturcenter i norra Sverige	Sweden	Luleå	Culture, Integration
Afghansk Kulturcenter i Piteå Sweden	Sweden	Pitea	Culture, Integration
Afghansk Kulturförening i Malmö	Sweden	Malmö	Culture, Integration
Afghansk Kulturförening i Ottestad	Sweden	Ottestad	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Akademiker i Sverige	Sweden		Integration
Afghanska Barn och Ungdom Förening i Nacka	Sweden	Älta	
Afghanska Centrala Förening i Värmland	Sweden	Karlstad	Culture, Integration
Afghanska FC	Sweden		Culture, Integration
Afghanska FF I Järfälla	Sweden	Järfälla	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Flytingar	Sweden		Integration
Afghanska Förening i Alvesta	Sweden	Alvesta	Culture, Integration
Afghanska förening I Kumla	Sweden	Kumla	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Förening i Sala	Sweden	Sala	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Förening i Söderhamn	Sweden	Söderhamn	
Afghanska Förening i Värnamo	Sweden	Värnamo	Culture, Integration
Afghanska föreningen för alla	Sweden	Klippan	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen i Jämtlands	Sweden	Östersund	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen i Köping	Sweden	Kungsör	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen I Ludvika	Sweden	Ludvika	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen i Lulea	Sweden	Luleå	
Afghanska Föreningen I Mellerud	Sweden	Mellerud	Culture
Afghanska Föreningen I Örebro	Sweden	Örebro	
Afghanska Föreningen i Oskarshamn	Sweden	Oskarshamn	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen I Strömsund	Sweden	Strömsund	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen i Sverige	Sweden	Ekerö	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen I Tingsryd	Sweden	Tingsryd	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Föreningen I Trollhättan	Sweden	Trollhättan	Culture, Integration
Afghanska föreningen i Uppsala	Sweden	Uppsala	Culture, Integration
Afghanska föreningen på Gotland	Sweden	Visby	Culture, Integration
Afghanska fotbollsföreningen i Kristinehamn	Sweden	Kristinehamn	Culture
Afghanska Konserter i Sverige	Sweden		Culture
Afghanska Kultur Foreningen Jönköping	Sweden	Jönköping	Culture, Integration
Afghanska kulturella föreningen i Köping	Sweden	Köping	Culture
Afghanska Kulturella Föreningen I Kristianstad	Sweden	Kristianstad	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturella Show	Sweden		Culture
Afghanska Kulturförening i Karlstad	Sweden	Karlstad	Culture, Integration
Afghanska kulturförening i Sundsvall	Sweden	Sundsvall	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturföreningen "Bamian"	Sweden	Helsingborg	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Borås	Sweden	Borås	Culture, Integration

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Hyltebruk	Sweden	Hyltebruk	Culture
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Lessebo	Sweden	Hovmantorp	Culture, Integration
Afghanska kulturföreningen i Lund	Sweden	Lund	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Östergötland	Sweden	Mjölby	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Sandviken	Sweden	Sandviken	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Kulturföreningen i Sverige i Stockholm	Sweden	Älta	Culture, Integration, Religion
Afghanska Kulturföreningen Västerås	Sweden	Västerås	Culture, Integration
Afghanska kulturföreningen-Mitt Dalarna	Sweden	Leksand	Culture, Integration
Afghanska kvinno & ungdoms kulturforening (Goteborgs)	Sweden	Angered	Integration, Advocacy
Afghanska Kvinnoföreningen i Trollhättan	Sweden	Trollhättan	Culture, Advocacy
Afghanska Penklubben i Nacka	Sweden	Nacka	Culture
Afghanska Riksförbundet i Svergie	Sweden		Integration, Advocacy
Afghanska ungdomsförening i Märsta	Sweden	Märsta	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Ungdomsföreningen i Gävle	Sweden	Gävle	Culture, Integration
Afghanska Ungdomsföreningen i Skellefteå	Sweden	Skellefteå	Integration
Afghanskt Akademiskt Kulturcentrum i Sverige	Sweden	Malmö	Culture, Integration
Ariana Afghanska KI förening	Sweden	Malmö	Integration, Religion
Arlovs Afghanskvensk Vanskap Foreningen	Sweden	Arlöv	
Asian Kulturhuset	Sweden	Huddinge	Culture
Asylgruppen in Malmö	Sweden		
Azad Afghan Forening	Sweden	Göteborg	Culture, Integration
Bureau for Rights Based Development (BRD-Sweden)	Sweden	Stockholm	Development, Advocacy
Dari och Pashto Tolkar i Sverige	Sweden		Integration
De Bortglömda barnen i Afghanistan (The Forgotten Children in Afghanistan)	Sweden	Umeå	
Defenceless asylum seekers	Sweden		Integration, Advocacy
Ensamkommandes Förbund Eksjö	Sweden		Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Göteborg	Sweden	Göteborg	Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Huddinge	Sweden		Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Ljungby	Sweden		Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Stenungsund-Tjörn	Sweden		Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Umeå	Sweden	Umeå	Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Vindeln	Sweden		Integration
Ensamkommandes Förbund Vingåker	Sweden	Vingåker	Integration
Fanos Förening	Sweden	Göteborg	Culture, Integration
Farkhonda & Tabasum	Sweden		Advocacy

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Föreningen Afghanistanier i Sverige i Uppsala	Sweden	Uppsala	
Golgozar Search Engine	Sweden		Development
Gruppen Hazara i Sverige	Sweden		Integration
Gull Bahar / Nätverket för afghanska vänner i Halmstad	Sweden		Culture, Integration
Hazara Internationella Nätverk - Svenska	Sweden		Culture, Advocacy
Hazaras in Sweden	Sweden		Advocacy
Hazarer i Sverige	Sweden		Integration, Advocacy
Integration i Varberg	Sweden		Culture, Integration
Internationella Afghanska Kvinno- center	Sweden	Göteborg	Integration, Advocacy
Kodakan Afghan	Sweden	Älta	Culture
Maihan Afghanska kulturforeningen	Sweden	Angered	
Radio Sweden Farsi/Dari (Sverige Radio)	Sweden	Stockholm	Journalism
Salsal förening i Sverige	Sweden	Uppsala	Culture, Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Finspång	Sweden		Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Höganäs	Sweden		Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Kristianstad	Sweden		Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Malmö	Sweden	Malmö	Integration, Advocacy
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Mölndal	Sweden		Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Riksförbund	Sweden	Solna	Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Stockholm	Sweden		Integration
SEF Sveriges Ensamkommandes Förening Uddevalla	Sweden	Uddevalla	Integration
Shahmama and Salsal National Association	Sweden	Jarfalla	Culture, Integration, Advocacy
Sham Cultural Association	Sweden	Malmö	Culture
Skånes Stadsmission	Sweden		
stoppa utvisningarna av afghanska ungdomar!	Sweden		Advocacy
Sundsvalls Afghanistankommitté	Sweden	Sundsvall	Development, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy
Svensk Afghansk Församling/Abu Bakar Sadeq	Sweden	Malmö	Integration, Religion
Svensk Hazara Förening i Lund	Sweden	Lund	Culture, Integration

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Svensk Hazara Förening i Märsta / Hazara community in Sweden	Sweden	Märsta	Culture, Integration
Svenskar Och Invandrare Mot Narkotika	Sweden	Sundbyberg	Integration
Sverige för flyktigamnesti	Sweden		Advocacy
Sverige Hazarernas Forening (Hazara Community in Sweden)	Sweden		Culture, Integration
The Afghan International Film Festival in Stockholm	Sweden	Stockholm	Culture, Advocacy
Ung i Sverige	Sweden		Advocacy
Unga Örna Dala Afghan	Sweden	Falun	Culture
United Afghansk Förening	Sweden	Umeå	Integration
Vimmerby Afghanska Förening	Sweden	Vimmerby	Culture, Religion
Voice of Gharjistan	Sweden		Advocacy
Afghan Academy International / Afghan Council of Britain	UK	London	Integration, Education, Culture, Media, Arts, Peace, Coordination
Afghan Action	UK	London	Development, Humanitarian Aid
Afghan Advisory Board	UK		
Afghan Advocacy Initiative	UK		
Afghan Association of London (Harrow)	UK	London	Integration
Afghan Association Paiwand LTD	UK	London	Integration
Afghan Business Association UK	UK	West Yorkshire	Professional/ Business
Afghan Community and Welfare Center	UK	Walsall	Integration, Development
Afghan Community Centre	UK		
Afghan Community Welfare Centre (Midlands)	UK		
Afghan Professionals Network (APN)	UK	London	Education, professional
Afghan Cricket Association	UK	London	
Afghan Culture and Islamic Center	UK	Birmingham	Culture, Religion
Afghan Ekta Cultural/Religious Community Center	UK	London	Development, Religion
Afghan Events Worldwide	UK		
Afghan Human Rights Foundation	UK	Glasgow	Culture, Integration
Afghan Islamic and Culture Center	UK	London	Religion
Afghan Shia UK	UK		Religion
Afghan Sikh Ekta Charitable Foundation	UK	Birmingham	Religion
Afghan Society in the West Midlands	UK	Birmingham	Integration, Development, Religion
Afghan Students Association UK	UK	London	Integration, Development, Student/ Academic

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Afghan Trust	UK	London	Development
Afghan Unity Group	UK	Leicester	Humanitarian Aid, Religion
Afghan Voice	UK	London	Integration
Afghan Voice Radio	UK	London	Journalism
Afghan Welfare Trust	UK	Luton	Development
Afghan Women's Support Forum	UK		Advocacy
Afghan Youth Association	UK		Culture, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy
Afghan Youth Movement UK	UK		Culture
Afghan Youths Guidance Foundation	UK	London	Integration, Religion
Afghana Foundation	UK		Development, Humanitarian Aid
Afghanistan & Central Asia Association	UK	London	Integration, Development
Afghanistan Music Unit	UK	London	
Al Sadat Foundation	UK	Reading	Development, Humanitarian Aid
Ariana Teleheal	UK	London	
Aryana Aid	UK	Enfield	Development, Humanitarian Aid
Association of Afghan Healthcare Professionals-UK	UK	Edinburgh	Integration, Development
Association of Afghan United in Britain	UK	Leicester	Integration, Religion
Aston Student Union Afghan Society	UK	Birmingham	Culture, Humanitarian Aid
Attock Community Association	UK	Bradford	Culture, Integration
Ayendah Sazan Community	UK	Leeds	Culture, Integration
Birmingham City University Afghan Society	UK	Birmingham	Culture
Bismillah Cultural Centre (Afghan Community)	UK	London	Culture, Religion
British-Afghan Women's Society	UK	London	Integration, Advocacy
Burton Afghan Society	UK	Birmingham	Integration
Cambridge University Afghan Society	UK	Cambridge	Culture, Integration, Student/Academic
Camden Afghan Community	UK	London	Integration, Advocacy
Coventry University Student Union's Afghan Society	UK	Birmingham	Culture, Advocacy, Student/ Academic
Derbyshire Afghan Community Association	UK	Derby	Culture, Integration
Dorset Hazara Community	UK	Bournemouth	Integration
Eagle Eyes Association	UK	London	Integration, Humanitarian Aid
Enabled Children Initiative	UK	London	Humanitarian Aid

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Farkhunda Trust for Afghan Women's Education	UK	London	Development, Education
Glasgow Afghan United	UK	Glasgow	Culture, Integration
Hazara Association Oxford	UK	Oxford	Culture, Integration
Hazara Charitable Trust	UK	Romford	Culture, Development
Hazara Community Association	UK	Manchester	Integration
Hazara Community Milton Keynes	UK	Milton Keynes	Integration, Religion
Hazara United Movement	UK		Integration, Advocacy
Hazara Council of Great Britain	UK		Advocacy
Help And Care For Afghan Homeless Children	UK	London	Development
Hewad Welfare Limited	UK	London	Culture
Ikhlass Masjid	UK	Manchester	Religion
Imam Hassan Mujtaba Foundation	UK	London	Integration
International Committee for Rehabilitation Aid to Afghanistan	UK	Leeds	Development
Islamic Integration Community Centre	UK	Northholt	Religion
Kateb Cultural Association	UK	Nottingham	Culture
Kent Afghan Community	UK	Maidstone	Culture, Religion
Khalsa Diwan Afghanistan	UK	Middlesex	Humanitarian Aid, Religion
Kings College London Afghan Welfare Society	UK	London	Culture, Development, Student/Academic
Kingston University Afghan Society	UK	Surrey	Culture, Student/Academic
Learning for Life	UK	London	Development
Leeds Afghan Education Centre	UK	Leeds	Culture
Leeds University Afghan Society	UK	Leeds	Culture, Student/Academic
Lewisham Afghan Community LTD	UK	London	Integration
Lewisham Islamic Centre	UK	London	Culture, Religion
London School of Economics Afghan Society	UK	London	Culture, Advocacy, Student/ Academic
Middlesex Afghan Community			
Manchester Hazara Community	UK	Manchester	
My Bright Kite	UK	Leeds	Integration, Advocacy
Nations of Migration Awakening the Diaspora (NOMAD)	UK	London	Integration, Advocacy
Nedaye Zan	UK	Middlesex	
Niazi Jirga	UK	London	Integration, Humanitarian Aid
Persian Advice Bureau	UK	London	Culture, Integration
Peterborough Afghan Shia Association	UK	Peterborough	Culture, Religion

Name	Host country	City	Main Field(s) of engagement
Preston Afghan Community Association	UK	Preston	Culture, Religion
Queen Mary's University of London Afghan Society	UK	London	Culture, Student/Academic
Scottish Afghan Society	UK	Glasgow	Culture, Integration
Scottish Refugee Council	UK	Glasgow	Integration, Advocacy
Society of Afghan Residents in the UK	UK	London	Culture, Integration
Southampton Afghani Shia Association	UK	Southampton	
Swansea University Afghan and Persian Society	UK	Swansea	Culture, Student/Academic
The Afghan Appeal Fund	UK	Wells	Development
The Afghan Council of Great Britain	UK		Integration, Humanitarian Aid, Advocacy
The Afghan Orphan and Widows Charitable Trust (a.k.a. Afghanistan Helping Hands)	UK	London	Development
The Khorasan Charity Organization	UK		Development
University of Hertfordshire Afghan Society	UK	Hertfordshire	Culture, Student/Academic
University of Huddersfield Afghan Student Society	UK	Huddersfield	Culture, Student/Academic
SOAS Afghan Society	UK	London	Culture, Student/Academic
University of Manchester Afghan Society	UK	Manchester	Culture, Student/Academic
University of Nottingham's Afghan Society	UK	Nottingham	Culture, Advocacy, Student/Academic
University of Wolverhampton Afghan Society	UK	Wolverhampton	Culture, Student/Academic
Window of Hope	UK	Wembley	Development, Humanitarian Aid
Zazai Association in Great Britain	UK		Integration

APPENDIX E: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRC

- **Access to funding:** Provide awareness for ADOs about donors that can fund diaspora activities. Extend diaspora grant mechanisms currently only available in Denmark to additional countries, starting with those where there is limited access to funding.
- **Capacity building:** Continue supporting capacity building of ADOs in Denmark for proposal writing, grant management and project management. Consider gap-filling for countries where capacity building is not available. Consider providing more advanced training for instance on leadership, asylum rights & advocacy.
- **Social cohesion, coordination & collaboration:** Support efforts by ADO to engage with each other through cultural or thematic events. Strengthen ADOs efforts in organising meetings to establish an effective and inclusive umbrella organization in each of the focus countries. BRD and SASNA in Sweden, Afghan Academy International or Afghan Council of Britain in the UK, the ACA in Denmark, DAMF and YAAR in Germany are good sources to have their experience in supporting efforts for simple coordination mechanisms, networks, or national umbrella organizations.
- **Integration:** Support ADO's role in facilitating the integration of newly arrived Afghans. This can be through training, peer to peer exchange, support in developing key documents available in Pashto and Dari/Farsi languages for recent arrivals about culture, rules, and values of the host countries.
- **Advocacy:** Support ADOs efforts in advocacy towards durable solutions for displaced Afghans by providing training, space for exchange between ADOs at the national and European level access to key International partners and outreach to policy makers.
- **DEMAC** (Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination): Add Afghanistan as a focus country to the DEMAC platform to conduct research on diaspora humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan, offer training opportunities and improve coordination between diaspora efforts and the institutional relief response.

APPENDIX F: GLOSSARY

	Definition
Assimilation	Adaptation of one ethnic or social group – usually a minority – to another. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, mores and behaviour or even fundamental vital interests. Although the traditional cultural practices of the group are unlikely to be completely abandoned, on the whole assimilation will lead one group to be socially indistinguishable from other members of the society. Assimilation is the most extreme form of acculturation.
Assisted voluntary return	Administrative, logistical, financial and reintegration support to rejected asylum-seekers, victims of trafficking in human beings, stranded migrants, qualified nationals and other migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country who volunteer to return to their countries of origin.
Asylum	A form of protection given by a State on its territory based on the principle of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognized refugee rights. It is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his or her country of nationality and/or residence in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Asylum seeker	A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds.
Diaspora	Diasporas are broadly defined as individuals and members or networks, associations and communities, who have left their country of origin, but maintain links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third-generation migrants.
Durable solution	Any means by which the situation of refugees can be satisfactorily and permanently resolved to enable them to lead normal lives. Traditionally this involves voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement.
Family reunification	Process whereby family members separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin.
Forced migration	A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).
Forced return	The compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act.
Multiculturalism	Integration approach that recognizes, manages and maximizes the benefits of cultural diversity. Migrants remain distinguishable from the majority population through their language, culture and social behaviour without jeopardizing national identity.

Refugee	A person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (Art. 1(A) (2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Art. 1(2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality." Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country "because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."
Refugee status determination	A process (conducted by States and/or UNHCR) to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with applicable national and international law.
Repatriation	The personal right of a refugee, prisoner of war or a civil detainee to return to his or her country of nationality under specific conditions laid down in various international instruments (Geneva Conventions, 1949 and Protocols, 1977, the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, human rights instruments as well as customary international law). The option of repatriation is bestowed upon the individual personally and not upon the detaining power. In the law of international armed conflict, repatriation also entails the obligation of the detaining power to release eligible persons (soldiers and civilians) and the duty of the country of origin to receive its own nationals at the end of hostilities. Even if treaty law does not contain a general rule on this point, it is today readily accepted that the repatriation of prisoners of war and civil detainees has been consented to implicitly by the interested parties. Repatriation as a term also applies to diplomatic envoys and international officials in time of international crisis as well as expatriates and migrants.
Resettlement	The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized.
Return migration	The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation.
Voluntary repatriation	Return of eligible persons to the country of origin on the basis of freely expressed willingness to so return. Most often used in the context of refugees, prisoners of war, and civil detainees. Also, one of the three durable solutions to address the plight of refugees
Voluntary return	The assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or another third country based on the free will of the returnee.

Source: Taken directly from IOM's Glossary on Migration, 2nd edition (IOM, 2011)

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