



DEM MAC

DIASPORA  
EMERGENCY ACTION  
& COORDINATION

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DIASPORA  
ORGANIZATIONS  
AND THEIR  
HUMANITARIAN  
RESPONSE IN  
UKRAINE 2022

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**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The DEMAC and Meraki Labs research teams would like to thank the members of diaspora communities in Ukraine and across the world, as well as the representatives of donors, NGOs, government officials, and other actors who dedicated their time providing information and sharing their valuable knowledge and experiences.

This real-time review is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the Danish Refugee Council on behalf of DEMAC and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

Real-time review conducted between February 24th and April 7th 2022.

Published in May 2022.

# ABOUT DEMAC

The mission of DEMAC is two-fold:

- 1) to enable inclusive coordination and collaboration among diaspora organizations providing humanitarian assistance, and across diaspora organizations and institutional humanitarian actors, and
- 2) to facilitate higher levels of engagement and visibility for diaspora organizations in the humanitarian system.

The objective is to contribute to transforming the humanitarian eco-system by laying the groundwork for a deeper understanding of diasporas as humanitarian actor groups with different modus operandi for the implementation of aid in practice, identifying and opening potential spaces for engagement and cross-fertilization, and improving coordination between diaspora and institutional relief providers.

# DEMAC AIMS AT

01

Enhancing knowledge

between diasporas  
and humanitarian  
institutions

02

Increasing awareness

on diasporas'  
humanitarian  
interventions

03

Improving coordination

communication and  
coherence of  
humanitarian response

# WHY DIASPORA?

Work with diasporas has shown that diaspora organizations are multi-sectoral, fast responding actors who work transnationally, including in countries facing humanitarian crises. Having a connection with and understanding of their country of origin or heritage plays a vital role in humanitarian assistance where diaspora organizations often are part of the first response in the aftermath of a disaster.

Diaspora are also key actors when it comes to raising the alarm in times of crisis. The ease and frequency of communication between local communities and diaspora organizations means that they can be alerted in real-time, and their capacity to collect and disperse funds rapidly ensures that they are a key factor in unlocking the first responses in crisis settings. In hard-to-reach places where access may be an issue, diaspora organizations have a unique advantage due to their local connections and ties. They use their transnational position to respond to the growing demands for remote management and cross-border response in countries where international actors have a limited presence, and to advocate on behalf of crisis affected populations in the policy arenas of their countries and regions of residence.

Supporting diaspora as part of a broader humanitarian ecosystem to play a key role in humanitarian responses and provide vital support to communities in countries of origin contributes to the relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of humanitarian responses. In light of their transnational identity and close local ties, it is also strongly linked to the localization agenda, one of the main commitments under the Grand Bargain. Localization aims to strengthen the resilience of local communities and to support local and national responders on the front line. UNOCHA has called furthermore, for an indispensable opening of the resource base of humanitarian action by integrating 'non-traditional actors' - such as diasporas - to enhance the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and render it interoperable.

Diaspora organizations are part of and play a central role in localization. Many can be considered front-line responders themselves, making direct and concrete contributions to emergency responses in their home countries. Others work closely with local authorities, local organizations and community groups, providing technical and financial support, playing a role in advocacy and linking local actors with additional sources of support.

Diaspora organizations are heterogeneous - they have different capacities, values and approaches and as part of a broader humanitarian community can play a valuable and agile role in humanitarian responses. However, assistance provided by diaspora organizations and the formal humanitarian actors often follow parallel tracks, resulting in a lack of mutual understanding and recognition, and thus a lack of coordination and collaboration that would be of benefit to the overall response.

# WHAT NOW?

Building on expertise gained since its inception in 2015, DEMAC is further consolidating itself as a permanent platform - a one-stop-shop - for enhancing mutual knowledge and coordination between diaspora humanitarian actors and the international humanitarian system.

DEMAC's work has been a key factor behind stronger representation and visibility of diaspora organizations in the humanitarian eco-system - a first and core example hereof being the coordination of joint messaging and participation of diasporas as a stakeholder group to the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016, which was a key factor to putting diaspora humanitarianism on the map.

DEMAC is also piloting concrete liaison structures between diaspora and institutional humanitarian actors towards improving operational coordination in specific crisis settings. Another core contribution to the role of diaspora humanitarianism has been continuous knowledge development: DEMAC has conducted a number of studies aiming to increase understanding of motivations and modus operandi of diaspora humanitarian engagement, replacing assumptions with evidence on diaspora contribution.

Building on these experiences and the past and present research, DEMAC is developing an operational framework for diaspora and humanitarian actors, to improve future responses to humanitarian emergencies. Through the development of a standardized approach for the international humanitarian system to assess and document the role and impact of diaspora in selected emergency responses, DEMAC enhance the knowledge and awareness of the nature and significance of the diaspora followed by the facilitation of internal discussions on how the system could and should relate to and coordinate with diaspora emergency actors. Furthermore, DEMAC uses the documentation from selected diaspora emergency responses to engage with diaspora humanitarian actors to enhance the generation of lessons learned and self-reflections from diaspora-led emergency responses with a view to adjust their approach and discuss how to engage with the international humanitarian system.

DEMAC is continuously developing guidelines, tools and resources in support of diaspora emergency engagement, with a view to remain prepared to support diaspora organizations' engagement in new emergency responses and facilitate coordination among responding diaspora organizations and between diaspora organizations and the humanitarian system.

Finally, DEMAC enhances the knowledge among diaspora organizations about the humanitarian system to enhance probabilities of coordination between the two.

DEMAC is currently working with multiple emergency-prone focus countries, while at the same time remaining prepared to engage with and support diaspora from additional countries should a humanitarian crisis unfold in their country of origin.

## Acronyms and abbreviations

AICM	Association Internationale de Coopération Medicine
CAD	Canadian Dollar
DEMAC	Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination
DO	Diaspora Organization
EUR	Euro
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GBP	Great Britain Pound
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandums of Understanding
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UCCA	Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United National High Commissioner for Refugees
UNWLA	Ukrainian National Women's League of America
UWC	Ukrainian World Congress
USD	United States Dollar
WHO	World Health Organization

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**This real-time review is part of the Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination initiative's (DEMAC) "Research study on diaspora humanitarian response and engagement".**

On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a coordinated offensive on Ukraine. The hostilities have been characterized by indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardments and have resulted in large-scale displacement across the country. As of 6 April, OCHA reported that 6.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced in Ukraine. Internal displacement has largely responded to the patterns of conflict in Ukraine, with the situation in eastern, southeastern, and northeastern Ukraine - in addition to Kyiv - being particularly volatile.

Throughout the 2014 to 2022 period, Ukrainian diaspora organizations (DOs) transitioned their humanitarian activities from a spontaneous approach based on supporting those most in need to developing longer-term relationships with communities, local organizations, and hospitals requiring support. The Russian Federation military offensive on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has once again thrust diaspora organizations into the position of being both frontline responders and important donors to local organizations and other frontline responders. Their close attention to the escalation of hostilities and their previously developed relationships in Ukraine have put them in a unique position as interlocutors between host countries and their focal points in Ukraine.

To better understand the situation, DEMAC commissioned a real-time review to assess the activities, reach, and impact of Ukrainian diaspora organizations for six weeks following the offensive on Ukraine. The study commenced with a diaspora organization mapping exercise of 63 Ukrainian DOs. To support the refinement of the mapping process and to identify organizations willing to participate in the real-time review, an online survey developed on Kobo in English and Ukrainian was shared with the 20 shortlisted organizations reviewed in this study. Social media monitoring consisted of a review of selected organizations' social media accounts between 24 February 2022 and 1 April 2022. A total of 18 key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with Ukrainian DOs (14), formal humanitarian actors (INGOs, UN agencies) (3), and DEMAC staff in Ukraine (1). To support the monitoring of diaspora organization coordination and concerns, researchers attended six weekly DEMAC-organized coordination meetings (beginning 10 March 2022) attended by diaspora and national NGOs.

This report finds that many organizations were well-placed to respond to the situation in Ukraine due to experience gained during the 2014 to 2022 period in response to the annexation of Crimea and areas of eastern Ukraine. This includes the ability to leverage pre-existing contacts and partners on the ground - particularly in the health response - as well as prior experience coordinating delivery of aid to remote areas of the country. In this sense, DOs had equal or better access to Ukraine as compared to traditional humanitarian actors in the early response period. Many organizations were well-placed to continue advocacy messaging and began organizing protests prior to 24 February 2022 in response to anticipated hostilities.



**This report has three thematic areas of recommendations, as follows:**

### **1: Coordination**

Coordination between diaspora organizations and their individual and organizational contacts in Ukraine is strong - however, coordination remains poor between diaspora organizations and the broader humanitarian system. Therefore, ongoing coordination support is required to keep diaspora organizations abreast of the changing operational context - this should include diaspora-centric coordination and continued efforts to link the diaspora and clusters. This would need to be supported by ongoing capacity building regarding the cluster system in general. A formal training session on global coordination structures, with a special focus on key clusters and their tools may be beneficial. Furthermore, training diaspora organizations in accessing, reading, and understanding, and reporting against 3W and 5W reports would be a good start.

### **2: Response Modalities**

Diaspora organizations responded quickly and with great agility in the immediate aftermath of the Russian offensive in Ukraine. Many organizations began preparing for a humanitarian response operation in January - far before many other organizations were doing the same. As a result, response has filled a real gap in need; however, adjustments to response modalities could support a more effective long-term response. This could include transitioning some ad-hoc community volunteer-based aid to a coordinated and consistent response in-line with the broader humanitarian response, while also monitoring the needs of local volunteer committees that may benefit from less stringent aid and reporting requirements. This includes purchasing one-off equipment required for clinics, hospitals, and other life-saving institutions that may not be available in Ukraine. There is a need to explore other forms of humanitarian assistance beyond non-food items. Cash-based assistance and providing cash grants to organizations with specific needs that can be purchased locally may be more suitable and efficient given the strength of local markets and the diversity of needs.

### **3: Operations Management and Strategy Development**

Diaspora organizations have rapidly mobilized in response to the current humanitarian crisis. Many organizations rely primarily or exclusively on volunteers to operate. As a result, this report recommends DEMAC supporting learning opportunities between experienced large-scale volunteer-based organizations and DOs. The report both encourages organizations taking on paid staff for key positions but also balancing this against likely drops in funding should the crisis become protracted. Indeed, as the conflict continues, DOs should engage more with Cluster guidance and move to support local organizations formed because of the current crisis to become sustainable.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this real-time-review is to better understand diaspora activities supporting the humanitarian response to the crisis in Ukraine and border regions. The research will be used to enhance the knowledge and awareness within the international humanitarian system in Ukraine about the significance and role played by the diaspora, in order to learn where there are potential synergies between diaspora and the humanitarian response system.

It focuses on the period from February 24<sup>th</sup> to April 7<sup>th</sup> 2022, providing a snapshot of the humanitarian response of Ukrainian diaspora organizations to the current crisis. The real-time review focuses on the following:

- Profile and structure of diaspora organizations supporting the response.
- Areas in which diaspora organizations are responding
- Types of partnerships developed by diaspora organizations
- Modality of service delivery and accountability to donors and recipients of assistance
- Coordination amongst diaspora organizations, and with the international humanitarian response

The findings of the real-time review will be shared by DEMAC with humanitarian actors engaged in Ukraine, including diaspora organizations and local partners.





## 2. CONTEXT

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a coordinated attack on Ukraine. The hostilities have been characterized by indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardments, which have resulted in large-scale displacement across the country. Within the first month of conflict, The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) had verified nearly 4,450 civilian casualties - including nearly 1,892 civilian deaths as a direct result of hostilities.<sup>1,2</sup> Direct attacks have also been reported on humanitarian aid workers.<sup>3</sup>

As of 6 April, OCHA reported that 6.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced in Ukraine. Internal displacement has largely responded to the patterns of conflict in Ukraine, with the situation in eastern and southeastern Ukraine, and Kyiv being particularly volatile. Spontaneous as well as organized evacuation of civilians from these regions have been ongoing since the conflict began. Lack of access has worsened the situation, cutting off several regions from critical humanitarian supplies and preventing free movement of civilians. Western Ukraine is considerably safer, but has immense humanitarian needs due to the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In addition to displacement within Ukraine, more than 4.1 million people are estimated to have fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries - primarily Poland - as of 6 April 2022.<sup>4</sup> This has resulted in immense government and non-governmental mobilization to respond to the needs of asylum seekers.

At time of writing, OCHA is reporting multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance has reached approximately 1.4 million people, with a focus on Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts. There were 159 humanitarian actors engaged in the Cluster System as of 31 March 2022, with local NGOs accounting for 84 of these actors (53%).<sup>5</sup>

### The Ukrainian Diaspora

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) estimates that the Ukrainian diaspora is nearly 7 million people - or 16% of the total population of Ukraine.<sup>6,7</sup> Nearly half of the Ukrainian diaspora live in Russia, with the remaining portion primarily spread throughout North America, Europe (particularly Poland, Germany, and Italy), and Australia. While the Government of Ukraine does not have a formal diaspora engagement policy, several initiatives introduced in the last five years acknowledge the importance of the diaspora in terms of economic development and leveraging diaspora to support a positive image of Ukraine abroad.<sup>8</sup> Much of this acknowledgement followed on the 2014 annexation of Crimea and a portion of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the mobilization of the diaspora in support of Ukraine in this period.

Throughout the 2014 to 2022 period, Ukrainian diaspora organizations (DOs) transitioned from a spontaneous approach based on supporting those most in need to developing longer-term relationships with communities, local organizations, and hospitals requiring support. They continued to advocate against the annexation of Ukraine and raise funds for initiatives, particularly in eastern Ukraine.<sup>9</sup>

The Russian offensive in Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 has once again thrust diaspora organizations into the position of being both frontline responders and important donors to local organizations and other frontline responders. Their close attention to the escalation of hostilities and their previously developed relationships in Ukraine have put them in a unique position as interlocutors between host countries and their focal points in Ukraine.

<sup>1</sup> Figures as of 12 April 2022: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-12-april-2022>

<sup>2</sup> This number is likely to underestimate casualties due to the rapidly changing situation and the time-consuming nature of verification. Furthermore, monitoring in the already Russian-occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk is seriously limited despite allegations of civilian targeting.

<sup>3</sup> OCHA (2022a). Ukraine: Situation Report - 6 April 2022. Geneva: OCHA.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> OCHA (2022b). Ukraine: 3W Operational Presence, as of 30 March 2022. Available from: <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiYzdiYzg0ZWVhZyZgOzI0OZG1wLTg5NWMTOTFiMDJmZGM5NGM2IiwidCI6Ij%20BmOWUzNWwRiLUONGYtNGY2MCIiZGNjLT-ViYUQxNmU2ZGM3MCIisimMIQj9&pageName=ReportSection2bb072c0e9e67c92a63>

<sup>6</sup> The Government of Ukraine considers this to include nationals living abroad and those of Ukrainian descent who still consider Ukraine their home country.

<sup>7</sup> EUDiF (2021). Diaspora Engagement Mapping: Ukraine. Brussels: European Union Global Diaspora Facility.

<sup>8</sup> See: Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> For a detailed summary of this, please see: DEMAC (2021). *Diaspora Organizations and their humanitarian response in Ukraine*. Copenhagen: DEMAC.

“We’ve been talking about it since November last year and we seriously started coordinating our activities and forming committees globally in January and we were already helping and procuring medicine by the second week of February, maybe even earlier.

Several weeks before the war began, the organizations we were working with were stockpiling stuff. We have friends in Congress, and we were listening to intelligence reports, we had information from the administration that there is a potential Russian attack and being Ukrainian, we believed it”

While diaspora interest in the crisis of Ukraine has been overwhelming, this report is solely concerned with evaluating the response of formal (registered) diaspora organizations that existed prior to February 2022, to keep in line with the mandate of DEMAC and remain consistent with the previous DEMAC Diaspora Organizations in Ukraine Report.

This report begins by detailing the study methodology and limitations. This is followed by a findings section divided into several sub-sections, including areas of response, modalities of service delivery, partnerships, and coordination. The report concludes with recommendations for DO response.

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### 3. METHODOLOGY

The study commenced with a diaspora organization mapping exercise. The mapping exercise began by combining and updating two pre-existing mappings completed by DEMAC, one previously compiled for the 2021 study and the other a compilation of agencies active in Denmark. Then, online research (websites, social media) was used to add additional organizations to the mapping. The mapping exercise for this study expanded the number of organizations from 23 to 63. The mapping included collecting information relevant to the current situation, including number of staff, volunteers, budget, fundraised amounts, and relevant contact information and social media addresses. The mapping has been included as Annex 1.<sup>10</sup>

To support the refinement of the mapping process and to identify organizations willing to participate in the real-time review, an online survey developed on Kobo in English and Ukrainian was shared with the 20 shortlisted agencies reviewed in this study. The survey remained open for a two-week period. In this time, nine unique responses were received. Of these responses, eight were included in analysis.<sup>11</sup> Questions focused on fundraising, activities, areas of operation, modalities, and partnerships.

<sup>10</sup> Note that an additional 'mapping' will be conducted of spontaneous/informal diaspora organizations/networks established for the purposes of fundraising abroad. These will not be the focus of the study but will instead be used to support the contextual analysis of diaspora engagement on the humanitarian response. There is no set mapping target number for these groups; they will be mapped as they are encountered in the formal mapping process.

<sup>11</sup> One response was excluded as it was submitted by a national NGO partner.



Social media monitoring consisted of a review of selected organizations' social media accounts between 24 February 2022 and 1 April 2022. The main goal for conducting this exercise was to capture and document DOs' activities during a stage of the crisis which usually remains a blind spot for at least a few months until official humanitarian reports are published. For this purpose, a list of official social media accounts was drawn up and monitored for their daily activities. Relevant content was recorded in a database based on pre-selected themes (e.g., fundraising, advocacy, accountability, partnerships) for further analysis. Social media monitoring was conducted in English and Ukrainian by a native Ukrainian speaker as well as Meraki Labs consultants. Content in other languages was monitored using Google Translate.

A total of 18 key informant interviews (KIIs) was conducted with Ukrainian DOs (14), formal humanitarian actors (INGOs, UN agencies) (3), and DEMAC staff in Ukraine (1). The purpose of the Key Informant Interviews is to highlight real-time actions, successes, and challenges of DOs and the humanitarian response in general. Questions have been structured based on the key topics outlined in the proposed report structure, below. A total of 20 interviews has been the target for this study, though final numbers (18) have been subject to organization availability and willingness to participate in the RTR. The list of KIIs has been included as Annex 2.

To support the monitoring of diaspora organization coordination and concerns, researchers attended six weekly DEMAC-organized coordination meetings (beginning 10 March 2022) attended by diaspora and national NGOs. Meetings consisted of an overview of the latest humanitarian response in Ukraine, including updates on assistance provided, needs, corridors and access, and provision of logistical coordination information.

### Limitations

This study had several limitations.

- This study commenced shortly after the conflict began. As a result, diaspora organizations as well as national and international humanitarian organizations faced significant time constraints in terms of their capacity to participate in this assessment due to the prioritisation of providing assistance to people in need. While several initiatives attempted to mitigate for limited time for direct engagement - online surveys, social media monitoring, monitoring weekly coordination calls, and review of online publications and sources - interviews are a rich source of information.
- This study is not representative of the diaspora response overall and may exclude many diaspora organizations with lower visibility. Given the limited timeframe of this study, only one week in the initial phase of the study was dedicated to expanding on the list of diaspora organizations included in the previous DEMAC study (2021)<sup>12</sup> and (re)mapping their engagement.
- This study was conducted remotely. This means no direct observation or verification of diaspora activities in Ukraine could be completed. It is unlikely that this would have significantly affected results given the rapidly changing context, the limits of coordination in the early phase of emergency response, and the indirect nature of much diaspora engagement (as detailed further in the report).

<sup>12</sup> The 2021 DEMAC study mapped 23 organizations. This study mapped 49 organizations (providing direct support in Ukraine and indirect through partners); however, only 20 were selected for in-depth review.



## 4. FINDINGS

### 4.1 Ukrainian Diaspora Organizational Structures

Ukrainian diaspora organizations have existed for several decades and, prior to 2014, were focused on providing cultural support and promotion of Ukrainian culture abroad. Diaspora organizations have slowly shifted focus to more humanitarian causes, with many emerging as a direct result of the annexation of Crimea and portions of eastern Ukraine.<sup>13</sup>

As a result, many organizations were already set up to provide some degree of humanitarian support and had active connections with individuals and local organizations in Ukraine. This does not mean that all organizations are formally registered in their respective countries; some operate as volunteer associations rather than formal charities. According to the online survey, 63% of respondents were registered organizations while 25% were unregistered.

Most organizations prior to the recent crisis were completely volunteer-run and provided their services as a form of patriotism (DEMAC, 2021). This has remained the case in the early phase of the humanitarian response - most of both registered and unregistered organizations are operating with no paid staff, constituting 75% of survey respondents - however, there are indications this is both increasing and changing.

<sup>13</sup> DEMAC has produced a detailed report on diaspora organizations in this period: DEMAC (2021). Diaspora Organizations and their humanitarian response in Ukraine. Copenhagen: DEMAC.

To cope with the sudden surge in funds and emergency needs, DOs also increased their number of volunteers. A survey respondent based in Poland reported that their number of volunteers has increased from ten to one thousand individuals. Another DO with headquarters in Denmark reported adding two hundred new volunteers to their volunteer-base of 300 individuals. Another organization based in Finland acknowledged they have grown too quickly and struggle to keep up to public demand to support the people of Ukraine; while they were previously supporting local cultural events, they are now sending aid into Ukraine, operating a logistical hub in Ukraine, and organizing weekly protests in Finland. This has resulted in a significant change in the day-to-day duties of volunteers.

“Before [the war] we were meeting once a month as a team. Now we meet on a weekly basis, and we have daily phone communications.”

Several organizations acknowledged the need to consider more paid staff - particularly considering the volume of work required to maintain the scale of response, maintain connection with the public, and continually respond to changing requests from contacts in Ukraine. Permanent staff were also seen to be needed to ensure that organizations retain the ability to respond in the future as there would be less turnover and an improved ability to retain ‘corporate knowledge’ over time. While some organizations felt that they would be able to maintain a higher level of service delivery going forward, others remained wary of the situation - acknowledging that as public interest in the crisis decreases, funding from the public will also decline. Partnerships with local actors (i.e., civil society, volunteers, local NGOs) were seen as key to maintaining the scale and quality of programming; however, the current pace of the response was seen as a limiting factor.

“We are all volunteers, but this will probably change soon because the volume of work is too much. This is a lot of money and a lot of responsibilities that our group of dedicated volunteers are carrying on right now - also the number of people that we’re helping has increased exponentially.”

The findings of this report have been organized into several thematic areas. It begins with areas of response, which include health and non-food item response, fundraising, advocacy, and information provision. This thematic area concludes with a reflection on the importance of military and civilian defender support in the diaspora response. This is followed by a section outlining the modalities of response. This includes how aid is being delivered practically both in terms of local coordination and logistical arrangements. Finally, the findings review partnerships and coordination within the response.

#### 4.2 Areas of Response

All the surveyed organizations reported being operational in Ukraine either directly or through a partner. Simultaneously, half of these organizations had direct or indirect operational presence in one of Ukraine's neighbouring countries. All the respondents in the online survey indicated that they are providing direct support to the people of Ukraine. Survey participants were able to select multiple areas of activity. As such, fundraising and coordination each with 75% frequency were reported by the participating organizations. This was followed by advocacy and awareness raising for 50% of the respondents.

As for the activities, all the surveyed organizations reported providing health support. Health is mainly defined as distribution of medical supplies both in the form of consumables and heavy equipment. This is followed by distribution of non-food items and information sharing with 75% of organizations reporting conducting such activities. Next is food distribution and shelter with 63% of organizations, and transport support for relocation with 13%.

The following sections detail main response types of DOs. They begin by providing an overview of fundraising efforts, followed by provision of in-kind assistance, advocacy, information sharing, and concludes with a reflection on support for military and civilian defence operations.

#### Fundraising

Diaspora organizations reported fundraising as one of their main areas of focus. The DOs reviewed for this review raised more than 60 million USD over the span of a few weeks following the offensive in Ukraine by the Russian forces. All the interviewed organizations had adopted multiple modalities to engage with the broadest audience to maximize their financial resources. Often, others - individuals, private businesses, etc. - would reach out to the Ukrainian diaspora organizations to provide cash or other forms of donations. Yet, for many of these organizations, fundraising activities began prior to 24 February 2022. As the situation was unfolding and the Russian troops were massing along the Ukrainian border, the diaspora organizations began to plan for a potential crisis.

Ukrainian DOs commonly utilize online crowdfunding platforms such as GoFundMe, JustGiving, Pomagam, Virgin Money, and Facebook's fundraising feature. Nova Ukraine's success in using Facebook's fundraising tool was highlighted in a blogpost by the company.<sup>14</sup> Nova Ukraine partnered with a group of students at the University of Stanford to create this campaign, raising 115,000 USD from 900 people in just 10 days. Organizations such as Ukraine Charity created official pages on multiple fundraising platforms so that individuals could initiate fundraising campaigns with the benefits going to their organizations.

<sup>14</sup> Facebook/Meta (2022): Helping People in Ukraine, 17 March 2022. Available from: <https://about.fb.com/news/2022/03/helping-people-in-ukraine/>



DOs that had established strong ties with their host communities were able to benefit immensely from the exposure. US-based Razom, along with United Help and Nova Ukraine were among the organizations featured in a tweet by The Late Show host, Stephen Colbert, with one million followers. They were supported and promoted by celebrities and famous figures such as the musical band Arcade Fire, Google's CEO and Twitter's Jack Dorsey. These efforts were complemented by various in-person events such as fundraising concerts and selling handicrafts with the benefits going to affected communities. One example was PYSANKY - Ukrainian easter eggs - For Peace<sup>15</sup>, an event organized by an individual fundraiser and promoted by DOs such as Razom and Nova Ukraine. Within this initiative, people could create, sponsor, and donate pysanky eggs to raise funds for the humanitarian efforts.

Some DOs profiled for this report highlighted how individuals from the community had organized fundraisers on their behalf (sometimes without their knowledge) to contribute to their response in Ukraine. This was facilitated by Facebook's fundraising feature that allows organizers to select a charity to contribute to; it is not a requirement for the charity to approve of these initiatives. Similarly, one organization reported three separate music events organized to fundraise on their behalf in a three-week period. In another example, UNWLA received a donation from Citizens Bank in New York City, which offered a wall of their building to a Ukrainian artist who did a pop-up event to complete a participatory mural, raising more than 25,000 USD for the response.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> PYSANKY FOR PEACE (2022). Available from: <https://pysankyforpeace.com/pysanky-for-peace-project/>

<sup>16</sup> Media covered this event. For example: <https://www.timeout.com/newyork/news/go-see-this-brand-new-ukrainian-mural-in-the-east-village-032922>



In another example, one survey participant indicated that they have raised one million USD since the recent escalation of the conflict. For comparison, the number listed on their website for the total amount raised since 2014, stands at 1,889,900 EUR. Others have experienced much larger changes in scale, which has the organizations stretched beyond their capacity, forcing them to recruit more volunteers and staff to process donations. This in turn could put these organizations at risk following the inevitable drop in donations.

“In the past eight years, the average revenue in donations for our organization would be 70,000 USD per year. In 1 month we raised +10 million USD.”

“Since the onset of the war we have had a massive increase in funding - like five times more, I would say. And this is without active fundraising. Before we had something like 1,500 GBP as a result of a fundraising campaign, now we had a campaign which brought 270,000 GBP, another 165,000 GBP. We used to be a low scale charity in terms of funds. Now I think we are like a medium scale charity.”

Fundraising efforts were also supported by private businesses with or without ties to the Ukrainian community. According to the key informants, after the Russian offensive in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, local and international businesses and corporations would reach out to them to provide various types of support. For instance, the fundraising campaign set up by Ukraine Charity managed to secure 221,574 GBP on JustGiving platform, which was matched by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

What is critical to note is that, due to the nature and scale of fundraising, a clear use for the funds being raised is not always determined in advance; fundraising is typically done to ‘support Ukraine’. In this sense, organizations typically have a high degree of discretion to determine how funds will be used based on needs, their capacity, and their partnerships in Ukraine as they arise. This makes fundraising through Ukrainian DOs a critical activity - one that supports a wide array of activities and makes funds available to support local initiatives and organizations in Ukraine with flexibility.

“Prior to the war we would apply for grants from municipalities, INGOs, or other organizations. Now there are a lot of fundraisers organized by INGOs, they reach out to us as a point of contact with the Ukrainian community...We fundraise also through our social media. We receive a lot of offers for support from private people or companies, this is really a totally new context for us. It’s really great that people are being so generous. The challenge for us is to try to understand which are genuine offers and which are not [so that we can rely on their support and plan around it].”



### Direct Assistance

Support to the health sector is the most prominent area of response for diaspora organizations assessed in this study. This includes provision of medical supplies (e.g., first aid kits, medications, basic consumables) as well as heavy medical equipment. Some organizations have also reported supplying supporting equipment, such as ambulances and generators. Health seems to be a prominent area of response for two reasons: first, many organizations were supporting the health sector prior to the current conflict, so health response is a continuation and expansion of existing programming. Second, health and trauma response were highlighted as critical activities both by the Government of Ukraine and the humanitarian response for Ukraine.

This type of support tends to be coordinated directly with hospitals and clinics requesting support. This is facilitated through several channels. First, organizations with local connections may receive specific requests from hospital or clinic staff. They may also receive requests from local government officials in the area. Others may have supplies available and reach out to different areas - directly or through local partners - to determine who is most in need of the items they have available.

“We buy or ship large equipment. Recent purchases included an oxygen generating station - 440,000 USD worth - for the military hospital, or power generators, or a large medical equipment. Sometimes we partner with other organizations and ship containers with large medical equipment. We also ship donated medical supplies for hospitals, and general medical supplies.”

According to the online survey, all the diaspora organizations are supporting the health sector. This is usually done by either sending donated medicine, or through purchasing of medical supplies and equipment. As reported by some organizations, the most efficient method, however, is to provide direct support to the hospitals and clinics. For instance, on 1 April 2022, British-Ukrainian Aid published photos from Mykolaiv, Ukraine showing successful delivery of an ambulance and medical supplies. The Ukraine Charity team, through their 2022 War Crisis Appeal, are fundraising to provide emergency medical supplies to the Ukrainian hospitals. As disclosed by the Ukraine Charity, the purchases will take place in close coordination with the Ukrainian national healthcare system and verified local NGOs.

The focus on health support is not surprising; it flows directly from efforts stemming from the 2014 crisis and deepened in the eight years following. DEMAC (2021) has previously reported on the scale of medical support from DOs, using similar modalities that have been scaled up in the crisis. These organizations were well-placed to leverage existing contacts.

“We usually directly contact the head of the clinic for receiving supplies. It’s usually a very direct way of communication, saying: ‘Okay, we have four pallets of hospital supplies, do you need them?’ They say yes or no. The truck comes in, picks it up, and delivers it. It’s all done relatively fast. Once the goods reach our warehouse, the turnout is probably like two days.”



<b>Profile: Bevar Ukraine</b>	<b>Profile: Ukrainian Association in Finland</b>
<b>Location: Denmark</b>	<b>Location: Finland</b>
<b>Founded: 2014</b>	<b>Founded: 1997</b>
<b>Website: <a href="https://bevarukraine.dk/uk/">https://bevarukraine.dk/uk/</a></b>	<b>Website: <a href="https://ukrainians.fi/en/">https://ukrainians.fi/en/</a></b>
<p>Member of the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC) and the Association of Ukrainians in Denmark (AUD), Bevar Ukraine is a volunteer-based organization with offices across Denmark. Created in 2014 in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and portions of Donetsk and Luhanska, Bevar has been providing medical supplies and basic need kits to the affected populations in eastern Ukraine for eight years. Between 2014 and 2022, Bevar sent 54 trucks of supplies to Ukraine (approx. 2 million USD), targeting hospitals, education institutions, and civilians in need.</p> <p>With the onset of the war on 24 February 2022, Bevar has scaled-up and adapted its operations to emerging needs. Their volunteer base has grown from 300 to 500 volunteers in and outside Ukraine since the conflict began. New partnerships have been created with Ukrainian DOs and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In the first three weeks of their response, Bevar was able to send 50 trucks of aid to locations across Ukraine, including Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odessa, and Chernivtsi - nearly matching the assistance provided in the preceding eight years of operation. Delivery of this assistance is dependent on an extensive network of volunteers and local organizations, including in hard-to-reach cities. Bevar has also established Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) in Ukraine to coordinate direct delivery of humanitarian aid to medical and educational institutions.</p> <p>Bevar has also expanded its range both in terms of geography and response modalities. Bevar has expanded to provide assistance to refugees at the border with Romania, Slovakia, Poland and Moldova. It has also initiated new programming in the areas of reception, legal aid, shelter, and psycho-social support in Denmark. These services have been complimented by a service information line.</p> <p>Thanks to their extensive network in and outside of Ukraine, Bevar has positioned itself as a key actor for information sharing and coordination of fundraising efforts by individuals and other organizations in Denmark.</p>	<p>The Ukrainian Association of Finland was able to partner with Finnish post offices to organize collection points for donations from the public where they would then be delivered free-of-charge to the organizations central collection hub. Through these drives, they were able to collect food, clothes, blankets, and other basic items.</p> <p>They tried to support people in providing the best type of assistance by listing priority items on their website. One organization reported trying to cover a range of needs by supporting both refugee support centers and providing direct assistance. Cash was provided to centers so they could respond to needs flexibly (e.g., food, shelter, transport, information) while at the same time food, hygiene kits and diapers were shipped into Ukraine for IDPs. Other organizations, including those based in Denmark, received lists of items needed from Ukrainian embassies and tried to support the collection or purchase of those items accordingly.</p>

<p><b>Advocacy</b></p> <p>The weeks leading up to and immediately following the initial phase of the Russian attacks on Ukraine were met by large-scale anti-war protests around the world. Many of these protests were organized by the Ukrainian diaspora and garnered high-profile media attention (NYT, 2022; Foreign Policy; 2022). The diaspora organizations across the world began their communications through multiple channels. On social media, they often posted content several times a day to bring attention to the crisis. They organized daily protests with coordinated messaging and accompanied them with hashtags to generate further awareness.</p> <p>Interviews conducted for this study indicate several organizations were directly involved in awareness campaigns in the form of large-scale protests in high profile areas, including outside Russian embassies, in prominent squares, and other high visibility locations such as Number 10 Downing Street (the British Prime Minister's residence) in London and the White House. In London, the British-Ukrainian Aid organization reported protests taking place daily between 14 March 2022 and 19 March 2022. Rallies taking place in Silicon Valley and the larger Bay Area were accompanied by demands of a No-Fly Zone for Ukraine and increased military and financial aid for Ukraine. A number of hashtags gained momentum during these protests such as #planesforukraine, #CANCELRUSSIA, #NoFlightZone, with #StandWithUkraine being widely used by both the Ukrainians and the individuals from other nationalities.</p>	<p>The Ukrainian National Women's League of America (UNWLA) had already prepared an advocacy package along with training when the Russian offensive took place. Following the escalation of hostilities, they developed a public advocacy initiative by organizing daily advocacy challenges for the participants. They have petitioned NATO to respond to Russian aggression. They also pressured Netflix to stop streaming Russian State television channels on their service and Netflix followed through on their request. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of American (UCCA) has a close relationship with the US Congress, Senate, and the current Presidential administration. Based on their positioning as a prominent diaspora organization, they were able to meet House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to promote US sanctions on Russia and support for Ukraine. The UCCA organizes and supports consistent protests and gatherings in Washington DC to maintain attention on the situation in Ukraine and continues to advocate for the government and companies to apply pressure on Russia.</p> <p>Advocacy is another area of engagement that was well-developed prior to the recent conflict as many organizations mobilized to pressure foreign governments to act in response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea and areas of eastern Ukraine. For example, the organization London Euromaidan has regularly been organizing protests in Trafalgar Square and 10 Downing Street beginning in 2014, which has allowed them to have a consistent message and an audience prior to the recent crisis. DOs that have been active in the last eight years have managed to leverage these relationships and their consistent position on Russian hostilities toward Ukraine to add credibility to their current activities.</p>
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“Since November 2013, when the Maidan Revolution took place in Ukraine, we have been protesting and campaigning to support Ukraine and its nation.... we wanted to let everyone know about 2014 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the occupation of Crimea, and the Russian war in the Donbas area.”

**Profile:** British Ukrainian Aid

**Location:** United Kingdom

**Founded:** 2014

**Website:** <https://british-ukrainianaid.org/>

Created in 2014, British Ukrainian Aid is a volunteer-run charity initially established as an awareness raising platform following the Russian offensive on Crimea. In the past eight years, advocacy activities have been directed at the UK Parliament, Ukrainian political parties, and the British public with the overall objective of maintaining consistent focus on the continued annexation of eastern Ukrainian.

Beginning in February 2022, British Ukrainian Aid began coordinating with other Ukrainian DOs in the UK to provide humanitarian support to the affected population. In this time, they have refocused their advocacy efforts to begin providing direct humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, with a focus on the health sector. In collaboration with the Ukrainian Medical Association in the UK and other diaspora organizations (Medical Aid Ukraine, UMAUK, Plast London, Ukraine Charity) they are providing medical supplies and equipment in Volnovakh, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Bila Churchv, and Chernihiv, amongst others. In Ukraine, they have established a network of volunteers and local partners that deliver the donated goods to people in need. They have also established an agreement with the Ukrainian Ministry of Health (MoH) to provide support to local hospitals. In the six-week period covered by this review, British Ukrainian Aid sent 11 trucks, 13 ambulances, and 1,225 first aid kits to Ukraine, in addition to several tons of medicines, medical supplies and equipment.

British Ukrainian Aid is also supporting refugees in neighbouring countries by providing assistance hubs on the Polish and Romanian borders, in partnership with a number of private companies such as Bloomberg, Apple, and Prudential.

### Information Provision

For the purposes of this study, information provision refers to activities conducted by DOs that include service referral (e.g., shelter, legal, psycho-social), refugee welcome services or reception support, and information relevant to decision making during displacement (internal and international).

Information provision was not a significant focus of most of the diaspora organizations reviewed for this study, though it does form a portion of some organizations’ activities. This was largely dependent on the location of the organizations and activities engaged in before the conflict - those in areas either receiving or expecting to receive significant refugee flows were more likely to be engaged in information provision to new arrivals. Our Choice Foundation, based in Poland, conducted multiple information sessions over Zoom and YouTube on access to services for refugees arriving post 24 February 2022. The sessions included topics such as registration, social assistance, and financial support, as well as access to labour markets.

“Our info-line is now a 10-line call center.... We answer 800-900 calls a day. They call to ask for accommodation, health services and PSS [psycho-social support].”

One organization in Finland established information desks in their centers and has worked to build a website for refugees to provide accurate information on services. They have made it part of their strategy to regularly talk to local media to ensure that the public is also aware of their services to refer people to. They specifically mentioned the importance of information provision to fight misinformation they see on social media about refugee services in Finland.

No organizations studied for this review were providing information to internally displaced persons. This is likely due to the limited direct footprint of DOs in Ukraine and the fact that this activity has been taken up by national and international NGOs with a presence, particularly in western Ukraine.

“A big part of what we are doing is receiving refugees. We receive the requests from French people or Ukrainians who would like to host families and we pair them with refugees. We already accommodated 50 families like this. Every day we receive around 30 refugees. We help them with information.”

### Humanitarian Assistance versus Military Support

The situation in Ukraine has attracted an immense amount of public attention and support due to the mobilisation of Civilian Defense Forces. There has been an outpouring of support towards civilian fighters, including mobilisation of protective and military equipment, medical supplies, food, and - in some cases - direct involvement of volunteer fighters from abroad, supported by Ukrainian embassies. Foreign Policy (2022) reported that as many as 22,000 people have entered Ukraine in the initial week of the conflict via Poland - many of them reported to be Ukrainians living in Europe who decided to join the Civilian Defense Forces.

Public perception of the Civilian Defense Forces is positive and has thus been a major mobilizing factor for diaspora and others. On the same day of the invasion, the National Bank of Ukraine opened a bank account where public donations for support of the Ukrainian military and civilian forces could be made by individuals and organizations. This is a clear follow-on from charitable donations being directed to the military operations in the Donbas region in 2014.<sup>17</sup> In this case, military support is seen to be a key means of protecting civilians, and as humanitarian. This line is further blurred by the fact that many serving in hostilities are regular civilians who have taken up arms to defend their communities but are otherwise operating outside of formal military structures.

Military support has not been formally reviewed as part of this study - though it is an important dynamic that sets diaspora (and national NGO) response apart from the traditional humanitarian system, which is neither mandated to nor interested in engaging with such initiatives. Coordination bodies have indicated the difficulty in separating these activities. According to the online survey, only two diaspora organizations indicated not providing support to the defenders. For most key informants, defenders mainly consisted of civilians defending their hometowns and families in light of escalating conflict and therefore supporting them constituted a form of humanitarian aid. It is also critical to mention that, like health support, support to the military was a common area of response in the 2014-2022 period, therefore this is a well-known and accepted form of support.

<sup>17</sup> Come Back Alive (Povernys Zhyvym) is a clear example of a national charity widely supported by Ukrainians and Ukrainian diaspora alike. It has been providing military equipment (e.g., drones, thermal imaging equipment) and technical gear to the Ukrainian Military since 2014 and received record donations in the lead-up and immediate aftermath of the Russian offensive.

“If previously we were sending goods mostly to the Donbas area, now we are bringing military goods all around Ukraine where [it] is needed”

“Mission number one is defenders. We ship humanitarian aid such as uniforms, thermal blankets, blankets, sleeping bags, boots, protective gear - that’s part of the humanitarian aid. We haven’t done that before but, right now, we also cover some food and other hygienic items for territorial defence units, which consist of civilians. For the defenders program, we also have medical supplies which consist of individual first aid kits...We also send other medical supplies, bandages, sutures, surgical equipment for field hospitals.”



#### 4.3 Modalities of Service Delivery

Most of the reviewed diaspora organizations work with local partners to deliver their response. Their local partners consist of national and international humanitarian organizations as well as informal community-based groups. As 80% of the reviewed DOs were founded on or before 2014, they had already formed their network of trusted local partners in their response to Russia's annexation of Crimea. DOs stayed in close contact with their partners on the ground in the weeks preceding the recent Russian attack and as a result, beginning to mobilize well before 24 February 2022. As reported by one diaspora organization, their partner hospitals in Ukraine had started stockpiling supplies as early as January 2022.

“We’ve been working in Ukraine since 2007 so we already know people and organizations who we can trust. They will tell us the needs and we would sponsor it...If we are happy with the transparency of all the supply chain and execution of the initiative then we will support specific fundraisers and initiatives.”



“We have a very good cooperation with people from the UK, Canada, and US - we work with a dozen of them. Funds from these DOs represent around 20% of our budget at this moment. So it’s a lot...For me the diaspora has more added value as external donors. They have a network that we don’t have. They are very important for us in order to have access to some markets. Also their contribution is immediate, not like a grant that takes time - so it is very important for us and easy.”

Many DOs have taken on volunteer teams in Ukraine. This typically is done in one of two ways. First, organizations have a dispersed network of individuals and small groups of individuals who can communicate needs and coordinate to receive and deliver supplies from the DO to those in need. Second, organizations may link with specific humanitarian hubs set up by communities to coordinate the distribution of assistance. In this case, the volunteers are not specifically associated with the DO, but volunteers for the broader community response; they may support the storage and distribution of aid from multiple sources. DOs included in this study typically prefer the first modality, as it was seen as more accountable - trust between the DO and volunteers on the ground was the best way to ensure assistance was put to good use.

While humanitarian hubs have been an incredible lifeline for many, there is also the risk that aid is diverted, as the transparency and management of committees varies greatly between administrative areas and the associated local government. One organization interviewed for this study indicated that ‘micro-funding’ was a very effective way of aiding Ukraine - where 1,000 - 1,500 USD could go a long way to support specific needs identified by individual, trusted volunteers. Specifically, they mentioned how they had given a small donation of this size for a few volunteers to turn a local sports center into a temporary shelter and information center where people could be referred to services locally. While the DO does not control the implementation of this activity or have any direct oversight, they are provided feedback from their individual volunteers.

While local partnerships are central to DO actions, the preferred modality response has been providing partners with supplies directly. This has created some exposure to logistical issues. In the initial response, a lot of aid was entering Ukraine and assigned ‘to the people of Ukraine’ - so did not have a clear pathway to distribution. In this case, much of the aid ended up being pooled by local governments and volunteer humanitarian hubs. In some cases, it has been reported that this aid has ended up on the black market. DEMAC coordination meetings were critical in sharing information about the changing logistical requirements to get items into Ukraine, including providing clear instructions on labelling shipments and ensuring a consignee was able to be identified and able to collect items

“For us right now the issue is not the support, it’s the transport and getting it into Ukraine. It’s a bigger issue than what we anticipated... The partners that we have been working with for years, we have been able to deliver the aid to them.”



## Accountability

For the purposes of this study, we have understood accountability to refer both to (1) an organization's ability to ensure appropriate use of aid and remain accountable to donors, and (2) an organization's ability to deliver appropriate, quality assistance that considers feedback from communities - recognizing both standards are difficult to achieve in a first-phase emergency response.

The situation in Ukraine has evolved rapidly. As a result of the immense need, popular mobilization through community-led volunteer groups managing 'humanitarian hubs' has been a consistent approach to ensure people can access basic goods quickly and efficiently. While humanitarian hubs are locally managed and have slightly different ways of working and linkages to formal government systems across Ukraine, they tend to have a similar approach: that aid is pooled and those in need can present themselves to get whatever items they need whenever they like with no need to register for assistance.

Humanitarian hubs are managed by groups of volunteers who organize, and store received food and non-food items and then support those in need in collecting items. Humanitarian hubs access supplies through donations entering the country that were either intended for them or items that may not have a specified recipient or organization upon receipt in Ukraine.

Based on the information collected in this study, a significant portion of diaspora organizations have contributed to humanitarian hubs either purposefully or because of aid shipments being addressed to 'the people of Ukraine' or local governments. In this sense, it is impossible to determine how much of this aid was used, who it was distributed to, and whether it was appropriate or of quality. It is also important to note that humanitarian hubs are used to serve civilian and military needs.

In general, accountability can be ensured to donors in that evidence that items were purchased, shipped, and received in Ukraine can often be provided. Several diaspora organizations included detailed reports of their expenditure on their website and social media accounts. The reports included exact numbers or percentages of amounts raised contributed to each of their activities. For instance, on 28 March 2022, the Ukrainian National Women's League of America (UNWLA) reported transferring 25K USD to Association Internationale de Coopération Médecine (AICM), 10K USD to Mechnikov Hospital in Dnipro, and 10K USD to their partner Initiative E+ to support wounded soldiers and civilians.

In-kind donations, however, were not monitored with the same level of detailed attention, one reason being the complex logistics operations required to move supplies and equipment over land from other European countries and within Ukraine. For US based organizations, the supplies were usually warehoused and sorted through before being packaged and shipped by air. The shipments would be received in a European country - with Poland being the main destination - before being transferred by land to various regions of Ukraine. The shipments often change multiple hands and are supported by a broad network of volunteers.

This form of accountability may not be important for organizations that are specifically operating only in Ukrainian-controlled areas, as opposed to some international humanitarian organizations that need to maintain presence as well as the safety and security of their teams in both government and non-government-controlled areas who could be accused of providing military or impartial aid.

For the reviewed Ukrainian diaspora organizations, accountability is largely defined as being transparent towards their donors. The remote nature of their service delivery - primarily working through partners - can be a potential reason for a lack of connection between these organizations and the individual beneficiaries. The key informants seem to believe that during large scale emergencies such as the current war, working with trusted partners absolves them from the need for further monitoring. As such, their primary focus is on providing frequent and timely reports through their online platforms, virtual meetings, and mailing lists to ensure visibility into their expenditures.



“We monitor the number of trucks or weight of aid delivered to Ukraine. The volunteers take pictures and we share them on our social media.”

“We’re a grassroots organization, we only rely on our trusted volunteers. And they always send very detailed reports. Many of them were personal connections. With most of them we [have been] working with since 2014.”

Accountability to beneficiaries (i.e., providing appropriate, quality, and timely assistance<sup>18</sup>) is not a focus of DOs at this point. This was identified as a systemic challenge prior to the recent war (DEMAC, 2021) and is difficult to address in a rapidly changing environment, on top of the scale-up most organizations have managed. DOs are often not able to report on how many people they have assisted as the nature of their assistance (e.g., providing supplies to clinics, providing items to volunteer humanitarian hubs) stops after the supplies are delivered. Local partners may also not have this type of insight as it is not prioritized. As DOs do not often know how their assistance is used, it is difficult to determine whether it is meeting the needs of Ukrainian civilians. It is important to note that this can also be a challenge for international humanitarian organizations in hard-to-reach areas (primarily in the east), where monitoring data is difficult or impossible to collect and aid moves through a series of channels before reaching its intended destination.

At a basic level, health responses are typically responding to direct requests from health providers - so are deemed to be appropriate. Similarly, requests from local organizations on the ground in Ukraine can likewise be assumed to be appropriate for their circumstances. DOs have also been able to be better pre-positioned and agile in providing initial support - suggesting there has been some degree of timeliness to these interventions. The quality of assistance is not known. Both appropriateness and timeliness will continue to be a challenge as the conflict dynamics change; DOs will need to remain prepared to adjust ways of working as conflict becomes protracted.

“I don’t think we can assess the number of people [who receive our assistance]. But we can assess it in the amount of dollars that we fund each project. And for example, if it’s humanitarian aid that we ship, we also keep track of the weight of aid that is going over there.”

<sup>18</sup> Coordination of assistance is addressed separately.

#### 4.4 Partnerships

According to the online survey, 63% of the respondents are part of a network. Ukrainian umbrella organizations dating back to the 1920s have been able to bring together many diaspora organizations across the world. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) for instance, includes a national council consisting of 70 representatives from each organization under their umbrella as well as representatives from their several branches across the United States. UCCA also belongs to the Ukrainian World Congress. The organization, however, does not coordinate with any external actors.

Most interviewed organizations do not see formal coordination between diaspora organizations themselves, as well as with other entities such as other NGOs and UN agencies, as a priority when compared to delivering services in the current emergency. As indicated by these organizations, at this moment, it is critical that every organization does everything in their capacity to focus on life-saving aid. Coordination was largely seen as something that can be worked on in the next phase of the response or even in recovery.

“Right now, we are not part of any umbrella networks. We don’t need to reach out to other organizations right now. That’s not a priority because everyone is already doing what they can because it’s an active war. When the war is over and there’s no immediate need to save people’s lives, we can talk about forming alliances but right now that’s not a priority. Right now, organizations are collaborating around projects like let’s get a full plane of supplies to Ukraine - and that’s a very good reason to get together.”

As such, the coordination and collaboration largely take place around individual projects. For instance, on 28 March 2022, at least eight diaspora organizations and community-based groups came together to ship 3.5 tons of medical supplies and equipment to Ukraine. Several organizations in the US have been working together for some time and have managed to collaborate on advocacy campaigns and awareness raising to increase the reach of their messaging. The fact that these organizations existed prior to the conflict and had active communication prior supported joint initiatives. Even then, others reported that relationships had been helpful, but had not necessarily resulted in shared activities.

“We are in touch with other DOs since before the war, but we don’t necessarily work together on some specific projects at the moment.”

Several informal networks using WhatsApp have been established (e.g., Ukrainian World Congress) to share information or reach out to like-minded organizations - though engagement is not consistent. Similarly, Ukraine911<sup>19</sup> was established to match organizations providing medical assistance in the US to organizations in Ukraine (or organizations linked to organizations in Ukraine) that have specific medical needs.

“Coordination has not been great. There are clusters of organizations that have worked together for many years and others who have not worked well together...There’s info on who is doing what, where and when but it’s not resulted in any meaningful coordination. Everyone is doing their own thing. It’s quite frustrating.”

<sup>19</sup> <https://ukraine911.org/>

While DOs have not necessarily formed broad partnerships between themselves, partnerships are central to the delivery of assistance in Ukraine. As mentioned in the assistance modalities section, 75% of survey respondents reported working with national organizations in Ukraine to deliver assistance. Organizations interviewed universally acknowledged the role of their volunteers in Ukraine and other partner organizations (e.g., AICM, Caritas, etc.) was critical. Furthermore, many organizations reported having partnerships with the Ministry of Health - many of which existed prior to the war - that supported their connection to hospitals in need.

Similarly, several partnerships with private businesses have been formed in response to the current crisis. For example, AirBnB reached out to Nova Ukraine to support Ukrainian refugees with temporary housing. In 48 hours, over one thousand displaced families had signed up to receive one of these housing vouchers. Orange - the multinational telecommunications corporation - along with Mastercard supported Our Choice Foundation to create their info sharing hotline. The Polish airline LOT provided additional support to the foundation's hotline by developing conversation scripts for them. Their hotline responded to over eleven thousand calls between 9 March 2022 and 22 March 2022. PromoUkraine also formed a partnership with Orange to provide the recently displaced Ukrainians with 250 SIM cards with unlimited calls to Ukraine.

In sum, the crisis has encouraged DOs to strengthen their partnerships - and create new partnerships - with local actors in Ukraine. They have also gained new private sector partners in the initial response period. While many organizations report loose partnerships with other DOs for specific project or logistical collaborations, no organizations reported significant changes to the nature of their partnerships with other DOs.

#### **4.5 Ukrainian DOs in the Context of the Formal Humanitarian Response Coordination**

Ukrainian DOs were uniquely positioned to respond to the humanitarian crisis that has unfolded in Ukraine, with many of them gaining valuable experience and connections through prior organizing, advocacy, and fundraising efforts from 2014 to 2022. Advocacy and fundraising for the current conflict began before the conflict started. The formal humanitarian system has also been active in Ukraine throughout this period, but eastern Ukraine was seen to be a protracted crisis, with little preparation for full-scale conflict. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2022 was released 11 February 2022, just over two weeks before the country fell into full-scale conflict. Humanitarian planning was focused on providing continued assistance to eastern Ukraine, particularly along the 'contact line' between government and non-government-controlled areas - only targeting 114,000 IDPs.

Diaspora organizations have long operated outside the formal humanitarian coordination system (DEMAC, 2021), both due to geographical distance as well as difficulty finding the appropriate entry point. Some initial engagement with the Health Cluster has been possible thanks largely in part to pre-existing relationships from the 2014 to 2022 period, however, these connections do not appear to be the norm. Based both on interviews and participation in weekly DEMAC coordination meetings, which were organized to provide a platform for information sharing, many diaspora organizations do not understand the purpose or ways of working of the cluster system, often preferring to work directly with contacts on the ground. Interestingly, many organizations express the need for clear and consistent information and the need to coordinate to better align gaps with excess capacity; however, the impulse has been to work together to identify and communicate needs rather than to collectively respond to needs identified by pre-existing coordination actors in the formal humanitarian system. Coordination mechanisms are managing an expanding number of partners, rolling out first-phase coordination systems, and fielding numerous requests for information. Their capacity to engage or 'train' diaspora organizations is limited, particularly when organizations have no operational presence in Ukraine and could be represented by partner organizations.

Despite the coordination disconnect between the formal humanitarian system and DOs, their response priorities have closely aligned with those announced in emergency appeals by OCHA and relevant agencies (i.e., WHO, UNHCR, IOM). DOs' focus on supporting trauma response and supplying health care facilities with consumables and medical equipment was central to the WHO Emergency Appeal (% to these priorities). Similarly, OCHA called on agencies to focus on supporting access to basic NFI and food items in the initial weeks, particularly in hard-to-reach areas - acknowledging local organizations and their partners were often best-placed to do this and already responding.

In this sense, lack of DO-humanitarian system coordination did not create a situation where agencies were working at cross-purposes. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which overlap was occurring but given the scale of need, it was unlikely that this would have particularly damaging effects. Humanitarian actors on the ground caution at a continued response that relies on unclear consignees for aid - particularly NFI - due to black market sale of aid - but it is unlikely that DOs are uniquely responsible for this. Instead, it is a signal that DOs would benefit from staying abreast of recommended response modalities, areas, and logistical support available (Logistics Cluster) and ensure responses stay aligned as an effective middle-ground.



**Table 1: The first 20 days of the humanitarian response**

Date	# Displaced	Humanitarian System <sup>20</sup>	UDOs
24 February	Unknown		UNWLA donations of medical supplies to AICM Ukraine were received by two different hospitals in Luhansk and Kharkiv Oblasts.
25 February	Unknown		Razom for Ukraine reported purchasing 100,000 USD worth of medical supplies including items such as Rescue CAT Tourniquets (GEN 7), Israeli Emergency Bandages (6", 100/box), QuilClot Combat Gauzes (Z Fold), IV Start Kits, Nasopharyngeal Airways, Bag Valve Masks, Sterile ABD Pads and Iridium Satellite Phones to be delivered to Ukraine.
26 February	116,000 refugees; 160,000 IDPs	First UNOCHA humanitarian Situation Report (SitRep) released.  UNHCR sends a truck of NFIs to Kyvyi Rig (Dnipro region). <sup>21</sup>	Hope for Ukraine receives their first group of IDPs in their facilities near Lviv. It took 48 hours for the IDPs to reach this safe place.
27 February	368,000 refugees	WASH Cluster issues first flash update mapping damaged water systems. <sup>22</sup>	Association of Ukrainians in Denmark organized a demonstration in support of Ukraine while fundraising for Preserve Ukraine and Bevar Ukraine

<sup>20</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all updates come from UNOCHA Daily SitReps corresponding to the day indicated in the table.

<sup>21</sup> [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/25feb\\_2022\\_protection\\_snapshot\\_eng.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/25feb_2022_protection_snapshot_eng.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/ukraine-wash-cluster-flash-update-27022022>

28 February	500,000 refugees/ 100,000 IDPs	HelpAge begins a Rapid Needs Assessment in eastern Ukraine aimed at understanding the specific needs of older people. <sup>23</sup>	Canada-Ukraine Foundation reported deploying 500,000 CAD to provide food packages, medicine, and shelter in Ukraine. This was done through their Ukraine Humanitarian Appeal in partnership with the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.
1 March	677,000 refugees	Cabinet of Ministers releases Decree 174 easing the passage of humanitarian aid into Ukraine.  Flash appeal published by OCHA to cover the March to May 2022 period. The appeal notes the extreme shortfall in funding compared to the planned 2022 response (18 million USD, or 9.2% of requirements as of 26 February). A Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) grant of 20 million USD was granted to top this up (<20% requirements).  OCHA acknowledges local organizations, churches, community-based organizations, and individuals have already mobilized and are providing critical assistance. <sup>24</sup>  First WASH Cluster meeting is convened. <sup>25</sup>	Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain begins their distribution of donated food and non-food items across the country including to the people isolated in Kyiv Oblast

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/eastern-ukraine-helpage-ukraine-rapid-needs-assessment-28feb-%E2%80%93-3-mar>

<sup>24</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ukraine%20Flash%20Appeal%202022.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/wash-cluster-meeting-minutes-national-focus-2022-03-01>





2 March	870,000 refugees	<p>WHO<sup>26</sup> releases specific flash appeal for health sector support (57.5 million USD).</p> <p>OCHA SitRep urges partners to focus on trauma healthcare, evacuation efforts, information provision, and supply of basic goods and food.</p> <p>The Red Cross reports reaching 8,000 people sheltering in metro stations.</p>	<p>Help Ukraine shipped 57 walkie-talkies, 30 flashlights, and 100 bottles of Advil to Kyiv hospital. They spent 5000 USD on the equipment and 400 USD on shipping costs.</p>
3 March	1 million refugees	<p>OCHA SitRep reports critical WASH needs in eastern Ukraine.</p> <p>First Cash Working Group convened. 88 representatives attended.<sup>27</sup></p> <p>WHO reports unconfirmed attacks on health infrastructure. WHO ships 6 tonnes of trauma care. 170,000 diapers distributed.</p> <p>Humanitarian partners reported to be setting up temporary shelters in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv.</p>	<p>British-Ukrainian Aid reported of raising 264,386 GBP to date. The amount will go to providing essential medical supplies to Ukraine.</p>
4 March	1.2 million refugees	<p>The UN Crisis Coordinator arrives in Ukraine.</p> <p>OCHA releases a report suggesting 4 million refugees could be expected to arrive in Europe.</p>	<p>United Help Ukraine shared a petition to ask NATO to close the airspace. The petition was closed with more than one million signatures</p>
5 March	1.3 million refugees	<p>Caritas sends humanitarian convoys with food, hygiene products and medicines went to Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipro.</p>	<p>Nova Ukraine raised 3.5 million USD between 24 February 2022 and 5 March 2022</p>

<sup>26</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/who-emergency-appeal---ukraine-and-neighbouring-countries.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/20220303\\_cwg\\_meeting\\_read\\_out\\_and\\_next\\_steps.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/20220303_cwg_meeting_read_out_and_next_steps.pdf)

6 March	1.5 million refugees	First Protection Cluster Meeting held. <sup>28</sup>	Ukrainian Congress Committee of America raised 643,764 USD from 4,416 individuals on Mightycause <sup>29</sup> platform.
7 March	1.7 million refugees	60.3 million USD have been received as part of the Ukraine Response Flash Appeal.  Health Cluster meets for the first time since the conflict began. <sup>30</sup>	British-Ukrainian Aid organized a protest in London's Parliament Square against the Russian offensive on #Ukraine
8 March	2 million refugees	The Ministry of Health announces that 400,000 tons of medical supplies have been delivered to Ukraine by neighbouring governments and humanitarian partners.	Ukraine Charity formed a partnership with the private company Special Vehicle Solutions for logistics support.
9 March	2 million refugees	OCHA asks that uncoordinated humanitarian convoys in hard-to-reach areas cease as they are being targeted and putting lives at risk.  First deadline to submit the Health Cluster 3Ws.	The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America delivered 17,000 lbs of medical supplies for Ukraine's Ministry of Defense. <sup>31</sup>
10 March	2.2 million refugees		United Help Ukraine with 30 volunteers and 5000 hrs of skilled labour raised 7 million USD to-date and spent 2.5 million USD with 90% of it going to the defenders and the other 10% for medical and humanitarian aid.

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/protection/events/2022-03/0>

<sup>29</sup> An online platform for non-profit fundraising

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/ukraine-minutes-national-health-cluster-meeting-7-march-2022-en>

<sup>31</sup> This included 100,000 USD worth of M-FAKs for the frontline soldiers; 2 semi-trucks of humanitarian aid from Fort Dix Military Base; Satellite communications systems for the territorial defense units in Ukraine (with support of UCCA Yonkers) and support for shipping from a member of the Polish American community. They also managed to secure a 10,000 sq foot warehouse as a collection center for humanitarian aid donations due to the support of Governor Murphy of New Jersey.

11 March	2.5 million refugees	The Government of Ukraine set up a Coordination Centre for Humanitarian and Social Affairs to coordinate the response of NGOs and international humanitarian organizations.  First FSL Cluster Meeting held. 39 partners are in attendance, up from 17 pre-existing partners. <sup>32</sup>  PIN received 300 tons of food items (in-kind) for distribution in Dnipro, Kharkiv, Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. The delivery of 1,000 food kits to Luhanska is underway.  Unicef delivers six trucks carrying nearly 70 tons of medical supplies to hospitals.  The Ukrainian Red Cross has provided first aid training to more than 12,000 local volunteers.	Bevar Ukraine was listed on the official website of the European Union as a trusted organization for receiving donations.
12 March	2.6 million refugees	OCHA held a meeting with heads of organizations. There were 130 NGOs in attendance, most of them new to the Ukraine context.  Credible reports of cluster munitions used on the Central City Hospital in Vuhledar in Donetsk oblast and in several districts of Kharkiv oblast.	Our Choice Foundation's hotlines receive over 2,000 calls daily.

<sup>32</sup> [https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/11.03.2022\\_eng\\_fsl\\_cluster\\_coordination\\_weekly\\_meeting\\_minutes.pdf](https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/11.03.2022_eng_fsl_cluster_coordination_weekly_meeting_minutes.pdf)

13 March	2.7 million refugees	<p>OCHA and the UNDSS established a humanitarian notification system to facilitate safe movement of humanitarian cargo to the worst-affected areas.</p> <p>Caritas reports delivering more than 15,000 food kits and more than 12,000 hygiene kits in the previous two week period.</p>	Bevar Ukraine deployed 4 trucks of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, including medicine to the front line and medical equipment for Kyiv hospital.
14 March	2.8 million refugees 1.9 million IDPs	An additional 40 million USD from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated to the humanitarian response.	British-Ukrainian Aid reported of planning daily protests from 14 to 19 of March, 2022 in London
15 March	3 million refugees 1.9 IDPs		Our Choice Foundation was supported by Polish airlines LOT in developing conversation scripts for the help lines



## 5. CONCLUSION

This report finds that, in the initial days of the conflict, diaspora organizations have managed to rapidly expand the scale and scope of their activities to respond to the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. Organizations sampled as a part of this study experienced a sudden increase in funding - both due to active fundraising efforts as well as spontaneous donations from the diaspora community and broader population. Indeed, many diaspora organizations were able to benefit from the mass outpouring of support for Ukraine, with several organizations reportedly receiving unprompted donations from Facebook fundraisers, community events, and private companies interested in supporting local humanitarian efforts. Similarly, diaspora organizations were able to leverage their positioning to a rapid scale-up in their response and the size of their volunteer teams. Organizations were able to channel funding into direct support to Ukraine - particularly in support to hospitals and in the provision of non-food items to volunteer-run humanitarian hubs. They also provided support directly to national organizations and implementing partners in Ukraine.

Many organizations were well-placed to respond to the situation in Ukraine due to experience gained during the 2014 to 2022 period in response to the annexation of Crimea and areas of western Ukraine. This includes the ability to leverage pre-existing contacts and partners on the ground as well as prior experience coordinating delivery of aid to remote areas of the country. In this sense, DOs had equal or better access to Ukraine as compared to traditional humanitarian actors in the early response period. Many organizations were well-placed to continue advocacy messaging and began organizing protests prior to 24 February 2022 in response to anticipated hostilities.

The DO-led humanitarian response may not be 'in line' with traditional humanitarian response - but was critical to filling a massive gap in needs in the initial weeks of the crisis while the humanitarian infrastructure was being established, grant funding was secured, and humanitarian agencies secured their own supply lines and staffing. Given the rapidity of the crisis and the level of displacement, local and agile response that is not restricted by traditional accountability principles focused on saving lives was appropriate. For many DOs, support to military and civilian defense forces was essential to their response and seen as an area that the public (including their donors) supported. This has been a difficult space to navigate as it is in the clearest contravention of humanitarian principles but is also aligned with the DO's mandate.

In a similar vein, no DOs examined in this study worked with formal humanitarian coordination structures. In general, understanding was weak as was the perceived utility of these systems. For these reasons, it is worth considering whether integration into the traditional humanitarian system is even desirable. It may be the case that if independent DOs are able to respond how they see fit - but not at cross purposes - then this allows a type of response the usual structures are not able to achieve but is ultimately of significant value.

There were few partnerships existing formally between diaspora organizations. Instead, many worked with DEMAC through weekly connections meetings and through a series of loose coordination with each other or in larger networks and associations. Diaspora organizations universally acknowledged the importance of coordination with each other and with the broader humanitarian response. Nevertheless, there was a mixed degree of importance placed on coordination; some organizations felt better coordination was necessary and the current lack of coordination frustrating - while others believed it was not necessary for the early stages of the response.

“The biggest issue is the finances...if we don’t receive support from the general public, it will slow us down a bit - but I have to be honest, up until this war all our events have been supported by the Ukrainian American community. This is different right now and we see people with no ties to Ukraine being very supportive - but that may die down.”

Going forward, diaspora organizations will need to transition their response to respond to protracted crises and, ideally, early recovery. Organizations that have managed to scale their responses due to the immediate outpouring of support following the Russian invasion, will be pressured to develop sustainable systems - staffing structures, fundraising, delivery modalities, and coordination to leverage available support. This is a significant burden at this time, as immediately responding to the crisis as it evolves day-to-day is a top priority.

“[in the future] the organization will not be the same - it will be on a larger scale. It will take years to rebuild, take care of wounded people, and veterans. We will partner with larger organizations - but now we are quick and efficient, and we know exactly the needs. When the war is over, we will have more time to assess possible partnerships and areas of interventions.”



## 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

**The following recommendations are based on direct feedback from diaspora organizations as well as observations from other diaspora responses. Some remain consistent with the previous DEMAC report (2021) on Ukraine. They have been divided into thematic areas of coordination, response modalities, and operations management.**

### Coordination

Coordination between diaspora organizations and their individual and organizational contacts in Ukraine is strong and a significant asset to the humanitarian response in Ukraine. It has allowed targeted support to reach communities in need. However, coordination remains poor between diaspora organizations and between diaspora organizations and the humanitarian system under OCHA.

- Ongoing coordination support is required to keep diaspora organizations abreast of the changing operational context, including access constraints/blockages, the latest guidelines for importing and transporting goods, as well as any relevant information shared by Ministries or local governments.
- There remain poor linkages between diaspora organizations and the humanitarian system. While many organizations work through national partners who may be reporting into clusters, much of the diaspora assistance likely is not being reflected in response summaries produced by OCHA. There remains a need to facilitate better cooperation, coordination, and trust between diaspora and the cluster system.
- There remains poor understanding of the cluster system in general. A formal training session on global coordination structures, with a special focus on key clusters and their tools may be beneficial for those interested in improving coordination. This should be in addition to specific briefings made by Cluster representatives at DEMAC coordination meetings.
- Train diaspora organizations in accessing, reading, and understanding 3W and 5W reports to best target assistance. Encourage reporting against 3W and 5W systems.
- Several informal diaspora organization coordination groups (WhatsApp-based, Google Docs-based) exist, but could be leveraged to concentrate organizations - particularly those that share common interests and response areas. DEMAC should collate these resources and share them among diaspora organizations to increase participation.
- There is a risk that diaspora organizations could replicate pre-existing coordination mechanisms. To the extent possible, DEMAC should encourage diaspora organizations to participate in pre-existing mechanisms.

## Response Modalities

Diaspora organizations responded quickly and with great agility in the immediate aftermath of the Russian offensive in Ukraine. Many organizations began preparing for a humanitarian response operation in January - far before many other organizations were doing the same. As a result, the response has filled a real gap in need; however, adjustments to response modalities could support a more effective long-term response.

- Diaspora organizations should be commended for their ability to act quickly and in ways that may not be possible for larger humanitarian organizations that are typically tied to ways-of-working approved by donor agencies. This includes assisting voluntary community committees and government agencies and affiliates. While this has been a major asset in the initial phase of response, it may be less valuable over time (i.e., in second-phase response and early recovery). Diaspora organizations should consider regularizing some aid according to cluster guidance to support a coordinated and consistent response.
- Diaspora organizations without local partner organizations could benefit from coordination with relevant clusters, who could refer diaspora organizations to trustworthy local partners in areas experiencing gaps in funding and services to support targeted delivery of aid. Likewise, diaspora organizations are well-placed to recommend trustworthy and well-positioned local organizations for further partnerships via the Clusters.
- On the other hand, diaspora organizations should carefully monitor the needs of local volunteer committees that may benefit from less stringent aid and reporting requirements due to capacity and feasibility of appropriate reporting at this phase of the crisis. This includes purchasing one-off equipment required for clinics, hospitals, and other life-saving institutions that may not be available in Ukraine.
- There is a need to explore other forms of humanitarian assistance beyond non-food items. Ukraine is reported to have a stock of most household items, clothing, and food items. These items should be purchased locally to increase acceptance of items and avoid flooding the Ukrainian market - leading to black market sales of aid and weakening the consumer-base for local (already stressed) suppliers. Cash-based assistance and providing cash grants to agencies with specific needs that can be purchased locally may be more suitable and efficient.

## Operations Management and Strategy Development

Diaspora organizations have rapidly mobilized in response to the current humanitarian crisis. Many organizations rely primarily or exclusively on volunteers to operate. In light of the current crisis, several organizations have significantly scaled-up their human resources - taking on more volunteers and paid staff, to the extent possible.

- Organizations should invite the support of volunteers, while also taking on skilled non-profit staff to the extent possible; however, this should be balanced against sustainability of these positions in the case that public interest in financially supporting the response in Ukraine declines. In this view, organizations may want to consider staffing solely for the 'first-phase response' lasting three to four months before committing to sustained positions.
- Gathering insights from established organizations that typically manage large pools of volunteers would be a useful learning opportunity for DOs. This could be held through a training forum or, more informally, convened as a special agenda point during a DEMAC coordination meeting.
- Organizations should remain abreast of guidance developed by the formal humanitarian system. This can ensure that, if full coordination is not possible or desirable, response modalities, areas of focus, and common logistical/operational information are factored into DO operations.
- Organizations should begin to consider consistent approaches for the protracted conflict period and how their assistance could be modified to support consistent needs. This could include establishing partnerships with like-minded DOs to pool funds and leverage expertise and contacts.
- Organizations should consider how they are best supporting local partners - especially new organizations formed in response to the current war - and how they could be best supported to become sustainable. This could include supporting institutional development, linking local partners with other DOs, and supporting their applications for other sources of funding.





# ANNEX A

## DIASPORA ORGANIZATION MAPPING

#	Name	Location	Website
1	Forum des Associations et Initiatives Franco-Ukrainiennes.	France	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/forumukrfrance">https://www.facebook.com/forumukrfrance</a>
2	Aide Médicale France Ukraine	France	<a href="https://amc.ukr.fr">https://amc.ukr.fr</a>
3	American Association of the Crimean Turks	USA	<a href="https://kirimny.org/">https://kirimny.org/</a>
4	Asociación Socio-Cultural y de Cooperación al Desarrollo "Ucrania-Euskadi"	Spain	<a href="https://www.ucranianos.com/">https://www.ucranianos.com/</a>
5	Association of Ukrainian women in GB (AUW)	UK	<a href="http://www.auw.org.uk/en/default.aspx">http://www.auw.org.uk/en/default.aspx</a>
6	Association of Ukrainians in Ankara	Turkey	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/UkraynaDernegi/">https://www.facebook.com/UkraynaDernegi/</a>
7	Association of Ukrainians in Denmark (AUD)	Denmark	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/ukrainians.dk/">https://www.facebook.com/ukrainians.dk/</a>
8	Association of Ukrainians in GB (AUGB)	UK	<a href="https://www.augb.co.uk/">https://www.augb.co.uk/</a>
9	Associazione Nazionale Italia-Ucraina Maidan	Italy	<a href="http://www.italia-ucraina.it/it/">http://www.italia-ucraina.it/it/</a>
10	Bevar Ukraine	Denmark	<a href="https://bevarukraine.dk/uk/">https://bevarukraine.dk/uk/</a>
11	British Ukrainian Aid	UK	<a href="https://british-ukrainianaid.org/">https://british-ukrainianaid.org/</a>
12	Canada Ukraine Foundation	Canada	<a href="https://www.cufoundation.ca/">https://www.cufoundation.ca/</a>
13	Chernobyl Children's Lifeline (CCLL)	UK	<a href="https://www.ccll.org.uk/">https://www.ccll.org.uk/</a>
14	Con Ucraina	Spain	<a href="https://conucrania.com/">https://conucrania.com/</a>
15	Voluntary Association of Ukrainian Women in Italy	Italy	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Roksolania">https://www.facebook.com/Roksolania</a>
16	European Congress of Ukrainians	Czech Republic	<a href="https://ekukrainians.org/">https://ekukrainians.org/</a>
17	European Frontier Foundation	UK	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/europefrontier">https://www.facebook.com/europefrontier</a>
18	Global Ukraine / Global Ukrainians Network	Global	<a href="https://www.global-ukraine.org">https://www.global-ukraine.org</a>
19	Help us help	Canada	<a href="https://helpushelp.charity/">https://helpushelp.charity/</a>
20	Hjælp Ukraine	Denmark	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/helpukra">https://www.facebook.com/helpukra</a>
21	Hjælp ukrainske børn	Denmark	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/hub.dk/">https://www.facebook.com/hub.dk/</a>

22	Hope for Ukraine	USA	<a href="https://hopeforukraine.net/">https://hopeforukraine.net/</a>
23	Hromada	USA	<a href="https://hromada.us/">https://hromada.us/</a>
24	I nuovi Confini	Italy	<a href="https://bambiniucraini.jimdofree.com/">https://bambiniucraini.jimdofree.com/</a>
25	I support ukraine	USA	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/362872595479976">https://www.facebook.com/groups/362872595479976</a>
26	Israeli Friends of Ukraine	Israel	<a href="https://www.israfriends.org">https://www.israfriends.org</a>
27	Klub "Ukraina"	Denmark	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/klub.ukraina/">https://www.facebook.com/klub.ukraina/</a>
28	Lastivka	Denmark	<a href="https://lastivka.dk/">https://lastivka.dk/</a>
29	London EuroMaidan	UK	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/london.maidan/">https://www.facebook.com/london.maidan/</a>
30	LSE SU Ukrainian Society	UK	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/LSEUkrainianSociety/about">https://www.facebook.com/groups/LSEUkrainianSociety/about</a>
31	New Wave School	USA	<a href="http://newwaveschool.org/support-ukraine/">http://newwaveschool.org/support-ukraine/</a>
32	Nova Poshta	Ukraine	<a href="https://novaposhta.ua/eng/">https://novaposhta.ua/eng/</a>
33	Nova Ukraina	USA	<a href="https://novaukraine.org/">https://novaukraine.org/</a>
34	OBERIG	Italy	<a href="https://www.oberig.org/it/">https://www.oberig.org/it/</a>
35	PLAST GB Ukrainian Scouting Organization in Great Britain	GB	<a href="http://www.plast.org.uk/">http://www.plast.org.uk/</a>
36	Pobratymy	Ukraine	<a href="https://pobratymy.org.ua">https://pobratymy.org.ua</a>
37	Portail de l'Ukraine	France	<a href="https://uaportail.fr/">https://uaportail.fr/</a>
38	PROMOUKRAÏNA	France	<a href="https://promoukraina.fr/">https://promoukraina.fr/</a>
39	Razom for Ukraine	USA	<a href="https://razomforukraine.org/">https://razomforukraine.org/</a>
40	Revived Soldiers Ukraine	USA	<a href="https://www.rsukraine.org/">https://www.rsukraine.org/</a>
41	Support Hospitals in Ukraine	USA	<a href="http://www.uahospitals.org/">http://www.uahospitals.org/</a>
42	Support ukraine	Online	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/supportukraine27/">https://www.facebook.com/supportukraine27/</a>
43	Support ukraine canada	Canada	<a href="https://www.support-ukraine.ca/pages/transparency">https://www.support-ukraine.ca/pages/transparency</a>

44	The Ukrainian House Our "Choice Foundation"	Poland	<a href="http://www.ukrainskidom.pl/">http://www.ukrainskidom.pl/</a>
45	Ukraine Amitié	France	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/ukraine.amitie/">https://www.facebook.com/ukraine.amitie/</a>
46	Ukraine Charity	UK	<a href="https://www.ukrainecharity.org/">https://www.ukrainecharity.org/</a>
47	Ukrainian American Coordinating Council (UACC)	USA	<a href="https://uaccusa.org/supportukraine">https://uaccusa.org/supportukraine</a>
48	Ukrainian Association in Finland	Finland	<a href="https://ukrainians.fi/uk/">https://ukrainians.fi/uk/</a>
49	Ukrainian Association of Washington State	USA	<a href="https://uaws.org/">https://uaws.org/</a>
50	Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia	USA	<a href="https://ukrarcheparchy.us/">https://ukrarcheparchy.us/</a>
51	Ukrainian Congress Committee of America- UCCA	USA	<a href="https://ucca.org/">https://ucca.org/</a>
52	Ukrainian Congress of Latvia	Latvia	<a href="http://ukrkongress.lv/">http://ukrkongress.lv/</a>
53	Ukrainian Diaspora United	Canada	<a href="https://www.ukrainiandiasporaunited.com/">https://www.ukrainiandiasporaunited.com/</a>
54	Ukrainian Medical Association of North America. (UMANA)	USA	<a href="https://www.umana.org/">https://www.umana.org/</a>
55	Ukrainian Medical Association of the UK (UMAUK)	UK	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/UkrainianMedicalAssociationUK">https://www.facebook.com/UkrainianMedicalAssociationUK</a>
56	Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA	USA	<a href="https://www.uocofusa.org/">https://www.uocofusa.org/</a>
57	Ukrainian World Congress	Canada	<a href="https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/">https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/</a>
58	Ukrainians in Portugal Association	Portugal	<a href="https://www.spilka.pt/">https://www.spilka.pt/</a>
59	Union of Ukrainian students in Oslo	Norway	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Union-of-Ukrainian-students-in-Oslo-108850605081348">https://www.facebook.com/Union-of-Ukrainian-students-in-Oslo-108850605081348</a>
60	United Help Ukraine	USA	<a href="http://www.unitedhelpukraine.org/">http://www.unitedhelpukraine.org/</a>
61	United Ukrainian American Relief Committee (UUARC)	USA	<a href="https://www.uuarc.org/">https://www.uuarc.org/</a>
62	UNWLA - Ukrainian National Women's League of America	USA	<a href="https://unwla.org/">https://unwla.org/</a>
63	US Ukraine Foundation (USUF)	USA	<a href="https://usukraine.org/">https://usukraine.org/</a>

## ANNEX B

# KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Organization	Type of Organization	Location	Website
Bevar Ukraine	Diaspora Organization	Denmark	<a href="https://bevarukraine.dk/">https://bevarukraine.dk/</a>
British Ukrainian Aid	Diaspora Organization	UK	<a href="https://british-ukrainianaid.org/">https://british-ukrainianaid.org/</a>
Nova Ukraine	Diaspora Organization	USA	<a href="https://novaukraine.org/">https://novaukraine.org/</a>
Our Choice Foundation	Diaspora Organization	Poland	<a href="https://ukrainskidom.pl/">https://ukrainskidom.pl/</a>
PromoUkraine	Diaspora Organization	France	<a href="https://promoukraina.fr/">https://promoukraina.fr/</a>
London EuroMaidan	Diaspora Organization	UK	<a href="https://supportukraine.uk/">https://supportukraine.uk/</a>
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA)	Diaspora Organization	USA	<a href="https://ucca.org/">https://ucca.org/</a>
United Help Ukraine	Diaspora Organization	USA	<a href="http://www.unitedhelpukraine.org/">http://www.unitedhelpukraine.org/</a>
Ukrainian National Women's League of America (UNWLA)	Diaspora Organization	USA	<a href="https://unwla.org/">https://unwla.org/</a>
Ukraine Charity	Diaspora Organization	UK	<a href="https://www.ukrainecharity.org/">https://www.ukrainecharity.org/</a>
United Help Ukraine	Diaspora Organization	USA	<a href="http://www.unitedhelpukraine.org/">http://www.unitedhelpukraine.org/</a>
US-Ukraine Foundation (USUF)	Diaspora Organization	USA	<a href="https://usukraine.org/">https://usukraine.org/</a>
Ukrainian Association in Finland	Diaspora Organization	Finland	<a href="https://ukrainians.fi/">https://ukrainians.fi/</a>
Association of Ukrainians in GB (AUGB)	Diaspora Organization	UK	<a href="https://www.augb.co.uk/">https://www.augb.co.uk/</a>
Health Cluster	Coordination	Ukraine	<a href="https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/health">https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/health</a>
AICM	Charity	Ukraine	<a href="https://aicm.eu/en">https://aicm.eu/en</a>
DEMAC	INGO	Denmark	<a href="https://www.demac.org/">https://www.demac.org/</a>
INGO	INGO	Not disclosed	Not disclosed

Produced by DEMAC – Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination, hosted by Danish Refugee Council and funded by USAID.

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