


## OVERVIEW

AHEAD's global snapshot #13 presents displacement forecasts for the period *May to July 2026*, providing early warnings on where displacement figures may rise or fall. This edition covers ten countries: **Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Yemen, as well as Myanmar (Kachin state), Niger and Burkina Faso (all three available upon request).** In addition, the snapshot includes a dedicated analysis of cross-border displacement movements from Sudan into neighbouring countries. Forecasts draw on recent displacement trends, conflict dynamics, food insecurity and seasonal factors. As displacement data can be highly uncertain or missing, the AHEAD model attempts to impute missing values and estimate current displacement levels before projecting three months ahead.



## GLOBAL OUTLOOK

**In Somalia, displacement is anticipated to climb by over 300,000**, and particularly large increases are expected in terms of the total number of drought- and flood-induced IDPs.

**In Sudan, the total number of IDPs is expected to decrease by roughly 11,000, following earlier declines driven by increased return movements.** Meanwhile, cross-border flows from Sudan, particularly into the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan and Chad, are projected to rise by almost 115,000.

**Internal displacement is anticipated to climb by roughly 46,000 in South Sudan**, prompted by the escalation of violence in Jonglei. **In Uganda, the AHEAD model projects an increase of more than 7,500 refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan across nine settlements.**

**Forecasts for eastern DR Congo indicate that the number of IDPs will increase by roughly 43,000 by July 2026. In Mali it is anticipated that the number of IDPs across the country will increase by 2,000 by the end of July.**

**In Yemen, the number of new displacements in the coming quarter is expected to be around 2,000**, with moderate increases anticipated in Hays.

For more information about AHEAD, please visit: <https://drc.ngo/what-we-do/innovation/anticipatory-action/ahead/>

Disclaimer: the maps shown here are for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by DRC. The forecasts presented in this snapshot are based on available data from relevant sources at the time of analysis. Work on the forecasting model is ongoing, and updates are made regularly as new information becomes available.



Internal displacement in Mali is almost entirely conflict-related. Displacement in Mali is driven by a protracted and complex conflict involving state forces, allied paramilitaries, and a patchwork of non-state armed groups, further exacerbated by intercommunal violence. The displacement is primarily concentrated in the central regions of Bandiagara, Mopti and Ségou, and the northern regions of Gao, Menaka and Tombouctou.

**HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES**

By July 2026, AHEAD projects the largest displaced population in Mali to be in **Bandiagara, Gao, Menaka and Mopti**.

Projections for May, June and July indicate the highest risk of large scale displacement in the eastern part of the country. **In Menaka, the number of IDPs is expected to increase by over 3,500 by July, compared to estimates from April.**

Smaller increases are anticipated in Taoudenni and Nara. In most other areas, no significant changes are projected. November 2025 was the deadliest month in the **Tombouctou region** in the past two years. If violence escalates in the region, the AHEAD model projects that displacement could **rise by over 3,000 people over the coming months.**




**PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS**

Following a brief lull in late 2024, the first half of 2025 witnessed a resurgence in violence, particularly following the consolidation of state control over Kidal. Military operations in the Menaka and Gao regions, in particular, have triggered population movements in the first and second quarters of 2025. In early 2026, most violent events were recorded in Ségou and Mopti. This intensification of conflict directly fuels new and secondary displacements.

Updated DTM IDP estimates for Mali (September 2025) indicate that, across the last two reporting periods (December 2024 to September 2025), the national IDP caseload rose by around 12,000 people. The largest increase was in Tombouctou, from 24,867 IDPs in December 2024 to 42,521 in September 2025. Over the next three months, the number of IDPs in Mali is projected to rise by around 2,000 people. While the national trend is estimated to have remained broadly stable since September 2025, the last period for which IDP figures are available, conditions in some regions could lead to sharper increases. In Ségou, where over 50 conflict incidents were recorded in March and April, displacement may accelerate further. A renewed rise in fatalities in Tombouctou, similar to levels seen in November, could also push displacement higher.

Mali is also a host country, with recent influxes of over 23,000 refugees from Burkina Faso into the Bandiagara region, straining already limited local resources and making the Danish Refugee Council declare a small emergency there. Mali is further hosting more than 165,000 Burkinabe and Nigeriens refugees.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



# EASTERN DR CONGO

Since January 2025, renewed M23 offensives in eastern DR Congo have driven new displacements. Between 4th of January and 19<sup>th</sup> of March 2025, M23 fighters entered into Masisi, Sake, Goma, Bukavu and Walikale. These advances have led to hundreds of thousands of new displacements, while millions have also been forced back toward their places of origin. In eastern DR Congo, AHEAD's displacement forecasts cover 28 territories across North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika provinces.


## HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

Displacement is expected to rise across several territories in South Kivu province. **In Fizi, the number of IDPs is projected to increase by around 13,000 by July 2026; in Kalehe, by more than 17,000.** In both Fizi and Kalehe, DTM recorded large increases in the overall number of IDPs between the last two data collection cycles.

Given the surge in violence in South Kivu, displacement is projected to increase across multiple territories in the province and to spill over into Tanganyika province. **In particular, Kalemie is projected to see an increase of around 6,300 IDPs over the next three months.**

In Ituri province, **Mambasa territory is projected to record an increase of more than 11,000 IDPs by July 2026.** In March 2026, the security situation worsened in Mambasa district, particularly in the NiaNia and Lolwa health zones, where armed attacks reportedly killed at least 87 civilians and displaced more than 60,000 people.

Increases are also projected across several territories in North Kivu, with some of the **largest expected rises in Masisi (+13,000) and Beni (+9,700, including Beni Ville).**



**3.82 MILLION**

Projected total IDP numbers by July 2026

**+43,000**


Projected IDP increase between April and July

## PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

**In eastern DR Congo, the number of IDPs is projected to increase by around 43,000 over the next three months, reaching approximately 3.82 million across the four eastern provinces by July 2026.** DTM data shows that IDP figures increased across all four provinces between the last two data collection cycles. In South Kivu, the total number of IDPs was estimated at 1,232,251, up 2.5% from 1,201,673 during the previous round. The largest increases were recorded in Kalehe, Fizi, Walungu and Shabunda. Increases were also observed in North Kivu, particularly in Goma and Nyiragongo, and in Tanganyika, especially in Kalemie, which continued to receive arrivals from Fizi and Uvira. At the same time, IDP return movements increased in all provinces except Tanganyika.

The AHEAD model projects further increases in displacement across the four eastern provinces. ACLED reported that February saw the highest monthly number of air and drone strikes ever recorded in DR Congo, linked to operations in Mwenga, Masisi and Fizi, while recent reporting points to further clashes in Kalehe, Kabare, Uvira and southern Masisi. The Ruzizi Plain, South Kivu highlands and Kalehe–Masisi axis also remain volatile, although the reported AFC/M23 withdrawal from some positions in South Kivu in May could affect displacement dynamics in the coming weeks. In parallel, ADF attacks continue to affect Beni and Ituri, including recent attacks around Beni territory and Ituri province that reportedly killed at least 40 people and involved looting and burning homes. Overall, these dynamics are likely to sustain new and secondary displacement into safer urban and peri-urban destinations, while returns and short-distance movements may partly offset inflows, producing moderate net growth in overall IDP numbers despite high underlying movement.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



# SUDAN


Since the conflict between SAF and RSF began, Sudan has seen a sharp rise in displacement, reaching nearly 11.6 million IDPs by January 2025. In recent months, figures have declined, largely due to increasing returns. The AHEAD model covers 18 states and includes cross-border flows into Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and Libya.

## HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

Over the coming three months, displacement in **Blue Nile** is projected to increase by around **13,000 people**, largely reflecting recent conflict dynamics and continued insecurity in the state.

Given the ongoing situation across the Kordofan region, the IDP caseload is expected to increase by roughly **12,000 individuals in West Kordofan by July, and by almost 9,000 in South Kordofan**. In **North and South Darfur, the model projects a combined increase of over 20,000 IDPs by July**, amid continued insecurity and pressure on already strained sites.

By contrast, return movements are expected to remain a key driver of declining IDP numbers in several other states. The largest reductions are projected in River Nile (around 13,000 fewer IDPs by July compared with April), while significant reductions are also anticipated in Aj Jazirah, White Nile, Gedaref and Khartoum.



**8.91 MILLION**  
Projected total IDPs numbers by July 2026

**-11,000**  
Projected IDP decrease between April and July


## PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model anticipates an overall decline in the number of IDPs in Sudan. By July 2026, the total is projected at around **8.91 million, about 11,000 fewer than in April**. This decline is consistent with recent DTM Sudan reporting. Mobility Update 22 (September 2025) estimated about 9.58 million IDPs nationwide, down by over 480,000 since late June and more than 2.0 million below the peak earlier in the year. Subsequent updates continued this downward trend, with the Displacement and Return Overview showing a continued decline in 2026, from around 9.1 million IDPs in January to 9.04 million in February and 8.9 million in March. Reductions are partly driven by returns, with more than 3.0 million individuals estimated to have returned from internal displacement by March 2026. However, returns do not necessarily indicate reduced needs, as many households are returning to damaged homes and limited basic services.

Despite the overall decline in IDP numbers recorded in recent months, new and secondary displacement is still expected in several areas. In Blue Nile, nearly 50,000 people were reportedly displaced between mid-January and early May following the escalation of hostilities, and the state has been described as an increasingly central front in the conflict.

In North Darfur, recent conflict developments may also contribute to further displacement. Fighting was reported around Tina in late February and March, while Karnoi was reportedly seized by the RSF on 16 March amid broader efforts to consolidate control in the state. Displacement from Al Fasher also remains significant. As of 1 March, around 138,000 people had reportedly been displaced from Al Fasher town and surrounding villages since late October 2025. Tawila has absorbed much of this pressure, with its IDP population rising from around 235,000 in January 2025 to over 707,000 in March 2026. In parallel, insecurity across Kordofan may continue to drive displacement within the region and toward neighbouring areas.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



## SUDAN CROSS-BORDER

Since the start of the conflict between the SAF and the RSF in April 2023, Sudan has experienced large-scale cross-border displacement. IOM DTM estimates indicate that more than 4.4 million people had crossed borders as of the latest reporting period. Approximately 69% of those displaced were Sudanese nationals, while 31% were non-Sudanese nationals. DTM tracks cumulative cross-border movements from Sudan since 15 April 2023, and the AHEAD model builds on this data to project future movements into Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Libya.

### HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES


The largest projected increases in cross-border movements are expected towards Chad. Over the next three months, the **AHEAD model estimates an additional 51,000 movements into Chad. Movements into South Sudan are also projected to increase by approximately 42,000 over the same period**, after more than 60,000 movements were already registered since January 2026.

Cross-border movements into Ethiopia are expected to continue increasing, with an estimated rise of 8,000 by July compared to April estimates.

Movements into Libya are projected to rise by approximately 12,000. Smaller increases are projected for the Central African Republic. Cross-border movements into CAR are expected to increase by around 1,800.

**+115,000**

**Projected increase in cross-border movements between April and July**



### PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS


Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects a continued increase in cross-border displacement from Sudan into neighbouring countries. **By July 2026, total cross-border movements into Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Libya are expected to increase by almost 115,000 compared to April estimates.** In South Sudan, DTM reported that approximately 1.38 million people had crossed from Sudan since April 2023 as of mid May 2026. Based on current projections, additional movements over the next three months are expected to increase the cumulative total to over 1.4 million by July 2026.

Movements from Sudan into Chad, Libya, and Egypt have continued since the start of the conflict. UNHCR reporting from March 2026 indicates that more than 559,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived in Libya since April 2023, over 7,000 more than January estimates; however, the evolving context and data limitations make it difficult to determine a precise cumulative number of crossings. For Egypt, which is not currently covered by the AHEAD model, available estimates published by DTM suggest that approximately 1,514,827 individuals crossed from Sudan into Egypt between April 2023 and October 2025, while an estimated 535,252 individuals were reported to have returned from Egypt to Sudan between January 2024 and February 2026.

Figures indicate that approximately 1,308,015 individuals, primarily Sudanese nationals, crossed from Sudan into Chad between April 2023 and mid March 2026. During the period from August to February 2026, an estimated 81,926 individuals were reported to have moved from Chad back into Sudan. AHEAD projections suggest that cross-border movements into Chad may continue to increase through July 2026.

Projected increases into Ethiopia are more moderate, but insecurity in Blue Nile may sustain cross-border pressure. In early February, around 3,250 people were reportedly displaced from Al Kurmuk locality, with most moving toward Doula in Ethiopia.

Cumulative number of people crossing from Sudan into neighbouring countries (since mid April 2023)



# SOUTH SUDAN

Internal displacements in South Sudan is caused by a wide range of factors, including armed conflict, communal clashes, land disputes, violence, natural disasters and cross-border movements. In the past few months conflict has escalated at a more broader level with especially high intensity in Upper Nile, Jonglei and parts of Unity state. This comes on top of major displacement caused by flooding in 2025 and a high number of returnees of South Sudanese fleeing the conflict in Sudan.


## HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

Continued and sporadic fighting in Jonglei State has recently triggered new and secondary displacement. Over the coming three months, the AHEAD model projects further increases in IDP numbers across several counties in South Sudan, including notable rises in **Uror (+7,000)** and **Luakpiny/Nasir (+3,500)** by July compared with April levels.

The latest DTM assessment in Jonglei identified additional displacement concentrated in Luakpiny/Nasir, Ulang, Akobo and Awerial, with movements from Ayod, Duk, Nyirol and Uror also following key corridors towards Canal/Pigi, Twic East, Awerial and Ulang. Over the coming months, the AHEAD model projects further increases in hosted IDP numbers in Canal/Pigi and Nyirol. Continued movement southward along the Nile corridor could also bring nearly **5,000 additional arrivals to Juba**, while worsening conditions or limited services in Ulang and Nasir could lead to further displacement towards Malakal.

**+ 46,000**

**Projected IDP increase between April and July**




## PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects a significant rise in displacement in South Sudan, with **46,000 additional displacements forecast by July 2026 compared with April**. These projected increases are largely driven by the situation in Jonglei. By mid-March, IOM DTM had identified more than 267,000 individuals displaced across Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria following the deterioration in the security situation, while subsequent reporting suggests that displacement may have slowed in many previously assessed locations after mid-March, even as new movements continued in Luakpiny/Nasir and Ulang. This appears broadly consistent with a possible easing from the peak levels of conflict seen earlier in the quarter, although the situation remains highly volatile. The humanitarian situation in central and northern Jonglei State nonetheless remains dire, and AHEAD projections suggest that IDP numbers may continue to rise across several counties in Jonglei in the coming months, as well as in Awerial, Malakal, Luakpiny/Nasir and Juba, though the geographic pattern and pace of new displacement may differ from the acute surge seen earlier in the year.

Recent developments may further intensify population movements. Late-March information points to large-scale displacement from Akobo, including around 110,000 people who crossed into Tiergol in Ethiopia and an estimated 114,000 others dispersed across multiple locations within Akobo after an evacuation order was issued ahead of a planned military offensive. More recent updates suggest that Akobo was subsequently retaken by opposition forces. In addition to insecurity, a weak-to-moderate likelihood of above-normal rainfall is projected for April in parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and Eastern Equatoria, while ICPAC forecasts wetter-than-normal conditions across central to southern South Sudan during the coming season. This could increase flood and access risks and worsen conditions for populations already displaced.

Projected displacement figures across South Sudan reflect a highly dynamic situation amid fluctuating conflict conditions, while the onset of the rainy season will restrict movement. Importantly, a large share of the projected increases may involve re-displacement of populations already displaced multiple times since the escalation of conflict in Jonglei and earlier crises. Given the rapidly changing conditions, forecasts for South Sudan will be updated more frequently in the coming weeks as the situation evolves.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



Note: South Sudan's displacement data are sourced from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix. Additionally their Displacement Event dataset is used to estimate changes from month to month.

Conflict and climate-related hazards continue to drive widespread internal displacement in Somalia. Drought, floods and insecurity have left millions displaced, with over 3.4 million people recorded by September 2025. IOM and DRC developed a multi-hazard model to produce quarterly forecasts estimating the number of people displaced by conflict, drought and floods. As projections are made on a quarterly basis, the forecasts presented here are the same as in Snapshot #12. Figures for the second quarter of 2026 are also available here: [Somalia Movement Projections Dashboard](#).

## HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

**Banadir is expected to see the highest increase in displacement in the coming months, with an additional 40,886 people anticipated to be displaced**, pushing the total to over 1.18 million by June 2026. 16% of those displaced are projected to move within Banadir and 84% arriving from other districts.

**In Baidoa, displacement is also projected to rise, with around 15,475 new displacements mainly due to floods and droughts.** Of these, 78% are expected to remain within the district, while 22% are anticipated to come from other areas.


In the Lower Juba region, displacement is forecasted to increase by more than 25,000, with **notable rises in Kismaayo (+12,851)**. The Hiraan region is also projected to see a large increase, with the **largest rise in Belet Weyne (+11,754)**.

**4.3 MILLION**

Projected total IDPs numbers by June 2026

**+ 304,362**

Projected IDP increase between February and June






## PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

**Over the next quarter, Somalia's displaced population is expected to increase by more than 300,000 people compared to February estimates.** Conflict may account for around 23% of this increase. Recent displacement trends and conflict risk analysis point to a continued risk of new displacement during the quarter, with conflict mainly anticipated in Lower Shabelle, Bari and Lower Juba. In Banadir, Luuq and Belet Weyne, the number of hosted conflict-displaced people could increase by more than 30,000 combined. The situation remains highly dynamic. High levels of violence persist, and ACLEED reported that Al-Shabaab carried out coordinated attacks against civilians across parts of southern and central Somalia in March. Should conflict intensify beyond current expectations, conflict-related displacement could rise above projected levels.

Although the Gu 2026 (April to June) seasonal outlook indicates normal to above-normal rainfall, conditions across Somalia are expected to remain highly variable, with an elevated risk of dry spells and uneven rainfall distribution. These conditions are unlikely to offset cumulative drought impacts from previous seasons, prompting increased displacement. As such, the Gu 2026 season should be viewed as a period of stabilization rather than recovery. Under this scenario, the number of people displaced by drought is projected to increase by more than 125,000 overall, with the largest increase likely to have already taken place in March.

Flooding is also expected to be a major driver of displacement over the quarter, accounting for about 36% of the projected increase in the displaced population. The number of flood-displaced individuals is likely to rise by around 108,000, with the largest increases projected in Baidoa and Burco.



# UGANDA


By the end of April 2026, Uganda hosted over two million refugees and asylum seekers across various settlements. Over half originated from South Sudan, while roughly one-third came from DR Congo. Nakivale hosted the largest share, followed by Adjumani, Bidibidi and Rhino. In Uganda, the AHEAD model projects how the population of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan may evolve across nine settlements.

## HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

**In Imvepi, the active population of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan is projected to increase by approximately 2,200 over the next three months.** Data for April 2026 shows that roughly 1,000 individuals were registered arriving in April, and almost 2,500 arrivals were registered in the February-April period.

Figures in Palabek have risen in recent months, though growth slowed in March. Almost 900 new arrivals were registered in April, and the refugee and asylum-seeker population from South Sudan is projected to grow by roughly 1,900 by July 2026.

**Relatively large increases are also projected in Rhino settlement, with an expected rise of around 1,700 individuals.** Between February and April, there were roughly 2,000 registered arrivals.



**1.05 MILLION**

Projected South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers by July 2026

**+ 7,500**


Projected increase in South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers between April and July

## PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan across nine settlements in Uganda. **By July 2026, the population is expected to rise by more than 7,500, reaching almost 1.05 million.** Between end-January and end-April, the number of South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers across the nine settlements covered by the AHEAD model increased by more than 11,000. However, monthly increases in recent months were lower than those recorded earlier in 2025, a pattern that is particularly evident in Rhino. Even so, the escalation of violence in South Sudan could lead to higher arrivals in the coming months.

UNHCR data indicates that, as of early May, more than 12,000 asylum seekers from South Sudan had arrived in Uganda since January, with Amuru remaining the main district of entry. Reporting also suggests that, following the recent large-scale displacement in Jonglei, population movements were observed both toward Juba and across the Nimule border into Uganda. At the same time, Central Equatoria has recorded among the highest levels of conflict events and reported fatalities in South Sudan over the past months. Movements from Jonglei toward Juba continue to be monitored alongside the security situation in Central Equatoria, as further southward displacement or a worsening of violence in the state could contribute to increased cross-border movements into Uganda and arrivals moving toward the upper end of the AHEAD probabilistic forecast range. Forecasts will be updated regularly as additional information on cross-border movements becomes available.

Reported and projected active population of South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers in Ugandan settlements



Note: Data on refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda are sourced from UNHCR. Settlement positions in the map are indicative and may not reflect precise coordinates.

Internal displacement has been ongoing across Yemen since the outbreak of conflict in 2015. In July 2015, IOM recorded 1.27 million IDPs across multiple districts. The latest IOM figures on the total number of IDPs indicate over 3 million people in accessible areas within 13 assessed governorates. Through its Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) tool, DTM monitors the estimated number of households forced to flee their locations of origin or displacement on a daily basis. The AHEAD model builds on these data to generate forecasts of new displacement across more than 50 districts in the governorates of Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Lahj, Ma'rib, Shabwah and Ta'iz, assuming an average household size of six individuals, in line with IOM DTM approach.


## HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

**In Al Khukhah, the AHEAD model projects roughly 240 individuals may be displaced into or within the district** over the next three months, potentially rising to around 1,600. DTM recorded less than 10 households between February and April.

**Roughly 340 arrivals are projected in Ma'rib City** and around 210 in Ma'rib district. The Ma'rib governorate recorded 1 newly arriving household in the last week of April, following higher numbers of arrivals registered in both December 2025 and January 2026.

**Around 380 new displacements are anticipated in Hays**, and about 100 in Salah, while in most other district no significant changes are being projected.

**+ 2,000**  
Projected new displacements between May and July




## PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

**Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects more than 2,000 new displacements due to conflict across more than 50 districts.** Throughout 2025, most increases in the number of new displacements were relatively moderate. Between 1 January and 6 December 2025, IOM Yemen DTM recorded 3,578 households (21,468 individuals) displaced at least once as a result of conflict, health, economic or natural disaster factors, of which over 50% were conflict-related. The situation changed in December as security tensions escalated in parts of Hadramawt, triggering new displacement from Hadramawt to Ma'rib. In December alone, over 900 households arrived in Ma'rib and Ma'rib City, from Hadramawt. Between 28 December and 3 January, a further 93 newly displaced households were identified in the governorate. Conflict-induced new displacements were much lower in the first quarter of the year. Between January and April, around 470 households newly displaced households due to conflict were registered by DTM, including about 30 in April across the covered governorates.

Projected increases over the coming months remain moderate and are consistent with the small upticks recently observed across monitored districts, noting that IOM DTM figures reflect newly identified movements in areas where displacement tracking is operational. Conflict forecasts through end-July also point to lower organized violence in Ad Dali' relative to the six-month average, while Al Hodeidah is projected to see some increase; however, displacement figures there are currently available only for some districts. Should conflict dynamics shift beyond current forecasts, localized displacement could rise above projected levels in some areas. Elsewhere, front lines have reportedly remained relatively quiet overall, with limited flare-ups in Abyan and Ma'rib, including a reported drone strike on the Harib front. Southern tensions also remain relevant following the December escalation involving STC-affiliated forces in Hadramawt and Al Mahrah. In Al Hodeidah, the UN Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) concluded its mandate on 31 March 2026.

Total number of new displacements estimated and projected





## **The AHEAD Program: Scaling Conflict-Induced Displacement Anticipation to Diverse Settings**

*The Anticipatory Humanitarian Action for Displacement (AHEAD) project, supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is dedicated to advancing anticipatory action for conflict-induced displacement. Across Burkina Faso, Niger, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, Yemen, and Myanmar, AHEAD focuses on developing national conflict-relevant anticipatory action frameworks, ensuring they are inclusive and shaped by multiple stakeholders, alongside in-country pilots. A strong monitoring, evaluation and learning approach supports the project by generating evidence from in-country pilots to inform advocacy efforts at the national, regional and global levels.*

*The project uses a statistical model developed by DRC to predict displacement 3-4 months in advance and helps inform more cost effective and smart humanitarian responses. Ultimately, AHEAD seeks to elevate the role of anticipatory action connected to conflict-induced displacement, positioning it as a key strategy for humanitarian action. Thanks to collaborations with WFP and IOM, the model is also used to forecast displacement in Sudan and Somalia. The AHEAD model is being scaled to 19 countries by the end of 2026.*

**DRC** DANISH  
REFUGEE  
COUNCIL  
• We are there