


OVERVIEW

AHEAD’s global snapshot #17 presents displacement forecasts for the period **September to November 2026**, providing early warnings on where displacement figures may rise or fall. This edition covers ten countries: **Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Yemen, as well as Myanmar (Kachin state), Niger and Burkina Faso (all three available upon request).** In addition, the snapshot includes a dedicated analysis of cross-border displacement movements from Sudan into neighbouring countries. Forecasts draw on recent displacement trends, conflict dynamics, food insecurity and seasonal factors. As displacement data can be highly uncertain or missing, the AHEAD model attempts to impute missing values and estimate current displacement levels before projecting three months ahead.



GLOBAL OUTLOOK

In Somalia, displacement is anticipated to climb by over 870,000, and particularly large increases are expected in terms of the total number of flood-induced IDPs.

In Sudan, the total number of IDPs is expected to decrease by roughly 70,000. Meanwhile, cross-border flows from Sudan, particularly into the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan and Chad, are projected to rise by over 74,000.

Internal displacement is anticipated to climb by over 35,000 in South Sudan, with large rises projected in Uror and Rubkona. In Uganda, the AHEAD model projects an increase of more than 6,000 refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan across nine settlements.

Forecasts for eastern DR Congo indicate that the number of IDPs will increase by roughly 24,000 by November 2026. In Mali it is anticipated that the number of IDPs across the country will rise by 3,000 in the next three months.

In Yemen, the number of new displacements in the coming quarter is expected to be over 25,000, as the fighting has intensified across multiple frontlines.

For more information about AHEAD, please visit: <https://drc.ngo/what-we-do/innovation/anticipatory-action/ahead/>

Disclaimer: the maps shown here are for illustration purposes only. Names and boundaries on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by DRC. The forecasts presented in this snapshot are based on available data from relevant sources at the time of analysis. Work on the forecasting model is ongoing, and updates are made regularly as new information becomes available.

EASTERN DR CONGO

Since January 2025, renewed M23 offensives in eastern DR Congo have driven new displacements. Between 4th of January and 19th of March 2025, M23 fighters entered into Masisi, Sake, Goma, Bukavu and Walikale. These advances have led to hundreds of thousands of new displacements, while millions have also been forced back toward their places of origin. In eastern DR Congo, AHEAD’s displacement forecasts cover 28 territories across North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika provinces.


HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

Displacement is expected to rise across several territories in South Kivu province. **Walungu is projected to record the largest increase, with around 15,000 additional IDPs by November 2026**, while Uvira is projected to increase by more than 12,000. These trends are consistent with recent DTM rounds, which recorded large increases in both territories.

In North Kivu, the number of IDPs in **Masisi** is projected to record the largest increase, **rising by more than 7,000** by November 2026. IDP numbers are also projected to increase by almost **10,000 in Beni**.

In Ituri, the number of **IDPs in Djugu is projected to increase by almost 15,000** between end-August and end-November. IDP numbers are also expected to rise significantly in Irumu (+16,000) and in Aru (+7,500). DTM recorded substantial increases in the overall nuber of IDPs in both Djugu and Irumu in recent assessments.


Relatively small changes are expected in Tanganyika. Kalemie is projected to keep seeing increases in the number of IDPs.



PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

In eastern DR Congo, the number of IDPs is projected to increase by more than 24,000 over the next three months, reaching approximately 3.6 million across the four eastern provinces by November 2026. Recent DTM assessments point to differing trends across provinces. In Ituri, the number of IDPs increased between the two latest data-collection cycles, while South Kivu recorded a relatively large decline in IDP numbers alongside an increase in returnees. In North Kivu, the overall IDP caseload remained broadly stable between the latest rounds. Particularly large increases have been recorded in Djugu, Masisi and Uvira.

The projected increase should be read against continued insecurity and population movements since the previous update. In South Kivu, RRM alerts issued in late August and early September reported new displacement linked to fighting in several of the territories where increases are projected. In Uvira, over 14,000 people were reported newly displaced in the Hauts-Plateaux following clashes in late August, while an alert in Walungu reported displacement across several localities following renewed fighting from 23 August. In Mwenga, an RRM alert recorded more than 10,000 new arrivals in Burhinyi alongside over 26,000 returnees. Fighting also continued around Walungu and in the Fizi–Uvira highlands in early September. In North Kivu, renewed fighting around the Masisi–Walikale border continued to generate substantial movements during late August and early September. Local reporting indicated that at least 16 villages in Masisi had been largely emptied, with some residents moving towards neighbouring Walikale. Separately, an RRM alert reported more than 44,000 IDPs being hosted in the Itebero health zone in Walikale following fighting in Masisi and Kalehe. Overall, these dynamics suggest that new and secondary displacement will continue in several areas over the projection period. However, returns, temporary movements and onward displacement may partly offset new arrivals, contributing to more moderate changes in territory-level IDP caseloads than the scale of reported displacement movements alone might suggest.



Note: Eastern DR Congo’s displacement data are sourced from OCHA.


Internal displacement in Mali is almost entirely conflict-related. Displacement in Mali is driven by a protracted and complex conflict involving state forces, allied paramilitaries, and a patchwork of non-state armed groups, further exacerbated by intercommunal violence. The displacement is primarily concentrated in the central regions of Bandiagara, Mopti and Ségou, and the northern regions of Gao, Menaka and Tombouctou.

HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

By November 2026, AHEAD projects the largest displaced population in Mali to be in **Bandiagara, Gao, Menaka and Mopti**.

Projections for September, October and November indicate the highest risk of large scale displacement in the eastern part of the country. **In Menaka, the number of IDPs is expected to increase by 3,000 by November, compared to estimates from August.**

Smaller increases are anticipated in Gao, Taoudenni and Nara. In most other areas, no significant changes are projected. Over 30 conflict incidents were recorded in the **Tombouctou region** in the past two months. If violence persists and escalates, this could push projections toward the upper end of the forecast range.




PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Following a resurgence of violence throughout 2025, Mali entered a critical phase of insecurity in early 2026. The conflict dramatically escalated on April 25–26, 2026, when JNIM and the FLA launched an unprecedented, coordinated offensive targeting strategic urban centers, including Bamako, Kati, Gao, Mopti, and Kidal. This offensive altered the security landscape, with the FLA claiming to retake Kidal from state and allied forces. The attacks, which included a blockade of the capital, triggered widespread regional curfews and severe disruptions to humanitarian access. By May 2026, ACLED reporting pointed to continued deterioration as armed-group activity and violent events heavily impacted central regions like Ségou and Mopti, while the northern regions remain highly contested. July has seen another coordinate offensive across Mali.

Updated DTM IDP estimates for Mali (September 2025) indicate that, across the last two reporting periods (December 2024 to September 2025), the national IDP caseload rose by around 12,000 people. The largest increase was in Tombouctou, from 24,867 IDPs in December 2024 to 42,521 in September 2025. **Over the next three months, the number of IDPs in Mali is projected to increase slightly.** However, conditions in some regions could lead to sharper increases. In Ségou, where over 65 conflict incidents were recorded in June and July, displacement may accelerate further.

Mali is also a host country, with recent influxes of over 23,000 refugees from Burkina Faso into the Bandiagara region, straining already limited local resources and making the Danish Refugee Council declare a small emergency there. Mali is further hosting more than 165,000 Burkinabe and Nigeriens refugees.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



Note: Mali's displacement data are sourced from IOM.

SUDAN



Since the conflict between SAF and RSF began, Sudan has seen a sharp rise in displacement, reaching nearly 11.6 million IDPs by January 2025. In recent months, figures have declined, partly due to increasing returns. The AHEAD model covers 18 states and includes cross-border flows into Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and Libya.

HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

Over the coming three months, displacement in **Khartoum is projected to increase by around 15,000 people**, following large increases in recent months linked to both within-state movements and arrivals from the Kordofan region. **In Blue Nile, the number of IDPs is projected to rise**, following a decline in June compared to May and an increase again in July.

The IDP caseload in **South Darfur is expected to increase by roughly 9,000 individuals** by November. In North Darfur, the model projects a significant decrease of almost 18,000 IDPs, as continued onward movement to other states is being recorded.

By contrast, return movements are expected to remain a key driver of declining IDP numbers in several other states. The largest reductions are projected in White Nile, Northern and River Nile.




PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model anticipates a decline in the number of IDPs in Sudan. By November 2026, the total is projected at around 8.5 million, about 70,000 fewer than in August. This decline is consistent with recent DTM Sudan reporting. Mobility Update 22 (September 2025) estimated about 9.58 million IDPs nationwide, more than 2.0 million below the peak earlier in the year. Subsequent updates continued this downward trend, with the Displacement and Return Overview showing a continued decline in 2026, from around 9.1 million IDPs in January to 8.62 million in July. Reductions are partly driven by returns, with more than 4 million individuals estimated to have returned from internal displacement by July 2026. However, returns do not necessarily indicate reduced needs, as many households are returning to damaged homes, limited basic services and areas affected by unexploded ordnance, including in Khartoum.

Despite the overall decline in IDP numbers recorded in recent months, localized new and secondary displacement is likely to persist, particularly across Kordofan, Blue Nile and parts of Darfur. In North Kordofan, continued insecurity around El Obeid generated substantial new arrivals during August, with UN humanitarian partners estimating that around 15,000 families had been displaced to El Obeid over the preceding three weeks. In Blue Nile, IOM estimated that over 99,000 people had been displaced since the escalation in conflict on 11 January. The displaced population was concentrated particularly in Ed Damazine, Geisan, Baw, Wad Al Mahi and Ar Rusayris. Elsewhere, displacement pressures persisted in South Kordofan, where fighting around Kauda between 20 and 26 August reportedly displaced hundreds of civilians, while renewed hostilities and insecurity continued to affect the wider Kordofan region. In North Darfur, climate shocks also contributed to new movements, with the UN reporting in mid-August that heavy rainfall in Tawila had damaged or destroyed nearly 1,300 homes and displaced thousands of families.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



Note: Sudan’s displacement data are sourced from IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix. Cross-border movements data are sourced from IOM and UNHCR Operational Data Portal.

SUDAN CROSS-BORDER

Since the start of the conflict between the SAF and the RSF in April 2023, Sudan has experienced large-scale cross-border displacement. IOM DTM estimates indicate that more than 4.4 million people had crossed borders as of the latest reporting period. Approximately 69% of those displaced were Sudanese nationals, while 31% were non-Sudanese nationals. DTM tracks cumulative cross-border movements from Sudan since 15 April 2023, and the AHEAD model builds on this data to project future movements into Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Libya.

HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES


The largest projected increases in cross-border movements are expected towards South Sudan. Over the next three months, the **AHEAD model estimates an additional 32,000 movements into South Sudan. Movements into Chad are also projected to increase by approximately 31,000 over the same period.** More than 90,000 movements were already registered towards both countries since February 2026.

Cross-border movements into Ethiopia are expected to continue increasing, with an estimated rise of 4,500 by November compared to August estimates.

Movements into Libya are projected to rise by approximately 5,600. Smaller increases are projected for the Central African Republic. Cross-border movements into CAR are expected to increase by around 1,000.

+74,000

Projected increase in cross-border movements between August and November




PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects a continued increase in cross-border displacement from Sudan into neighbouring countries. **By November 2026, total cross-border movements into Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Libya are expected to increase by almost 74,000 compared to August estimates.** In South Sudan, DTM reported that approximately 1.42 million people had crossed from Sudan since April 2023 as of mid August 2026. Based on current projections, additional movements over the next three months are expected to increase the cumulative total to over 1.46 million by November 2026.

Movements from Sudan into Chad, Libya, and Egypt have continued since the start of the conflict. UNHCR reporting indicates that more than 566,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived in Libya since April 2023. For Egypt, which is not currently covered by the AHEAD model, available estimates published by DTM suggest that approximately 1,514,827 individuals crossed from Sudan into Egypt between April 2023 and October 2025, while an estimated 769,602 individuals were reported to have returned from Egypt to Sudan between January 2024 and June 2026.

Figures indicate that approximately 1.35 million individuals, primarily Sudanese nationals, crossed from Sudan into Chad between April 2023 and mid August 2026. During the period from August 2025 to June 2026, an estimated 181,038 individuals were reported to have moved from Chad back into Sudan. AHEAD projections suggest that cross-border movements into Chad may continue to increase through November. At the same time, the number of people entering Sudan from neighbouring countries has reportedly increased since January 2026. IOM DTM recorded more than 400,000 arrivals during the first six months of the year, including over 90,000 in June alone.

Projected increases into Ethiopia are more moderate, but insecurity in Blue Nile may sustain cross-border pressure. In early February, around 3,250 people were reportedly displaced from Al Kurmuk locality, with most moving toward Doula in Ethiopia.



Note: Sudan’s displacement data are sourced from IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix. Cross-border movements data are sourced from IOM and UNHCR Operational Data Portal.

SOUTH SUDAN

Internal displacements in South Sudan is caused by a wide range of factors, including armed conflict, communal clashes, land disputes, violence, natural disasters and cross-border movements. In the past few months conflict has escalated at a more broader level with especially high intensity in Upper Nile, Jonglei and parts of Unity state. This comes on top of major displacement caused by flooding in 2025 and a high number of returnees of South Sudanese fleeing the conflict in Sudan.


HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES

Over the coming three months, the AHEAD model projects further increases in IDP numbers across several counties in South Sudan. **The largest rises are anticipated in Uror (+7,300), Rubkona (+6,000) and Duk (+5,000)** by November compared with August levels.

As of August, IOM DTM estimated that around 444,000 people had been displaced by the crisis since January, with the largest concentrations recorded in Uror, Nyirol and Akobo. Most movements were reportedly reactive and linked to broader conflict dynamics.

The AHEAD model anticipates continued displacement pressure in parts of Jonglei and neighbouring areas. Beyond Uror and Duk, further increases in hosted IDP numbers are projected in Nyirol, Bor South and Akobo.

+ 35,000
Projected IDP increase between August and November




PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects a rise in displacement in South Sudan, with 35,000 additional displacements forecast by November 2026 compared with August. The largest projected increases remain concentrated in Jonglei and neighbouring areas. While the intensity of large-scale military operations declined following the acute displacement surge earlier in the year, renewed fighting in July highlights the continued volatility of the situation. Clashes between government and opposition forces were reported in Walgak in Akobo County and neighbouring Panyikang on 5 July, and around Waat in Uror and Lankien in Nyirol on 13 July.

As of 31st of August, IOM DTM had identified more than 444,000 people displaced since January. Recent displacement has also extended beyond the Greater Upper Nile area. By end-July, fighting along the South Sudan–Uganda border had displaced an estimated 9,100 people in Kajo-Keji County, Central Equatoria. At the same time, some of the movements from earlier this year have partially reversed. As of 31st of August, DTM had recorded around 149,000 returnees across Jonglei and Upper Nile, including more than 70,000 people returning from Ethiopia's Gambella region. Most returns were to Jonglei, particularly Akobo and Uror. However, these movements may not represent stable or permanent returns. Continued daily movements between Akobo and Tiergol in Ethiopia further highlight the fluidity of these population movements.

Projected displacement figures across South Sudan therefore reflect a highly dynamic situation in which new displacement, return and re-displacement are occurring simultaneously. The rainy season is likely to constrain movement and humanitarian access in some areas. Flooding can also trigger new movements in flood-prone areas, while drought and water stress are also emerging concerns in parts of the country. A substantial share of the projected increase may involve populations already displaced one or more times during the Jonglei escalation and earlier crises.

Total number of IDPs estimated and projected



Note: South Sudan's displacement data are sourced from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix. Additionally their Displacement Event dataset is used to estimate changes from month to month.

SOMALIA

Conflict and climate-related hazards continue to drive widespread internal displacement in Somalia. Drought, floods and insecurity have left millions displaced, with over 3.4 million people recorded by September 2025. IOM and DRC developed a multi-hazard model to produce quarterly forecasts estimating the number of people displaced by conflict, drought and floods. Figures are also available here: [Somalia Movement Projections Dashboard](#).

HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES


Over the coming months, projected increases in displacement at district level are expected to be driven primarily by flooding associated with El Niño conditions during the October–December (OND) season. **Belet Weyne is expected to record by far the largest increase, with an additional 230,000 people projected to be displaced.**

Other substantial increases in flood-induced displacement are projected across several districts. **Gaalkacyo is expected to see an additional 83,000 people displaced, while significant increases are also anticipated in Baardheere (+73,000), Luuq (+49,000) and Baidoa (+44,000),** among other locations.

Conflict-induced displacement is also projected to increase in a number of districts. The largest increase is anticipated in Banadir (+15,000), followed by Balcad (+7,800) and Qansax Dheere (+5,000).

+ 870,000




Projected IDP increase between August and December



PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Conflict may account for around 7% of the projected increase. Conflict-induced displacement nevertheless remains likely, particularly in southern and central Somalia. In Bay, clashes between federal and opposition-aligned forces in Baidoa on 17 August caused several casualties, amid a wider deterioration in political tensions; ACLED recorded at least 78 armed engagements between these actors in Bay between February and late August. In Lower Shabelle, Al-Shabaab activity remained elevated during August, with analysis indicating that attacks in the region increased substantially between June and August compared with the first five months of the year. These dynamics could generate localized new or secondary displacement.

Flooding is expected to be the dominant driver of displacement over the projection period, accounting for more than 800,000 of the projected increase. The latest seasonal forecasts provide a strong signal of elevated flood risk during the October–December Deyr season. ICPAC’s September outlook indicates a 90% probability of wetter-than-normal conditions across central and southern Somalia, alongside a high likelihood that seasonal rainfall will exceed 400 mm in parts of central and southern areas. An early-to-normal onset of the rains is also considered more likely across much of Somalia. These conditions coincide with a rapidly strengthening El Niño. WMO reported in early September that El Niño is firmly established and is expected to become very strong, with an almost 100% likelihood that it will persist through February 2027. A positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) is also expected to develop, potentially reinforcing wetter conditions in the Horn of Africa. ICPAC has identified 1997 and 2023 as relevant analogue years, both of which experienced unusually wet Deyr seasons. The resulting risk is likely to be greatest in low-lying and riverine areas, particularly along the Juba and Shabelle basins, as well as in locations exposed to flash flooding.



UGANDA

By the end of August 2026, Uganda hosted over two million refugees and asylum seekers across various settlements. Over half originated from South Sudan, while roughly one-third came from DR Congo. Nakivale hosted the largest share, followed by Adjumani, Bidibidi and Rhino. In Uganda, the AHEAD model projects how the population of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan may evolve across nine settlements.

HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES


In Imvepi, the active population of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan is projected to increase by approximately 2,300 over the next three months. Almost 4,800 arrivals were registered in the April-June period.

Figures in Palabek have risen in recent months. The refugee and asylum-seeker population from South Sudan in Palabek is now projected to grow by roughly 1,400 by November 2026. **Relatively large increases are also projected in Rhino settlement, with an expected rise of around 1,600 individuals.** Between April and June, there were roughly 2,200 registered arrivals.

Current forecasts are however conditional on the progressive easing of temporary asylum-admission restrictions and a gradual return of reception and registration dynamics towards patterns observed before the June disruption.

1.06 MILLION
Projected South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers by November 2026

+ 6,000
Projected increase in South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers between August and November




PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan across nine settlements in Uganda. **By November 2026, the population is expected to rise by more than 6,000, reaching over 1.06 million.** This projected increase follows a period of renewed upward movement between end-February and end-May, when the South Sudanese refugee and asylum-seeker population across the modelled settlements increased by almost 15,000. Recent registration data point to a marked acceleration in May, with more than 6,500 new arrivals from South Sudan recorded during the month, compared with roughly 3,400 in April and 2,500 in March. Registered arrivals fell considerably in June; the slowdown observed continued through the following months. As of 10 September, UNHCR’s Refugee Arrival Movement Monitoring Dashboard had not recorded any new arrivals through Amuru during July, August or the first ten days of September. However, this decline coincided with temporary Ebola-related restrictions on the admission of new asylum seekers through high-risk border districts, including at Elegu from mid-June, and should therefore be interpreted cautiously.

Admission and registration arrangements remain an important source of forecast uncertainty. But the main upside risk to the forecast remains a deterioration in conditions in South Sudan, particularly in areas with relatively direct access to Uganda. In Eastern Equatoria, OCHA reported in August that worsening food-security conditions following a prolonged dry spell were already prompting some communities to move to neighbouring areas and across the borders into Uganda and Kenya. Cross-border movements also follow significant displacement in Central Equatoria in July, when clashes in Kajo-Keji County near the Ugandan border displaced thousands of individuals.

Reported and projected active population of South Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers in Ugandan settlements



Note: Data on refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda are sourced from UNHCR. Settlement positions in the map are indicative and may not reflect precise coordinates.

Internal displacement has been ongoing across Yemen since the outbreak of conflict in 2015. In July 2015, IOM recorded 1.27 million IDPs across multiple districts. The latest IOM figures on the total number of IDPs indicate over 3 million people in accessible areas within 13 assessed governorates. Through its Rapid Displacement Tracking (RDT) tool, DTM monitors the estimated number of households forced to flee their locations of origin or displacement on a daily basis. The AHEAD model builds on these data to generate forecasts of new displacement across more than 50 districts in the governorates of Abyan, Ad Dali’, Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Hadramawt, Lahj, Ma’rib, Shabwah and Ta’iz, assuming an average household size of six individuals, in line with IOM DTM approach.

HOTSPOTS & KEY FIGURES


Over the next three months, the AHEAD model projects around 11,000 additional displacements in Ta’iz, concentrated particularly in **Maqbanah (around 4,000), Mawza’ (2,200) and Jabal Habashi (2,000).**

In Al Hodeidah, **around 2,300 additional displacements are projected in Hays and around 1,600 in Al Khukhah**, although rapidly changing front lines make these estimates especially uncertain.

Lahj is also expected to become an increasingly important destination, with around 5,000 additional displacements projected, particularly in **Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah (around 1,600) and Tuban (1,400).** Higher movements remain possible as the situation is evolving quickly.

+ 25,000


Projected new displacements between September and November



PROJECTED TRENDS & DRIVERS

The AHEAD model projects around 25,000 additional conflict-related displacements over the next three months across more than 50 districts, with the largest share currently expected in September. These projections are additional to displacement already captured in the data from early September. The context has changed rapidly since the beginning of September. Hostilities intensified in western Ta’iz from 3 September and extended to Yemen’s West Coast by 5 September, including around Maqbanah and Jabal Habashi, with large-scale population movements following. Nearly 40,000 people had been displaced by 7 September, with movements continuing. IOM DTM subsequently recorded 13,500 displaced individuals between 30 August and 5 September, followed by over 59,000 individuals displaced between 6 and 12 September alone.

The security situation has deteriorated substantially and across a much wider geographic area. ACLED describes the fighting between 3 and 7 September as the most serious escalation since the UN-sponsored ceasefire brought major hostilities to a halt in April 2022, recording clashes between Houthi and Saudi-backed IRG forces across Al Dhale’e, Al Bayda, Ma’rib, Shabwah, Al Jawf, Al Hodeidah and Ta’iz, and at least 276 fatalities over the five-day period. On 10 September, the UN Special Envoy said that the previously identified risk of a return to large-scale conflict had become a “harsh reality”, reporting intensified fighting across multiple frontlines and that Ansar Allah had gained control of Mokha, while emphasizing that fighting was continuing and the situation remained fluid. Subsequent reporting has documented further Houthi territorial gains along the Red Sea coast towards Bab el-Mandeb, alongside continued strikes and counter-strikes. Against this rapidly evolving backdrop, there is substantial uncertainty around both the scale and timing of displacement over the forecast period. The wide range of possible outcomes reflects the potential for conditions to change considerably between forecast rounds. The AHEAD team is working towards biweekly updates informed by IOM’s weekly displacement data.





The AHEAD Program: Scaling Conflict-Induced Displacement Anticipation to Diverse Settings

The Anticipatory Humanitarian Action for Displacement (AHEAD) project, supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is dedicated to advancing anticipatory action for conflict-induced displacement. Across Burkina Faso, Niger, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, Yemen, and Myanmar, AHEAD focuses on developing national conflict-relevant anticipatory action frameworks, ensuring they are inclusive and shaped by multiple stakeholders, alongside in-country pilots. A strong monitoring, evaluation and learning approach supports the project by generating evidence from in-country pilots to inform advocacy efforts at the national, regional and global levels.

The project uses a statistical model developed by DRC to predict displacement 3-4 months in advance and helps inform more cost effective and smart humanitarian responses. Ultimately, AHEAD seeks to elevate the role of anticipatory action connected to conflict-induced displacement, positioning it as a key strategy for humanitarian action. Thanks to collaborations with WFP and IOM, the model is also used to forecast displacement in Sudan and Somalia. The AHEAD model is being scaled to 19 countries by the end of 2027.

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